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under him.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Senate House 
Central Research Fund for their grant which enabled me to visit the 
United States. Vhile there, the staff at the National Archives, 
Washington D.C., Washington National Archives Center, Suitland and the 
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hosts in Washington, Mr. and Mrs. Baquar Hussain, were exemplary.
In London, the staff at the Public Record Office, Kew; the British 
Library of Political and Economic Science; the School and Oriental 
and African Studies Library were both efficient and co-operative. The 
many friends in London who helped are too numerous to mention, but a few 
cannot be ignored. Farrakh Mirza was always there when needed and never 
disappointed. Shahid Aslam was invaluable with his keen interest and 
uncomplaining help, even when unreasonably demanded. Haroon Mahmood,
Aamir Khalid and. Mohammed Hussain Jiwani were helpful and distracting, 
but always at the right times.
In Pakistan, thanks are due to the Foreign Ministry, Islamabad, for 
being as helpful as possible. Special thanks to Ambassadors Ameer Usman, 
Sajjad Hyder and Mujjahid Hussain.
Finally, the debt owed to my family for the help in this thesis 
cannot be exaggerated. Rarely can any research student have received so 
much back-up from his own home. My brothers and sister were on constant 
stand-by if neeeded. My mother showed by example how self-discipline in 
stud/ can be achieved and my father was the constant intellectual 
stimulation so vital in any work. Together, they provided everything I 
could possibly need; morally, financially and practically. I hope that 
this work will provide some small compensation for a long and difficult 
time in exile away from their friends, family and country.
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ABSTRACT
In August 1947, the British Raj was divided into two separate states 
of India and Pakistan. Relations between the two countries were strained 
from the very start with a dispute over the princely states, 
particularly Kashmir. Fighting started within a few months of 
independence and the dispute was referred to the United Rations.
Pakistan was a country divided by over a thousand miles into East 
and Vest wings, forming the largest Muslim state in the world, both in 
terms of population and size. It was this position which first attracted 
the attention of the United States. The Cold Var had descended on Europe 
with a vengeance and threatened to break into a 'hot war' over Korea in 
1950. The fall of China to the communists had led the American strategic 
planners to pin their hopes on India to show a non-communist example to 
the world. The Pakistan government indicated some willingness to help 
the west if it was given a security guarantee against India. It was a 
reluctance to antagonise India which prevented any military 
understanding between Pakistan and the United States.
By 1952, a new administration was in control both in America and 
Pakistan. The balance that Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of 
Pakistan had tried to keep, died with him in late 1951. The team of 
Eisenhower and Dulles were 'Cold Var Varriors' to the core, and so a 
closer understanding was inevitable. Military aid to Pakistan was 
initiated in 1954 after the Pakistan government had signed a pact with 
Turkey and a Mutual Assistance agreement with the United States. The 
role that Pakistan could play in any 'mutual assistance' was to provide 
the men to fight in any conflict in her region. After some reluctance 
Pakistan also adhered to two further pacts, the South East Asia Treaty
Organistion and the Baghdad Pact. How and why Pakistan joined these 
pacts will be looked at, with the hectic and complicted diplomatic 
shuttles between London, Washington and Karachi using British and 
American archives. The effect this had on Pakistan's foreign policy will 
be examined, with Suez as the case study.
U-
Introduction i_ E&kl5lflH and. the Vorld 
Over the first decade of Pakistan's existence, she aligned herself 
with countries both west and east. In a sense, this reflected the 
problems with which Pakistan was born on 14 August 1947 with a Vest 
Pakistan of 33 million inhabitants and an East Pakistan of 42 million 
inhabitants, surrounded by a militarily stronger India. To counteract 
this she entered into a pact with Turkey, which culminated in the 
Baghdad Pact of 1955, while to the east, she accepted membership of 
SEATO in 1954. Few states in history have been conceived in similar 
circumstances to those of Pakistan in 1947. . This thesis will not go
into the manner or justification of the event itself, only recording 
that Pakistan was created, and before the rest of the world really knew 
what had happened, the British had departed from the sub-continent, 
leaving behind the states of India and Pakistan. In a world political 
scene divided by the western capitalist and the eastern communist 
states, the creation of a state on religious grounds was thought of as 
an aberration against the trend of world politics. With hindsight, 
however, religion, particularly Islam, has become an increasingly 
important political and nationalist force.
The break-up of the British Raj and the partition of the sub­
continent caused massive upheaval and problems, not least of which was a 
feeling of great bitterness between the two successor states. 
Ironically, the British emerged in 1947 in an influential position in 
both sucessor-states, as their dislike of each other, as well as the 
need for a powerful ally, meant that the Raj was wound up with official 
popularity in both India and Pakistan. Pakistan's problems were
crippling by any standards: a country separated by over a thousand miles 
of a hostile India, an underdeveloped infrastructure, the single largest 
immigration in human history and practically no industrial base or 
technology. To make matters worse, Pakistan lacked trained and motivated 
administrators and the one figure in the country capable of leading the 
nation through such desperate times was seriously ill.
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the Quaid-E-Azam (Great Leader), to the people 
of Pakistan, was a barrister and had been a distinguished figure in sub­
continental politics since the 1920's. He had been the undisputed leader 
of the Muslim League for over ten tears when he took over as the first 
Governor General of Pakistan in August 1947. As he stood out as a giant 
in the contemporary scene, all the major decisions were referred to him 
for judgement, even though the traditional role of a Governor General in 
an independent Commonwealth state was largely ceremonial. This tradition 
of referral to the head of state in Pakistan was to have unfortunate far 
reaching consequences later when lesser personages took over the job.
The organisation of a Foreign Ministry was also far from easy. The 
ministry was allotted two residential villas in Karachi, several miles 
away from the rest of the government offices. Not only was the physical 
distance daunting, the lack of equipment made the job almost impossible. 
One British visitor to Karachi recalled how the whole of the Foreign 
Ministry had only one typewriter!(1) The Ministry was initially headed 
by Mohammed Ikramullah, a former Indian Civil Service officer. The first 
Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, served as the first 
Foreign Minister as well. It was not until December 1947 that Sir 
Zafrullah Khan was appointed to that post, and he was instantly called 
to the United Nation to present Pakistan's case on Kashmir. Pakistani
embassies were correspondingly short staffed, even in London and 
Washington, One Pakistani diplomat recalled how the first Washington 
Embassy was run on a shoe-string budget from two rooms in a Washington 
hotel, with the Ambassador drawing no salary.(2)
Kashmir
Pakistan and India were to have very little time ever to normalise 
their relationship and develop neighbourly ties. The two states were 
hardly two months old when the problem of Kashmir erupted, leaving 
relations so strained that two wars resulted as the direct outcome of 
that problem; and it has at other times again threatened to do so, right 
down to the present day. The basic problem of Kashmir was that it was 
seen as too important for either state to let go. It was seen by 
Pakistan as vital since the major rivers which flow into West Pakistan 
have their source there. The cultural, economic, physical and, above 
all, religious ties which Pakistan had with Kashmir left few people in 
any doubt in 1947 that Kashmir would join Pakistan sooner or later. The 
situation was complicated by two factors. Firstly, the Maharajah of 
Kashmir was a Hindu and had no inclination to join Pakistan, despite the 
vast Muslim majority of his subjects. Secondly, Jawaharlal Nehru, the 
Prime Minister of India, was of Kashmiri origin and had a personal 
interest in the subject. Some historians have speculated that Nehru was 
keen to see Kashmiri accession into India to disprove the theory that a 
Muslim majority state could not be a part of India. (3) The actual 
version of events leading to armed intervention by both sides has been a 
matter of great dispute.
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What is indisputable is that during September 1947, Kashmir 
witnessed an uprising against the brutal regime of the Mahara^ab. The
uprising was met with indiscriminate violence by the state trny but
large tracts of Kashmir were freed from princely rule. In other ireas,
Muslims were either .massacred or driven into Pakistan as refugees. One
respected British saiurce puts the figure dead at around tvo hmdred
thousand. <4) Many of those driven into Pakistan were ex-so.diiers and
were preparing to return once their families were safe in Punjab. On the 
night of 22 October, an armed force entered Kashmir, includiag a large 
group of Pathan tribesmen, with the intention of incorporating that 
state into Pakistan. The Pakistan government accepted no respoisibilty 
for the action, claiiming the force was guided by patriotic anc ril.gious 
fervour and had no official sanction.
Whatever the ■fcruth of this, and it seems implausible ;hct the
Pakistan government was not involved at all, the result was ;iut the 
Maharajah appealed to the Indian government for help against; the 
incursion but was told that he would have to accede to Indie before he
could receive any aid. This he did on 26 October. The accession dooument
itself was to prove another bone of legal contention. Lord Houitlatten,
the first Governor General of India, insisted in the dociment of
accession that it was only a temporary arrangement, aid tiat a
plebiscite had to be held to determine the fate of the state, once law 
and order were restated. Pakistan ever since has demanded a plebiscite 
since she is convinced, rightly or wrongly, that Kashmir would vote to 
join her. India has been notably reluctant to hold any such refe~endum 
and the arguments continue to the present day. The result of :he episode 
was that Indian troops were sent to Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir,
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and the irregular Muslims were driven back. Jinnah later sent Pakistani 
troops in to bolster their position and the eventual line of control 
left Iidi* with the Valley and the majority of the state. Pakistan was 
left with some northern agencies and about one third of the area. India 
referrei the dispute to the United Nations in January 1948, but then
lost interest as her troops established a good hold. This is still the
present position, despite wars in 1948 and 1965.
Strategic and military problems
The importance of Pakistan as a possible strategic base was not lost 
on the British. Throughout 1946, the British Chiefs of Staff and the 
sub-comni:tee of the Joint Planning Staff planned to use the air bases 
of the Ncrth Vest Frontier as a form of defence agreement with the new 
successor state. The way in which both British and American strategic 
planners identified the need for such bases as a key requirement in 
post-war strategy has recently been looked at by historians. (5) The 
significance of such bases was their proximity to Soviet cities with a 
populatioi of over 100,000. The Americans had first showed interest in 
the bases during the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in November 
1945 wlen the Secretary of State, James Byrnes, had requested American 
control of such bases in the British Empire. Ernest Bevin, the Foreign 
Secretary informed Byrnes that India was virtually a sovereign state in 
such matters. The Americans persisted in these requests throughout 1946. 
The British aim was to secure a defence agreement with both India and 
Pakistan before the independence of the two states but this was not
possible. The Chiefs of Staff still felt, however, that, if India and
Pakistan :ould be retained in the Commonwealth, the two countries could
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still be persuaded to co-operate with the west on defence matters. The 
Kashmir dispute, however, ruled out any possibilty that Pakistan and 
India could work together on defence issues but the British strategy for 
South Asia continued to work on this assumption for at least two more 
years.
The military division of the British Indian Army was to prove one of 
the most contentious issues of the whole partition process. As mentioned 
before, the British assumption was that the strategic defence of the 
sub-continent had to be taken as a whole and not as separate units. The 
British plan seems to have been to cut their political losses, accepting 
the political partition of the sub-continent, but insisting on a common 
defence authority. The ability of Pakistan to defend herself against 
Afghan aggression aided by the Soviet Union was thought to be totally 
unrealistic. The British strategic nightmare was that Vest Pakistan 
lacked the depth to maintain bases and India was seen as vulnerable if 
Pakistan was defeated and occupied. Jinnah had no abjection to same form 
of joint planning with Britain but insisted that Pakistan was to have an 
army of her own. The Indian National Congress, however, objected to any 
idea of Pakistan having her own army and so refused to enter into any 
defence talks. The division of the army was made all the more difficult 
by the fact that there were no exclusively Muslim units in the British 
Indian Army. Pakistan was eventually given one-third of the army and 
surplus military stores.(6)
The division of the military stores was to prove another bitter 
experience for Pakistan in her initial dealings with Nehru and the new 
Indian government. Instead of the promised one-third, Pakistan received 
less than half of that and what she did receive was mostly rubbish, such
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as left-footed, boots. Liaquat Ali Khan felt that the lack of stares made 
the Pakistan Army little better than 'tin soldiers'.(7) Ayub Khan, later 
to be the Commander in Chief of the Army and President of Pakistan,
recalled how 'The position was so bad that for the first few years we
could only allow five rounds of practise ammunition to each man a 
year'.(8)
This desperate economic and military situation left Pakistan with 
seemingly little choice but to seek allies. The eventual share Pakistan
received from the Reserve Bank of India was less than eighteen per cent
of the total reserves, and even this was forced on the Indian government 
by the highly embarrassing fast by Mahatma Gandhi, which among other 
things, was intended to ensure that Pakistan received a share of her 
rightful assets. To equip her defence forces,Pakistan used a large part 
of sterling reserves and foreign currency earnings, with government 
expenditure on defence in the years immediately after independence 
averaging nearly seventy per cent. (9) This implies that defence 
immediately became a top priority for Pakistan which comes to prominence 
as this thesis opens and that she felt that she had to make up for the 
military weakness by looking around for the support of friends.
II
The sheer impotence of Pakistan's defence capability, therefore, had 
been driven home in a rather brutal fashion soon after independence. 
Because of the economic and administrative problems of the new state the 
only solution seemed to be to look around for outside help. There has 
been a fierce debate in Pakistan whether the government should have 
tried to approach both superpowers instead of just relying on the west. 
It is true that the creation of Pakistan went almost unnoticed by the 
Soviet Union and there was no message of felicitations on the creation
of the new state. Stalin was reported to have remarked how primitive it
was that countries were still being established on the basis of
religion.(10) Diplomatic relations were also slow in being established. 
It was not until April 1948 that Sir Zafrullah Khan, the Foreign 
Minister of Pakistan, suggested to the Soviets that ambassadors should 
be exchanged. This initiative from Pakistan which was said to have been 
inspired by frustration with the western attitude over Kashmir.
The first Pakistan ambassador to the Soviet Union was finally sent
on the last day of 1949 but the first Soviet ambassador to Pakistan did
not arrive till March 1950. (11) It is interesting that Stalin had
equally little interest in India at that time. The sister of the Indian 
Prime Minister, Nehru, was sent as India's first ambassador to the
Soviet Union. Despite Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi Pandit's impressive 
credentials, Stalin avoided ever receiving her. (12)
The British factor in Pakistan remained significant in the early 
years after independence due to the British officers who stayed on in 
senior military, judicial and civil posts into the 1950's. The
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realisation was growing amongst Pakistani politicians, however, that 
Britain was not the power she had been before the Second Vorld Var. The 
United States had emerged by 1945 as the world's undisputed number one 
industrial, financial and military power. Washington owned two-thirds of 
the world's gold supply, one third of the world's exports and half the 
world's shipping. The army in 1948 had 12.5 million service personnel 
and a virtual monopoly on atomic weapons. It seemed to many to be the 
age of 'Pax Americana' . (13) The U.S. also enjoyed a clean record, not 
having been a colonial power and having supported the freedom movement 
on the sub-continent. It was true that few Americans had supported the 
Pakistan movement but then it was a movement which enjoyed little 
international publicity, let alone support. The Americans were quick to 
realise two important facts about the new state: firstly, that it was to 
be the largest Muslim state in the world and secondly, it occupied an 
area of important strategic value.(14) According to U.S. source 
material, the Pakistan Finance Minister from 1947 to 1951, Ghulam 
Mohammed, made a request for 'a helping hand' from the U.S. as early as 
1 September 1947. It seems from this evidence that the Pakistan 
government were committed from the start to trying to interest the 
Americans in providing help for Pakistan on an economic and military 
basis.
Fuelling the movement towards America was a desperate realisation 
that India was not prepared to play the part of a friendly neighbour and 
that Britain was unwilling and unable to do anything about it. It must 
have seemed a logical step to approach the Americans for economic aid 
for two reasons. Firstly, the British and Americans enjoyed a special 
relationship in the new world order and so the Pakistani approach to the
U.S. would not upset the British. Secondly, given the new role of
America as the defender of the 'free world' and protector of the oil 
wells of the Kiddle East, Pakistan felt that she could be a valuable 
ally. Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister from 1947 to 1951, was 
reported to have agreed with a comment from Lord Mountbatten, the last 
Governor General of British India and the first of an independent India, 
when the latter said that there were only two major forces in the world 
at that time. One was the Commonwealth grouped with America, and the
other was the communists and Pakistan should be allied with the
former. <15)
The problem for Pakistan was not only that India was a non-communist 
state but also that the Kiddle East was already under British, thereby 
western, control. Moreover, America was not in a desperate hurry, as 
Pakistan was. Throughout the whole of this thesis there are certain 
recurrent themes; the main one of which is the American and British 
desire not to antagonise India past the point of no return, always 
hoping that Uehru would see the errors of his ways and agree to co­
operate with the west. This western hope made the job of the Pakistani 
politicians and diplomats even more difficult, and in the first few 
years of Pakistan's existence she observed a position of technical 
neutrality but, in reality, was anxious to secure American help if the
right terms were offered. The choice of Pakistan's first representative 
to America also revealed the importance Pakistan attached to the post. 
Jinnah appointed one of his closest associates, M.A.H. Ispahani as 
ambassador to Washington on 8 September 1947, less than a month after 
independence. The American response was significantly slower. The first 
American Ambassador to Pakistan presented his credentials in April 1948
Ik
but returned home after just a few months due to ill health. In February 
1949, the new appointment was announced but he never took up the 
appointment as he was busy in Indonesia and ended up being the U.S. 
ambassador there! Avra Varren was eventually appointed the U.S. 
Ambassador in February 1950. (16)
Pakistan a M  the. Muslin world
Given that the ideology of Pakistan was geared to the unification 
and independence of the Muslims of the sub-continent, one might have 
expected her foreign policy to have aimed at the establishment of a 
Muslim bloc in the world. As one former Pakistani diplomat put it, 'The 
unification of a part only of the Muslims of the world under the flag of 
Pakistan was thus not viewed by the founding fathers of Pakistan as the 
culmination of their efforts but merely as a necessary milestone on the 
journey towards the ultimate goal of universal Muslim solidarity'. (17) 
This debate has been covered in depth by Pakistani historians,(18) but 
there were a number of reasons why the natural extension of such a 
policy was not translated into any positive form. The initial hurdle was 
the reaction of other Muslim states themselves.
The creation of the world's largest Muslim state, both in terms of 
population and size, provoked a mixed reaction. While most states 
welcomed Pakistan into the fold of Muslim nations, some were suspicious. 
As one scholar has phrased it, 'other Muslim states seemed to have less 
difficulty than Pakistan did... in reconciling their allegiance to 
the concept of an Islamic unity with their functioning as a nation 
state'.(19) Egypt felt threatened by Pakistan's size and did not like 
Karachi hosting a whole string of seminars on Muslim affairs. Turkey,
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which enjoyed the greatest respect in Pakistan, had tried under Kemal 
Ataturk to promote secularism and shied away from any talk of 'Islamic 
unity and brotherhood'. Afghanistan was also a disappointment for 
Pakistan. The only vote against Pakistan's admission in the United 
Nations on 30 September 1947 was that of Afghanistan, on the grounds 
that the Pathans of the North Vest Frontier wanted to join Afghanistan. 
Although the vote was later revoked, bitter feelings existed on both 
sides, with Pakistan concluding that it was surrounded on both sides by 
hostile states. Pakistan did gain some prestige in the United Nations, 
however, through the efforts of Zafrullah Khan on the Palestine 
question. Zafrullah spoke so well in the United Nations against the 
plans to create a state of Israel that he was later recognised as the 
main Muslim spokesman on that issue.(20)
Pakistan wasted little time in sending a delegation to the Muslim 
world. Sir Feroze Khan Noon, a prominent Muslim League spokesman, was 
sent by Jinnah in October 1947 to drum up support for Pakistan's stance 
on Kashmir. Noon revealed to the British Ambassador in Jordan how he was 
working for a union of Muslim states in the Middle East allied with 
Great Britain and/or the United States. Noon was remarkably perceptive 
in this as the Baghdad Pact was still not seriously thought of by 
British and American planners and was eight years away.(21)
The problem of dealing with any aspect of the contemporary history 
of Pakistan is that western powers like Britain and America have 
declassified their material and allowed researchers access to almost all 
files from the nineteen-fifties. This gives a somewhat distorted picture 
of events as the perspective gained from such papers must inevitably 
tend to be a western one. The Pakistan archives, till the time of
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writing, are not available to public use and so the crucial Pakistani 
angle is missing. The only person so far to be allowed access to 
Pakistani archives has been the former head of the Research Division of 
the Pakistan Foreign Ministry.(22) ilis account of this period is mostly 
general and uncontroversial but has a few important references and 
insights which have been incorporated where relevant. Vhat is, 
therefore, being presented in this thesis, is a reconstruction of events 
as accurately as possible, taking into account Pakistani memoirs, 
writing and interviews wherever available. Any conclusions drawn must, 
therefore, be seen as interim until the whole picture is complete, in 
which case some re-assesment will be vital. This aside, the material 
available in London and Washington is vast enough to provide a very good 
idea of what the western position and opinion was regarding Pakistan.
Vhat this thesis hopes to cover is an examination of what Pakistan 
hoped to gain by any military and political alliance with the west and 
what the west wanted from Pakistan. The slow but inexorable moves 
towards a formal agreement with the west are examined, with the constant 
diplomatic moves between Karachi, Washington and London. Although the 
Pakistani archives are unavailable, the central character in the story 
is still Pakistan, with the internal dimension being seen as directly 
relevant to foreign policy in this period, and revealing about 
Pakistan's decision making process. The fact that Pakistan did not hold 
any national election, <in fact the first real election was not held 
until 1971), makes the role of the Pakistani public rather secondary. It 
was the same small clique which dominated Pakistan from its inception 
throughout the period under discussion, swapping posts but keeping the 
policies similar. It is not enough in dealing with Pakistan's foreign
n
policy to concentrate on the actions and statements of the Foreign 
Minister. The personal factor also enters in. Certain Pakistani 
statesmen saw their relationship with Washington as essential to their 
country's destiny. Other had uppermost in their minds Pakistan's place 
in the Islamic world.
This personal factor was important because of the nature of the 
state of Pakistan. The role of the Governor General, especially in the 
time of Ghulam Mohammed and Sikander Mirza, was as significant as it had 
been since Mohammed Ali Jinnah held that office from August 1947 to 
September 1948. The role of the army could also not be neglected; and, 
while its exact weight in the Cabinet is unclear because of the present 
lack of sources available, it is fair to assume that the defence 
minister (and behind him) the Commander-in-Chief, had a considerable 
impact on policies formulated. In 1953, we even see the two posts being 
combined with Ayub Khan, becoming the Defence Minister. The unique and 
pressing defence problems of Pakistan made her foreign policy all the 
more crucial. Vhat the thesis will try to show is to what extent the 
fundamental problems were solved and at what cost.
is
CHAPTER 1 Pakistan S&els. Ses.HEl.ty 
Affler isfln interest in Pakistan
The hope that the Pakistanis had of obtaining practical American 
help began to receive a slightly more positive response at the end of 
1949. An internal report prepared by the South Asia section of the State 
Department in November 1949 illustrated a slight, but important, shift 
in the U.S. attitude towards Pakistan. The report pointed out that in 
her short history Pakistan had demonstrated a high degree of political 
stability and vitality and was estimated to be emerging as the strongest 
military power in Asia between Turkey and Japan. Her vital strategic 
position was painted out with close proximity to the Soviet heartland 
and which offered the prospect of a base closer to Russia than anywhere 
else available. Her geographic position in relative proximity to the oil 
fields of the Middle East was also pointed out. The report went on to 
say that the Pakistan army, consisting of some of the best units of the 
Second World War, was having, in effect, to shoulder the total 
responsibilty for the defence of the sub-continent against the Soviet 
Union. The heavy defence burden of Pakistan had also been compounded by 
the Kashmir dispute which added up to 'an exceptionally heavy defence 
burden'.
The report went on to recall how the Pakistan government had 
initially approached the U.S. in 1947 with a request for a five year 
loan of $510,000,000. This was seen as virtually meaning total American 
responsibilty for the defence of Pakistan and one which the U.S. had 
been unwilling to shoulder. Not only was the request refused but an 
unofficial arms embargo had been placed on the sale of military
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equipment to both India and Pakistan. This was done in the hope of 
preventing a major escalation of the Kashmir dispute but had been seen 
by Pakistan as being unfair as India had all the stockpiles from the 
Second Vorld Var and so the embargo had affected Pakistan far more. The 
episode was recognised as having caused bitterness in Pakistan; and when 
the embargo had been finally lifted in June 1949 a military mission from 
Pakistan had visited the U.S. It had presented a comprehensive list of 
Pakistan's defence requirements and it had been interpreted by the State 
Department as indicating Pakistan's willingness to be associated with 
the U.S. in long term military planning. The Americans suggested to the 
Pakistani team that they should approach private sources even though, as 
the report admitted, the Americans were well aware that they could not 
provide the type of equipment that Karachi wanted. Pakistan was
recognised as totally dependent on outside sources for her defence 
requirement|s and the U.K. was seen as unable and unwilling to fulfil 
the Pakistani requests. The report concluded that, if Pakistan was not 
assisted by the U.S., then not only could the U.S. not expect any
Pakistani support in the future but she could also force Pakistan to 
make a deal with the Soviet Union. (1)
This slight shift towards Pakistan was continued, thanks to the 
negative reaction Nehru caused on his official visit to the U.S.in
October 1949. The Americans were keen for a powerful ally in Asia after 
the victory of the communists in China, and Nehru had been regarded as 
the great anti-communist hope. But Nehru seriously disappointed his 
hosts by refusing to agree to any pact or formal military agreement with 
the U.S. President Truman spoke of his feelings about the visit with
Avra Varren, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, in February 1950. Truman
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told Varren that he had a 'disagreeable' time with Nehru and felt that 
the attitudes adopted in the Indo-Pak disputes were 'silly'. He went on 
to say that he had not been able to observe 'any inclination on the part 
of Mr. Nehru to be reasonable in the Kashmir dispute', The President 
did, on the other hand, like Zafrullah Khan and appreciated his gift of 
a copy of the Koran. Truman said that he was looking forward to 
Liaquat Ali Khan's visit and the settlement of outstanding Indo-Pakistan 
disputes. He added that, in view of 'the apparent reasonableness of the 
Pakistan attitute' he was considering the possibility of proposing to 
Liaquat that Pakistan should make some sort of concession in the Kashmir 
dispute, in return for some sort of a quid pro quo, without specifying 
what that quid pro quo might be. (2)
The. threat ol
In the early part of 1950, the British and Americans were disturbed 
by reports of a distinct possibility of war breaking out between India 
and Pakistan over mass communal rioting in both countries. The horrors 
of partition seemed to be repeating themselves as Muslims fled from Vest 
Bengal and Assam in India and Hindus fled from East Bengal in Pakistan.
Both sides naturally blamed the other for the trouble and the move to
war seemed to be irresistable, but there was little doubt that Pakistan
was in no shape for war and that Pakistan's leadership was aware of
this. On 23 February, Nehru increased tension by threatening in the 
Indian Parliament to use 'other methods' against Pakistan to force her 
to rectify her ways.(3).
The tense situation meant that the U.S. Ambassador in Karachi, Avra 
Varren, stayed in very close contact with Liaquat and was in constant
touch with other leading political figures in Pakistan, including Khwaja 
Nazimuddin, the Governor General, and Ghulam Mohammed, the Finance 
Minister. After extensive conversations with many people, including the 
U.K. High Commissioner in Karachi, L.B. Grafftey-Smith, who had recently 
returned from a tour of Dacca and Calcutta, Varren reported on 1 March 
that the numbers claimed to have been killed were 'grossly exaggerated'. 
Varren went on to say that this was mainly due to the Indian 
government's deliberately inflated figures. The press reports on both 
sides were seen by Varren as also having contributing to the inflamed 
situation. Grafftey-Smith had also raised the possibility of the Indian 
government trying to smear Liaquat while the world was focussing on the 
Kashmir hearings in the United Nations. Varren expected Liaquat, during 
the visit of the Shah of Iran, to suggest that each government should 
accept the responsibilty for protecting its minorities. The Ambassador 
regretted that he was unable to receive immediate news of Indo-Pak 
government exchanges as the organisation of the Pakistani Foreign 
Ministry was still weak, although he believed that the will to keep him 
informed did exist. <4)
Grafftey-Smith passed his impressions to his counterpart in Delhi, 
Sir Archibald Nye, on 16 March in an effort to clarify a few points. He 
found it puzzling how the commanders of the Indian army could have told 
Nye that the massive troop movements had been purely defensive while 
admitting that they could see no sign of any contemplated aggression by 
Pakistan. Secondly, Grafftey-Smith questioned how the Indian army could 
argue that its troop movements were designed to reassure public opinion 
as they were not only carried out in the utmost secrecy but were also on 
the Punjab border rather than the Bengal side where it would have been
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more plausible. He also criticised Nehru for arguing that as Pakistan 
was a self-declared Islamic state, it could not look after its Hindu 
minority: that to equate Pakistan as a Muslim country in the same way as 
Saudi Arabia was as ridiculous as to call England a Christian country in 
the same way as Spain was under the Inquisition. The High Connnisioner to 
Pakistan believed that there was little to choose between India or
Pakistan in their treatment of minorities, but for Nehru to issue
bellicose statements had only made Pakistani Hindus feel more insecure 
and increased the flow of refugees. His conclusion was that Pakistan was 
very keen to avoid another mass exchange of populations as she did not 
want forty million Muslims in exchange for fifteen million Hindus. <5)
On 18 March, the U.S. Military Attache in Karachi reported a
conversation which he had had with the top commanders in the Pakistan 
army, Generals Gracey and Cawthorn. They had discussed the possibility 
of an outbreak of hostilities between the two countries. The two
generals 'laughed at the thought that Pakistan had the remotest idea of 
going to war' , saying that there had been no movement of Pakistani 
troops even though India had concentrated almost her entire army on the 
Pakistan border. The generals went on to say that they had just returned 
from a Joint Defence Ministers' meeting where the situation had been 
discussed. All present had regretted the amounts being spent on defence 
at the cost of development and, in spite of the current situation, the 
discussion had gone into long-term planning and the possibilty of joint 
defence with India against communism. The U.S. Military Attache 
commented that this was the first time he had heard such a suggestion 
and it led him to believe that Pakistan was not seriously expecting war 
with India.
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The meeting had apparently also agreed that the U.K. should play a 
bigger role to settle the current dispute as they had recognised that 
the U.S. saw it as a Commonwealth matter. The Pakistanis had said that, 
if the western powers did not play a more positive role in settling 
disputes and giving assurances of help against Russia, the Pakistanis 
should adopt a policy of neutrality. The Attache commented that for 
Pakistan to adopt a policy of neutrality could be a very serious blow to 
the west as she had always been on the western side and the loss of her 
'fine air-fields and soldierly qualities... might be the balancing 
weight between victory or defeat at the hands of the U.S.S.R.' (6)
The British Embassy in Washington was also involved in the Anglo- 
American efforts to defuse the tense situation. On 24 March, the Embassy 
had talks with the State Department over the situation and was informed 
by the Americans that the Indians had told Loy Henderson, the U.S. 
Ambassador to Delhi, that if further massacres of Hindus in East Bengal 
took place/then Indian action was 'inevitable' and no amount of external 
pressure could stop Indian troop movements. Varren in Karachi had asked 
Liaquat to make a direct approach to Nehru but was told that he had
tried twice before but had been given the 'run-around' and was not going 
to risk that again. Henderson felt that the best approach for the U.S. 
now would be a letter direct to Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Indian Foreign 
Secretary, and pointed out that any wars in the past had been started by 
troop movements and he would be grateful if Bajpai could give him any 
information on the situation which he could pass on to the U.S.
government. The State Department approved this telegram but had felt
that troop movements did not go to the heart of the matter as the
underlying problem was communal violence. <7)
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The combined pressure of America and the Commonwealth had some 
effect when Eehru made some conciliatory statements and invited Liaquat 
Ali Khan to Delhi to discuss the situation. Eye reported on 28 March 
that he had met his American, Canadian and Australian counterparts and 
they all reported that their reception had been friendly and 'there was 
no hint of resentment at our action'. They had all been assured that the 
Indian troop movements had no aggressive intention. The western envoys 
were also reported to be relieved by Liaquat's acceptance of the 
invitation to Delhi. <8) The British even offered to send out a Cabinet 
Minister to attend the Liaquat-Eehru talks in India. Lord Addison was to 
have gone but the Indian refusal to accept him at the talks meant that 
he was ultimately not sent. Pakistan had accepted the proposal but Nehru 
said that he felt more progress would be made if the two leaders met 
face to face. The Indians also made it clear that the talks were only to 
concentrate on the minorities and Kashmir was not on the agenda.(9)
This particular Indo-Pakistan crisis finally receded when Liaquat 
Ali Khan flew to New Delhi to agree a pact on 2 April. The pact was 
finally announced to the immense relief of millions on 8 April, but 
though the negotiations still nearly broke down over the question of 
'Minority Boards'. The Pakistan government had involved the western 
powers by asking the State Department to intervene over this question 
and the U.S. Ambassador had been instructed to help. (10) The Minorities 
Agreement, as it became known, promised the minorities in both countries 
complete equality, a full sense of security and equal opportunity. (11) 
The agreement did succeed in almost halting the massive flow of refugees 
from both countries within two months, but as one journal noted, the 
flow of Muslims from India had not stopped as 'many Vest Bengalis do not
want the agreement to work* . (12) Both the Vest Bengali ministers in the 
central Indian cabinet resigned as a result of the accord and publicly 
attacked the accord. (13) The British had ruled out the use of any force 
in trying to defend Pakistan in any conflict but planned to rely on the 
use of moral force and seriously contemplated calling for a special 
Commonwealth conference to dissuade India from attacking Pakistan.(14)
On 3 April, following the Minorities Agreeement, the State 
Department drew up a Policy Statement on Pakistan outlining the basic 
objectives and realities of the American relationship with Pakistan. The 
basic objectives of U.S. policy were seen as the western orientation of 
the country, its development politically and economically, peaceful 
relations between Pakistan and her neighbours and Pakistan's voluntary 
association with the U.S. on the latter's international objectives. The 
State Department felt that, as Pakistan was dependent on external help 
for military and economic assistance, it should receive this aid from 
friendly western nations, particularly in the Commonwealth. Although the 
U.K. was not mentioned, there is little doubt that this is what the 
Department was referring to. It felt that Pakistan should understand why 
the U.S. was giving priority to the recovery of western Europe and that 
the recovery of those countries would be the best long-term hope for 
Pakistan. As far as the defence of the sub-continent went, the U.S. 
recognised that Pakistan could not shoulder the burden alone and 
believed that co-operation between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan was 
necessary to the defence of that region. It was clearly stated that any 
U.S. assistance to Pakistan would also try to bring about the objective 
of co-operation between these three states.
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The State Department policy statement recounted the story of
Pakistani attempts to obtain military supplies from the United States
and recognised that Pakistan had already started to turn to alternative
countries as the U.S. had not been able or willing to help. The 
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possibility of obtaining any bases in Pakistan was obviously not being
helped by this turn of events. Public opinion in Pakistan was seen as
initially favourable towards the U.S. but had become more sceptical due
to a number of reasons; and so the document said it was necessary to
remind Pakistan that the U.S. was 'neither pro-Indian, pro-Israel nor
anti-Muslim' . The State Department felt that as Pakistan was more likely
to be friendly towards the west if she was a member of the Commonwealth,
U.S. policy should be to try and keep U.K.-Pakistan relations friendly.
To this end, high-level talks were seen as necessary with the British to
clarify the American position.
The question of Kashmir was seen as central, not only to the
question of Indo-Pak relations, but also to Pakistan's friendship with
the U.K. and U.S. The vigorous role Pakistan tried to play in the
formation and leadership of a Muslim bloc had forced the State
Department to review the previous theory that the destiny of Pakistan
was, or should be, bound up with that of India. The Americans felt there
was enough evidence to se€~ that Pakistan was a viable state and would
/
continue to develop independently if not interfered with. The possibilty
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of a close alliance between India and Pakistan was seen as remote and 
the breach between them because of partition as being very deep. The 
manner in which India had pursued its consolidation and the Kashmir
dispute had led the State Department to comment that indicated traits
that 'in time could make India Japan's successor in Asiatic
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imperialism'. This would have meant that a strong Pakistan leading a 
Muslim bloc would become desirable to maintain a balance of power. Co­
operation, however, was still the U.S. objective as Soviet expansionism 
was seen as threatening South Asia.(15)
The. gjgit ol Liaquat ALL Khan in America 
9
After his succesful visit to New Delhi in April, Liaquat Ali Khan
A
paid a visit to Washington in May. This visit has been seen by many
Pakistani historians as being of crucial importance, not because of any 
major agreement signed during his visit, but because of the symbolic 
message it gave. Liaquat was invited to visit the Soviet Union in 1949 
and had accepted. This was seen by G.W. Choudhry, the former head of the 
Research Division of the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, as being a direct 
result of Nehru's visit to the U.S. He believed that the Soviet Union 
had noted how the British and Americans were paying far more attention 
to India than to Pakistan and the latters resentment of that fact. This
showed, Choudhry says, that the Soviet Union was quicker than the west
to realise that the 'pivot of Pakistani policy' was her relationship
with India. (16)
In the memoirs of Sajjad Hyder, a senior figure in the Pakistan 
Foreign Ministry in the fifties and sixties, he has described how 
Liaquat accepted the Russian invitation, which had come from the Soviet 
Embassy in Tehran, since no direct diplomatic relations existed between 
Karachi and Moscow. Hyder claimed that Liaquat was serious about the 
visit and had even drawn up an entourage of around twenty people and 
worked out a schedule of his trip. The invitation to Washington was said 
by Hyder to have been first suggested to Ghulam Mohammed, the Finance 
Minister who had been on a trip of America in September 1949. Hyder was
based in the Pakistan Embassy in Washington at that time and claimed 
that the feeling there was that Liaquat should visit Moscow first.
A visit to Moscow by the Pakistani Prime Minister was seen as an 
opportunity to remind the west of Pakistan's earlier commitment to stay 
neutral in the cold war; and Hyder claimed that there was after the 
announcement 'a sudden warmth in America's attitude towards Pakistan and 
its Mission in Washington after the Soviet invitation'.(17) The Pakistan 
Ambassador to Washington also seemed to agree with this view. In a 
letter to Liaquat Ali Khan on 7 September 1949, Ispahani wrote :
'Tour acceptance of the invitation to visit Moscow was a 
masterpiece in strategy... Until a few months ago, we were unable 
to obtain anything except a few sweet words from middling State 
Department officials. Ve were taken so much for granted as good
boys; boys who would not play ball with communism or flirt with the
left; boys who would starve and die rather than even talk to the 
Communists. .. we were treated as a country that did not seriously 
matter. With your acceptance of the invitation from Moscow overnight 
Pakistan began to receive the serious notice and consideration of 
the U.S. government. . . every effort is being made to rid us of the 
feeling that the U.S. is being partial to India ... efforts are now
being made to rid us of our suspicions and to impress on us that we
shall be accorded the just treatment and attention that we deserve'.
Choudhry claims that there was also a powerful clique in Pakistan 
who 'sought to sabotage any move toward Moscow'. This group was said to 
include Zafrullah Khan, Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammed, Foreign 
Secretary Ikramullah and 'other senior bureaucrats'. Choudhry claims 
that the Pakistan Ambassador to Iran was pushing hard for Liaquat to 
visit Moscow and when he was told by Ikramullah tof be^^jf careful in
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dealing^the Russians, the Ambassador had replied, 'While fear of Russia 
is still as yet a mere bogey, there are others (the western powers) who 
have let us down so often' . (18)
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No mutually acceptable date could be agreed upon by the Soviet and 
Pakistani governments and Liaquat had, therefore, indicated the urgency 
of the matter by agreeing to the Soviet request to exchange ambassadors 
before his visit. Hyder believes that Liaquat's acceptance of the 
invitation to America during the visit of George McGhee, Assistant 
Secretary of State, to Pakistan in November 1949, before the exchange of 
ambassadors with Russia had taken place, led to a change of heart on the 
part of the Soviets who did not respond to Liaquat's offer to visit 
their country in November. Hyder describes the episode as 'a pity' and 
says that the 'history of Pakistan-Soviet relations might have taken a 
different course had he,(Liaquat),not been stood up'. (19) For whatever 
reason, Liaquat never visited the Soviet Union but followed the path of 
the Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, and landed in the U.S.on 3 May 1954.
The Americans described Liaquat as a 'calm, industrious premier’ in 
an intelligence report prepared before his arrival. Although the 
Americans recognised that Liaquat could never 'achieve in the minds of 
his people the peculiar eminence of the Quaid-i-Azam' , he was still seen 
as providing very satisfactory leadership. Liaquat was seen at the time 
as 'dec idedly pro-American' and, although he had made many strong 
criticisms of former and present British policies, not as violently 
'anti-British as some of his colleagues'.(20) The intelligence report 
further stated that in regard to Russia, Liaquat tried to keep an open 
mind and was 'more wary than receptive', adding that the opinion of the 
Embassy in Karachi was that a visit by Liaquat to the U.S. S. R. under 
ordinary circumstances would not be dangerous and ' may even be an 
education for him' but warned that, if Liaquat had found that 'Pakistan
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was being sold down the river in favour of India by the U.K. and the 
U.S., he might be tempted to use the U.S.S.R. as a counter'.
His acceptance of the Russian invitation was also seen as coming 
after he had returned from a Commonwealth conference in London at which 
he had felt that Pakistan was treated badly in comparison with India and 
was being treated as a camp follower of no consequence. The Americans 
realised that opinion in Pakistan was divided over the visit of Liaquat 
to the States. Some had welcomed it enthusiastically while others had 
felt that the American attitudes towards the problems of Palestine and 
India made any close friendship between the two countries 
undesirable.(21)
On his way to the States, Liaquat stopped in London for talks with 
the British Prime Minister on 1 May. Liaquat met Clement Attlee to 
discuss the situation between India and Pakistan. Liaquat described in 
some detail the talks which he had had with Rehru on the minorities 
problem and admitted that, despite agreement on the minorities question,
until it was resolved 'all other agreements were likely to be 
infructuous'. Liaquat tried to argue that Britain had her Commonwealth 
responsibilities to see that war did not break out and that the 
Commonwealth should take some action against the aggressor. When Attlee 
asked how the aggressor in such a conflict could be determined, Liaquat 
replied that he was willing to let any international body study the 
situation and to accept their arbitration. Attlee later described 
himself as being 'much impressed' by Liaquat's 'responsible 
attitude'. (22)
he unable to make any progress on the question of Kashmir.
Liaquat told Attlee that
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Liaquat Ali Khan arrived in the United States on 3 May. Liaquat's 
public tone throughout the tour was one of trying to explain the 
arrival of Pakistan on to the world stage. His speeches were later 
published by Harvard University Press under the title, 1 Pakistan, the 
Heart of. Asia1 . Although Liaquat was given all the pomp and ceremony a
head of government is accorded on an official vist, his tour did not
A
arouse the same public interest as that of Nehru's. <23)
The danger of the Soviets making a tempting offer to Pakistan 
raised its head just as Liaquat was starting his visit to Washington. 
The Americans learnt through Henderson of a Russian offer to Pakistan of 
one thousand of the latest Soviet tanks, as many fighter aircraft as 
Pakistan could maintain and large shipments of machinery which would 
enable Pakistan to industrialise rapidly. All this equipment would have 
to be installed west of the Indus river. The Pakistan government was in 
return to be allied with the eastern bloc. Although she refused the 
offer, Henderson thought the Soviets were simply trying to tempt 
Pakistan and felt the offer was 'almost inconceivable' and 'stupid'. He 
wondered whether the story was not being deliberately circulated among 
official circles in Karachi in order to extract more help from the U.S. 
(24)
The Americans were unmoved by reports from India that the visit of 
Liaquat was proving to be a source of real worry to the government 
there, in particular to Nehru and Patel. Webb, the acting Secretary of 
State, replied on 9 May that the Americans felt it 'difficult to 
understand' Indian nervousness regarding the visit as it was planned 
months before as a visit identical to that of Pandit Nehru. Webb said
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Indian fears of Liaquat trying to purchase arms should not be surprising 
as Nehru had also tried to purchase ammunition during his visit and the 
Indian Embassy in Vashington was still trying to purchase military 
equipment. Vebb emphasised that, although there were shortages of stock,
the U.S. government had not changed its attitude of not objecting to
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commercial arms py££hasS5r but turned down flatly an Indian request to be 
kept informed of the nature of the talks which Liaquat would have in 
America as the Pakistan government had not received, or even requested, 
information during the visit of Nehru. Vebb said, however, that Indian 
fears would be kept in mind during talks with Liaquat just as Pakistani 
worries were during Nehru's. His conclusion was that Liaquat would do no 
more than lid present the viewpoint of his government, in the same way
that Nehru had presented his governments. Vebb added that the U.S. 
government had received no comments or complaints from the Pakistan 
government before or during the visit of the Indian Prime Minister. This 
was an obvious dig at the contrast to Indian behaviour as Liac^u|t's 
visit was approaching.(25)
Liaquat Ali Khan had high-level talks during his visit with the 
President, Secretary of State, Defence Secretary and senior Pentagon 
figures. Liaquat created a favourable official response as the Americans 
feared a repetition of the neutral stance taken by Nehru. Liaquat spoke 
of his country's resolve 'to throw all its weight to help in the
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maintenance of stability in Asia. Stabilty in Asia is most important not 
only for our freedom but for the maintenance of world peace' . (26) The 
contrast with India was clear for all to see and Pakistan's acceptance 
of the American doctrine a± Asian countries/ recognising' the need for 
joint responsibilty could not have failed to go down well in official
American circles. George McGhee wrote later that the Pakistani attitude 
had created a very favourable impression in America and after 'the 
wishy-washy neutralist Indians they were a breath of fresh air'.(27) 
Liaquat repeatedly hinted at Pakistan's desire to be allied in some way 
with America and it was clear to the Americans where Pakistan stood in 
the Cold War.(28)
On 20 May, Sir Oliver Franks sent a telegram to London which claimed 
that Pakistan, 'the world's largest Muslim state', had been cleared by 
the Americans for large scale arms purchases. U.S. government officials 
were said to be disposed to allow Pakistan to purchase whatever arms 
were in the country. Liaquat was said to have emphasised the stable and 
anti-communist nature of his government. Doubts were still mentioned as 
to whether the arms Pakistan wanted were available as there were heavy 
American commitments to the European military programme. Because of the 
stated American policy of equal treatment in the Indo-Pak dispute, India 
was also assumed to have obtained the same rights.(29) Within two days 
of this telegram, Franks wrote that, in talks with the State Department, 
the Americans had denied that any arms sale had been made and the 
information above was incorrect. The Department officials v$SEe, 
according to Franks to have been annoyed by the Indian attitude to 
Liaquat's visit as they had seen it as 'undignified and petty'.(30)
Liaquat was still in America, recovering from an operation after the 
official visit was over, when the Korean war erupted on 25 June. He 
declared that the Pakistan government would back the United Nations 
action 'to the fullest' and the Pakistani representative to the U.N, 
declared his government's support for the U.N. resolutions calling for 
the withdrawal of the aggressor and requesting help to this end from
other states. Although there were hints of Pakistani troops being sent 
to Korea, the only Pakistani contribution to the long conflict was 
ultimately five thousand tonnes of rice. Liaquat Ali Khan was said to 
have insisted on a promise of some tangible support from the west before 
Pakistan would commit herself fully to the western camp. According to 
S.M. Burke, a senior Pakistani diplomat, the United States was asked 
whether it would came to Pakistan's aid if it was attacked from India 
and, when the Americans refused to give any undertaking, it was deceided 
not to send any troops. (31) This has been confirmed from other sources. 
Liaquat was said to have had a divided reaction from the Cabinet on this 
issue, with Ghulam Mohammed being notably eager to comply with the 
American request for troops. He was even said to have told Liaquat to 
'govern or get out1. (32) Liaquat still refused to budge and the Pakistan 
assembly passed a resolution condemning the North Korean invasion but 
offered to send wheat rather than men. The Americans, however, did not
feel upset about the Pakistani refusal to send troops to Korea. Their
ambassador reported that the Pakistani decision was taken, not because 
of any reluctance to make a stand against Soviet imperialism, but 
because of a blockage of any progress on Kashmir. He therefore urged
the State Department to try and find a solution to that insoluble
problem. (33)
Vestern caroperation on Pakistan
On 4 May, a Top Secret formal agreement had been reached between 
British and American officials about the sub-continent. It was agreed 
that close liaison between the two states about problems of the sub­
continent showed close agreement regarding their aims and that the U.S. 
role should be to 'supplement, not to supplant, the endeavours of the 
United Kingdom'. This was because of the primary interest the U.K. had 
in the region. It was further agreed that for all future difficult 
situations, the two governments should work out a joint response in case 
of 'profitable intervention or assistance'. On Kashmir, both sides 
agreed to support the role of the U.K. as a mediator and, although it 
was seen as politically inadvisable for either country to propose 
partition, if a solution involving some form of partition were to be 
proposed, it was deceided that it would be 'considered sympathetically'. 
The other headache the Pakistan government had was the Afghan demand for 
' Pakhtoonistan’ or j independent state for the Pathans. This was one 
dispute in which the U.K. and U.S. were not afraid to voice their 
support for Pakistan. It was decqiided that the Americans should take the 
advice of the British and warn the Afghans 'of the dangers of their 
agitation about the tribal areas'.(34)
The simmering dispute between India and Pakistan throughout the 
early part of 1950 caused serious concern to the U.K. government. To see 
two of the largest populations in the Commonwealth at each others' 
throats so soon after independence was the last thing Britain wanted. 
The Americans were also concerned about the possibility of war, although 
their main fear was the possible Russian exploitation of the situation.
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On 24 July, Franks, the British Ambassador in Washington, sent a 
telegram to Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, suggesting that the 
Pakistanis had recently been trying to raise the alarm about the danger 
of Indian aggression. Franks recounted how a certain M. O.A. Baig, the 
Minister in the Pakistan Embassy in Washington and later to become 
Foreign Secretary, had called a member of the British embassy staff to 
him and proceeded to talk about the dangerous state of Indo-Pak 
relations. Baig had quoted at length from a report which had been sent 
to Liaquat while he was in America. Shortly after that conversation, 
Baig gave the British diplomat a copy of a Pakistani record of a 
conversation between Ispahani, the Pakistan Ambassador, and Dean 
Acheson, the Secretary of State on 5 July.
The main part of the conversation dealt with Indo-Pak relations but 
other subjects were also raised. One was the Indian objection to any
Pakistani arms purchases and the other was the candidature of Zafrullah
Khan for the Presidency of the U.N. General Assembly, A member of the 
British Embassy had asked the State Department if they were worried 
about the present state of the sub-continent. The Americans replied that 
they had asked their ambassadors in India and Pakistan for their 
evaluations but the report from Karachi was encouraging. Zafrullah had 
said a sincere effort was being made by the prime ministers of India and 
Pakistan to improve relations but this was not being reflected at other
levels, Franks felt that Ispahani was trying to gain American sympathy
for Pakistan in the run up to the U.N. debate on Kashmir and taking 
advantage of American annoyance at Nehru's stance over Korea.(35)
The meeting between Ispahani and Acheson on 5 July certainly took 
place along the lines outlined by Baig but the request for the meeting
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was seen by the Americans as Pakistan's response to the Indian 
ambassador's allegations that Liaquat was making some misleading 
statements regarding the division of British arms between India and 
Pakistan, Acheson was advised by the Bear Eastern section merely to go
a
through the formalities with Ispjhani and stay non-committal, (36) 
The main American pre-occupation throughout the latter half of 1950 
was, of course, Korea. As the U.B. forces faced setbacks in the Korean 
campaign, it became painfully obvious to the Americans that they lacked 
a reliable, useful ally in Asia. Of the two largest states, China was 
actively involved in an undeclared war with America by the end of the 
year, while India maintained its neutral stance and, despite arousing 
some hope in the State Department by supporting the initial U.N. action, 
Behru totally refused to send anything but an ambulance unit.(37) McGhee 
had then flown to London to urge the British to take some action over 
Kashmir which would solve the problem for ever. The main reason 
underlying the American thinking was not the negative reason for fear of 
all-out war but the hope that an end to the dispute would enable 
Pakistan and India to release troops to fight in Korea. McGhee was also 
thinking in terms of the two states joining in an Asian defence 
system. (38)
This theme was developed in an evaluation of the State Department on 
25 December. The problem was to try and predict how Pakistan's relations 
with the United States would be affected by an American conflict with 
China or Russia. A basic recognition was made that Pakistan's over­
riding fear was that of Indian domination. The Americans realised that 
they could not expect any Pakistani help in the ongoing conflict in 
Korea if it developed into a full-scale war with China. Pakistan was
expected to place her political influence on the American side and allow 
the Americans unlimited access to her raw materials. In case of a major
war with Russia, Pakistan was expected to allow her bases to be used by
the west. If the U.S. gave Pakistan firm military guar/antees, then 
Pakistan was expected to become a solid ally. Other action hoped for 
from Pakistan was the possibility of taking parallel action with the 
U.S. in regard to China and Russia as well as taking part in an Asian 
defence system and the use of her influence with the Arabs to solidify 
anti-communist feeling. It was recognised that to win firm Pakistani 
support, the Americans should take firm action on Kashmir in the U.N.
and help solve the Afghanistan problem.(39)
Varren was aware of the danger of moving too slowly. The decision to 
postpone the debate on Kashmir in the United Nations raised a storm of 
protest in Pakistan. Pakistan was to see the highest level of press 
criticism yet seen against the United Nations and the western powers. 
On 4 December, Varren pointed out the growing frustration within 
Pakistan with the lack of progress on Kashmir and said this would harm 
the position of Liaquat Ali Khan. The Ambasador said that Liaquat was 
already under attack from many quarters for his pro-west foreign policy 
and its failure to produce any positive results for Pakistan. This 
weakening domestic position, he thought, may force Liaquat to take a 
more visibly independent line. (40) Varren also said that the High 
Commissioner had asked his government to do something to streng^^en 
Liaquat's position and he wondered if the U.S. government could also do 
something, preferably in tandem with the British. Varren suggested that 
a joint statement of support during Attlee's visit to Vashington might
h n &
There was not a great deal of hope that Pakistan would join the 
western camp at this stage by helping to set up an Asian anti-communist 
bloc. The Americans felt that the Pakistanis would try to avoid
antagonising the Russians. The Americans did feel, however, that the 
Pakistanis got on better with Americans, than with the Russians or
British. The conclusion of the American analysis was that unless 
Pakistan was handled badly, she would remain in the western camp.(42)
Ike. meeting oi interests
1951 was to be crucial for Pakistan and the future direction of her
foreign policy. The first major event of the year was the appointment of
the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army. There had 
been growing speculation about this, given the important practical and 
symbolic significance of the post, and on 17 January 1951 General
Mohammed Ayub Khan took over. He had served as commander in East
Pakistan and had recently been brought back to Rawalpindi, Vest 
Pakistan. Ayub recorded in his autobiography, Friends. Mot Masters, how 
he was conscious of the significance of the event. He was honoured that 
'after nearly two hundred years a Muslim army in the sub-continent would 
have a Muslim Commander-in-Chief. <43) There is no real documentation on 
the selection decision but General Gracey definitely had a say. The 
Americans were reassured by the selection as Ayub was seen as 'pro- 
American' . (44) Few people could have guessed that this was a job he 
would hold till 1969, which would include two extensions till 1958 and
then, nearly eleven years as the President of Pakistan!
Considering his later career, it is somewhat ironic that one of his 
first statements to the army was to 'keep out of politics'. He went on
to say that the army was 'the servants of Pakistan and as such, servants 
of any party that the people put in power' (45) Whether he liked it or 
not, however, Ayub was instantly involved in national politics. Evidence 
had come to light of a plot to carry out a coup along the lines of 
Turkey in the twenties. Gracey had mentioned to Ayub on leaving his post 
that there was a 'Young Turk' element in the Pakistan army. This was to 
be known as the 'Rawalpindi Conspiracy' when, in early March, the Chief 
of the General Staff Akbar Khan, and a group of other senior officers in 
the armed forces, were arrested for plotting a coup. Akbar was one of 
the heroes to have emerged from the Kashmir conflict in 1947-8 and was 
thought to be the natural choice of Commander-in-Chief. Even Ayub 
described him as 'a brave officer who enjoyed considerable prestige in 
the army' . (46) The conspirators were thought to have had backing in the 
air force and civil service, along with several communists. Liaquat 
decided to hold a special tribunal to hear the case, which would be
heard ' in camera'. The defendents engaged a certain Hussain Shaheed 
Suhrawardy to be their defence counsel.
Suhrawardy was to remain a prominent political figure throughout the 
fif^ties, and Prime Minister for over a year. Ayub was furious at the 
line of questioning Suhrawardy followed and later said that he could not 
'forgive Suhrawardy's unnecessarily harsh and undignified cross- 
examination of the army officers'. This was to have later repercussions 
as Ayub and Suhrawardy were to become Cabinet colleagues jzs&sj: and Ayub 
felt that Suhrawardy was 'no friend of Pakistan'.(47)
The conspirators were accused of wanting to sever Pakistan's 
relations with the Commonwealth, move closer to the Soviet Union and re­
open the Kashmir campaign. The proceedings of the case are still closed
but all the fifteen defendents were found guilty and imprisoned. The 
sentences ranged from one to twelve years rigorous imprisonment but 
despite a half-hearted attempt to secure their release, there &was 
little public knowledge regarding the case. In October 1955 Sikander
Mirza quietly remitted all the sentences and all were released.(48) One
result of the episode was the fact that Ayub Khan was now the undisputed
leader of the Pakistan army, and had gained the confidence of the west
by his removal of the 'communist' element in the armed forces. This 
whole episode has been seen as evidence of how international strategic 
considerations had begun to affect the political process of 
Pakistan.(49) Army headquarters were moved to Rawalpindi as Karachi was 
a 'hotbed of intrigues' according to Ayub Khan, and the difficult task 
of restoring morale to an army which had been purged of some of its most 
popular officers began.(50)
American foreign policy took a giant step when President Truman 
presented his budget in early January^ Its main clause was to more than 
double the budget to pay for increased American military commitments 
around the world and to pay for the protection of U.S. national security 
interests worldwide, but particularly in Asia. Truman also approved the 
Rational Security Council's advice on policy towards South Asia, which
accepted that the U.S. would have take 'calculated risks' in that area.
C
One of these calulated risks was to ensure that all was done to win
K
Pakistan and India over to the side of the west in the Cold War. (51) 
Before making any firm decision on how to do this, a conference of 
American ambassadors and State Department officials, was held in Ceylon 
between 26 February and 2 March to discuss this. Varren, the Ambassador 
to Karachi, reported that Pakistan was willing to provide forces for the
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defence of the Middle East but would insist on a military guarantee 
against India. The U.S. was extremely hesitant on such a move as it 
might mean discounting India, the largest non-communist Asian power. The 
ambassadors decided that the Persian and Iraqi sector could not be 
defended without Pakistani assistance. (52) Such a decision, backed with 
the huge financial increase in American foreign military aid, was to 
signal a significant move towards Pakistan which was clear even 
then.(53)
American moves ta displace Britain
American policy on Pakistan was spelt out in a policy statement in 
early 1951. (41) The basic objective was seen to be to increase pro­
western feeling in Pakistan and to support any non-communist government 
in that country. Pakistan's manpower potential was recognised as 
important to the west at a time when Pakistan was trying to replace the 
role of the old British Indian army.
The document pointed out that the U.S. wished to avoid the 
responsibility for the economic welfare of Pakistan, while trying to 
help her to achieve some economic development. Impartiality in Indo- 
Pakistan disputes being seen as necessary, as U.S. policy was to support 
the British and Commonwealth initiatives for any settlement of the 
Kashmir dispute. It was recognised that American promises of help to 
Pakistan had always exceeded performance and improved implementation of 
promises was needed before any real objectives could be realised. Her 
policy of allowing the U.K. to play the leading role in western efforts 
to settle the Kashmir question had led to instructions to the Ambassador 
in Karachi to co-ordinate as much as he could with his British 
counterpart. Varren replied on 8 January that understanding between the
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two missions was excellent, indeed it had possibly been too close in the 
past and that, while their approach to international issues was 
independent, their recommendations were nearly always identical. Warren 
suggested that, as the Pakistanis were becoming extremely sensitive to 
any suggestion of an Anglo-American front, care should be taken to avoid 
giving that impression.(54)
The Americans were aware of Britain's high opinion of the potential 
of Pakistan's army through conversations with the British military and 
an article written by a retired British general for a British newspaper 
which received attention in Washington. (55) The main thrust of the 
article was that the nucleus for the best army in Asia was in Pakistan, 
and military aid would be better spent there than anywhere else. The 
Americans themselves were also being convinced of this: in a memorandum, 
the State Department noted that, despite the seemingly formidable 
problems facing the Pakistan military, if military equipment was 
provided with some technical expertise, then as in the last two world 
wars, the potential for an impressive and large army existed. The fact
dk
th| the British furnished military equipment first, rather than being 
inactive and leaving the area to itself, was seen as being of crucial 
importance. The limitations on Pakistan's ability to help the west were 
seen as a direct consequence of no major power being willing to take an 
active interest.(56)
The Americans were at this stage very interested in keeping Pakistan 
firmly in the western camp but were under no illusion about the 
difficulty of the task. Another State Department memorandum discussed 
the various policy-makers as well as the opinion-moulders who could be 
used by the Americans to keep Pakistan on a pro-western keel. The basic
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policy-makers were seen as inherently pro-west; and hence in little need 
of any persuasion. The press and universities were identified as the 
major influential areas where work could be done. (57) The Americans 
were become increasingly aware that, despite the obvious western 
leaning of the leaders of Pakistan, there was one issue which could yet 
persuade them to join an alliance with Russia and turn their backs on 
the west. That was the question of security against India in general, 
and Kashmir in particular. The Americans noted that the British were 
trying to extricate themselves from this seemingly hopeless knot,
thereby shifting attention back to the Security Council and the U.S. The 
Americans saw the problem of Kashmir in the wider context, not just of 
Indo-Pakistan relations , but also of it's own ability and willingness 
to accept international responsibilities. The U.N. wing in the State 
Department did not feel that the risk of offending India justified
abdicating their international responsibilities and alienating the 
entire Muslim world who were already critical of the U.S. over Israel.
The policy review specified that the U.N. should not drop the 
Kashmir question but did not go so far as to suggest that the U.S.
should now shoulder the responsibility of the initiative which the
British had previously done. The definite political benefits of allowing 
the U.K. to play the leading role were recognised and the U.S. now 
wanted to be patient and wait for Indian concessions.(58)
In April, George McGhee met his British counterparts in the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Offices to discuss a joint strategy for Pakistan and 
South Asia. He was in favour of giving Pakistan some assurances against 
the threat of India in the event of a general war. He felt it was highly 
unlikely that India would take advantage of the situation by attacking
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Pakistan. On Kashmir, McGhee felt that to placate Pakistani fears of an 
Indian fait accompli, the U.S. and U.K. governments should give Pakistan 
an assurance that they would not recognise any settlement in Kashmir 
which was brought about by the unilateral action of India. The British 
officials agreed with him that Pakistan was a vital link in the Near 
East but wanted to avoid any commitment to Pakistan which would 
antagonise India. The British felt that, if Pakistan was associated with 
the west in a defence pact, that should be sufficiently reassuring for 
her rather than demanding specific assurances.(59)
Anglo-American discussion on Pakistan continued in Washington in 
May. The Foreign Office had asked for a number of clarifications to the 
previous talks. The Americans said that, although a Foreign Service 
convention of theirs had concluded that Pakistani participation was 
highly desirable in the Middle East defence plans, there were no 
definite plans as to how this would be carried out. The meeting had 
concluded with the Americans promising to keep the British informed over 
any proposals over Pakistan.(60)
The Americans were not idle in the meantime however. They had been 
considering ways of trying to persuade Pakistan to join an Asian defence 
system. An official South Asia Regional conference had recommended that 
'the U.S. should encourage Pakistan's participation in problems common 
to the Middle East and its orientation towards Turkey. In addition, the 
U.S. should consult more carefully with the Government of Pakistan on 
questions of common interest in the Middle East'. (61) The Americans 
also recognised that a great deal of tact and patience would be needed 
to achieve their objectives. The main problem which the State Department 
saw in their strategy of building Pakistan up, was that countries like
Egypt and Turkey would resent any attempt by Pakistan to assume 
leadership of the Muslim world. The Americans felt that the first 
positive steps they could safely take was to provide some experts for an 
Islamic Economic Conference and to assist in the setting up of an 
Islamic university. Pakistan was also to be kept informed of U.S. plans 
for economic and military assistance to the Middle East.(62)
It is interesting to note that none of these proposals seems to have 
conveyed to the British. This could be because of two possible reasons: 
firstly, the U.S. had not firmly thought out its own course of action as 
well as being unsure of the Pakistani response and had decided to wait 
until something definite was agreed upon before telling the British. The 
other, seemingly more likely, explanation, is that the U.S. had decided 
that Pakistan and the Near East was too important an area to be left 
entirely to the British and were now determined to play a solo role to 
secure American interests. In answering a query from the State 
Department, Varren certainly favoured an independent role for the U.S.
was becoming more and more necessary to play an independent role in 
Pakistan, as the British were showing themselves to be increaingly less 
willing to play the leadiing role in South Asia. He recommended that the
abandoned. Varren went on to say, however, that British co-operation was 
still a desirable objective as British prestige still remained high in 
Pakistan and it was desirable to uphold the global understanding which 
existed between the two western powers. Varren concluded that regular 
exchanges of information still continued and relations between the two 
missions were excellent.(63)
that the composite thinking within his Embassy was that it
old idea of letting Britain play the should now be
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Ihg. assassination of. Liaquat LLL Khan *
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Liaquat Ali Khan, had remained in the shadowy the Quaid-e-Azam, 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, almost all his active political life and had first 
come in to his own after the death of Jinnah on 11 September 1948. He 
was widely respected at home and abroad but it was becoming obvious, 
however, from late 1950 that his position was under growing threat.
There were a number of reasons for this, but the failure of his
government to achieve anything positive on Kashmir, either in the United 
Nations or in direct talks with India, was a major factor. The 
consistently high defence expenditure made development expenditure low 
even by Asian standards, and the fact that he/from a part of central 
India made Liaquat without a natural constituency, and j feel an 
outsider. <64) Members of his Cabinet were growing restless and a British 
historian with high level contacts in Pakistan believed that they were
'too ambitious to accept his sensible, selfless advice'.(65) Even if
this was a somewhat partial view, there is little doubt that Liaquat was 
facing a restless and increasingly uncontrollable Cabinet. Ayub Khan 
later recalled that Liaquat had started to look 'too slow to regain the
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initiative'. His eye-sight was deteriorating a n d j was surrounded by 
people who were 'slow and indecisive'.(66)
Apart from Kashmir, Liaquat had to contend with a public upsurge of 
popular Muslim nationalism, exemplified by the events in Egypt and Iran. 
In Iran, a dispute between the British oil companies and the nationalist 
leader, Mossadeq, caught the Pakistani public imagination. In Egypt, the 
government had enforced the blockade of ships bound for Israel and 
refused to re-negotiate an old treaty which gave the British the right
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to station troops there. Liaquat publicly declared his support for the 
nationalists and there has been specualtion that Liaquat was going to
capitalise an this sudden crest of popularity by removing s o u k  lis
critics in the Cabinet. (67)
In July, Liaquat addressed a huge crowd in Karachi in a 'Defence
Day' rally called in response to Indian troops ma^ssing on the Punjab
border. Liaquat told the crowd that he was not willing to throw away the 
freedom which Pakistan had won so dearly and pleaded with the nation to 
remain united, preferably behind him. Liaquat then made his famous 
gesture of leaning out of the window and holding up a clenched fist, 
declaring that to be the new symbol for Pakistan. This posture was 
maintained for nearly three minutes while the crowd burst into shouts of 
'Pakistan Zindabad'(Long live Pakistan). (68) There seemed then to be a 
real possibility of war with India, and Ayub later admitted that Liaquat 
had told him that he was fed up with the situation and wanted to fight 
it out with India. Ayub said it was not only the politicians but also 
the troops who wanted to 'settle accounts', but it was his 'job to hold 
them back', which he did. (69)
Although the 'triumvirate' of Ghulam Mohammed, Ayub Khan and 
Sikander Mirza wanted Liaquat to ignore the public mood and co-operate
with the west in the Middle East, the Prime Minister had something else
in mind. There is evidence to suggest that Liaquat instructed the
joint Pakistan-Egyptian-Iranian policy in the Middle East. (70) Liaquat 
was now far more critical of the western attitude over Kashmir and noted 
sarcastically that Pakistan saw how 'action happens in short order where 
the Americans are concerned'.(71) Varren approached Liaquat on 12
Pakistan Ambassador in Iran to discuss with Mossadeq the of a
October on the question of Pakistan's contribution to Middle East 
defence and reported that Liaquat was 'cagey' and most reluctant to
commit himself in any way. Liaquat told Varren that he was not as 
concerned with the Middle East as he was with Kashmir and he hoped that 
the United Nations would, at last, propose something concrete by 15 
October.(71) Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated just four days later.
On 16 October 1951, Liaquat was to address a Muslim League meeting 
in Rawalpindi. There were rumours that Liaquat was due to make a very 
important statement but, before he even started, a man near the front
stood up and fired point blank into the Prime Minister. Liaquat
collapsed and died, but more shots rang out killing the assassin, and
Akbar, an Afghan national, on the pay-roll of the Pakistan government.
Conspiracy theories abound as to the motive of the killing. Few 
believe that Akbar was acting without any instructions from anyone and 
many have pointed the finger at members of the government itself. There 
is no evidence directly pointing to anyone in the Cabinet; but the fact 
that Akbar was on the government pay-roll has been seen as significant. 
Vhether anyone was involved or not, the removal of Liaquat from the 
scene certainly benefit|ed almost all the Cabinet. The lack of 
investigation after the murder and the claims that Liaquat was about to 
purge his Cabinet, all added to the suspicions. The British government 
has also been seen as a possible culprit as it is rumoured that Liaquat 
was taking Pakistan too far away from the Commonwealth into the arms of 
America. The United States has not escaped accusation that it killed 
Liaquat to prevent him from forming an independent Muslim alliance in 
the Middle East. The Indians were seen as relieved that Liaquat had died
all hope of tracing the was identified as Saeed
so
just when war fever between the two neighbours had reached another high 
point. Whatever the truth, and it has to be said that no serious attempt 
was made to find it, Liaquat's death marked a turning point in 
Pakistan's history. The last national politician of standing had been 
removed and the new men to take over were not accountable to anyone and 
the democratic process in Pakistan slowly ground to a shacade.
Ayub Khan was in London when the event took place and on his return 
professed himself shocked at the attitude of Cabinet Ministers. He 
recalled that 'not one of them mentioned Liaquat Ali Khan's name, nor 
did I hear a word of sympathy or regret from them. . . it seemed that every
one of them had got himself promoted in one way or another' . (72) In a
biz^i?e move, the Governor General Khwaja Uazimuddin, who had taken over 
the post after the death of Jinnah in September 1948, stepped down to 
become Prime Minister. Ghulam Mohammed, the Finance Minister, became the
new Governor General and it was obvious to all political observers where
the real power now lay, despite the technically ceremonial role of the 
Governor General.
Among the many strange incidents fallowing the assassination is the 
fact that a letter written by him on 25 August 1951 surfaced in 
Washington on 18 October that year. The letter was to Dean Acheson, the 
Secretary of State, and was a request for America 1a&=££ to supply 
Pakistan with new weapons. The request was not a plea for aid as Liaquat 
pointed out that 'financial arrangements have been made by my 
government' . (73) A copy of this letter was also sent to Britain, who
regretted their inability to help. Both these letters were hand 
delivered by a figure who was to play an important role in Pakistan's 
foreign affairs over the next few years, Mohammed Ikramullah. Ikramullah
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at the time was the Foreign Secretary in Pakistan, and had accompanied 
Liaquat on his visit to the States in 1950. He was described after that 
visit as being ' thoroughly westernised. Ikramullah is. . friendly 
towards Americans.. he seems to prefer to associate with Americans and 
British rather than his own compatriots'.(74) In other words, Ikramullah 
was exactly the sort of Pakistani the Americans liked to deal with.
Anglo-Pakistani relations took another turn for the worse in autumn. 
The Deputy British High Commissioner in Lahore visited the British 
officers stationed in Sialkot. He said that the British and Americans 
were agreed upon the need never to antagonise India and, in the event of 
an Indo-Pak war, all British personnel would be withdrawn. Vhen a 
British officer had inquired whether officers would be allowed to assist 
Pakistan in a personal capacity, he was told that this would not be 
permitted, but that British officers could volunteer to join any U.N. 
forces which might be sent to the area to restore peace. This 
conversation, with all its potential implications, reached the ears of 
the Defence Secretary, Sikander Mirza.
Mirza asked Ambassador Varren to find out from the British whether 
the story was true. Varren raised the subject at the next regular weekly 
meeting he had with his recently arrived British colleague, Sir Gilbert 
Laithwaite. Laithwaite appeared to be completely confused by the 
incident as he said that he was unaware of the meeting altogether, let 
alone the nature of the conversation which took place. Laithwaite 
admitted, however, that he had received a top secret message the night 
before to the effect that, in the event of war, all British personnel 
were to be withdrawn. Laithwaite believed that this decision had come 
about as a result of Indian pressure. Varren pointed out to the State
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Department that there were about ninety British personnel in India and 
one hundred and forty-three in Pakistan. The Pakistan Air Force was seen 
as particularly reliant on British help. Laithwaite said he thought that 
the decision was both premature and vague.
Varren informed Mirza that, to the best of his knowledge, the 
account of the meeting was untrue. Mirza then gave Varren a transcript 
of the conversation of the meeting, which seemed incontrovertible. 
Varren met again Laithwaite and told him that Mirza's story seemed to be 
true. Laithwaite said Jaspar, the Deputy High Commissioner, was 
obviously the culprit and Varren should be aware of the immense 
embarrassment he had caused the High Commission on a number of occasions *
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And- was now due to be transferred. Varren commented to Vashington that 
this whole incident was an unfortunate start for Laithwaite as the 
Indians would probably leak the new decision to the press and the 
Pakistan government would be furious.(75)
American moves to. secure Pakistan's alignment
The Americans had by now decided to take a more aggressive role in 
trying to push Pakistan into accepting some form of a military alliance, 
such as a mutual security programme. Varren said he had spoken to 
Liaquat about it before his fateful trip to Rawalpindi and he had 
promised to give an early answer. Varren then waited until the period of 
official mourning for Liaquat was over before raising the matter with 
Ghulam Mohammed. Varren had also raised the question with the new 
Foreign Secretary, Mirza Osman Ali Baig.(76)
The British slowly began to realise that all was not well with the 
earlier pact with the Americans over the sub-conti nent^|^l. On 23 
October, Laithwaite reported to the Commonwealth Relations Office that
his 'usually very forthcoming' United States colleague had not kept him 
informed of American moves to involve Pakistan in a Middle East defence 
pact. Varren had told Laithwaite that he had tried to persuade Liaquat 
on 12 October but Liaquat was reported to have shown only a general 
interest and had been reluctant to commit himself in any way, as he 
wanted some sort of guarantee over Kashmir.
Laithwaite reported that he met Zafrullah and 'threw out a fly at 
him' but he had not risen to the bait and had said the important thing 
now was for the new government to settle down. Nazimuddin was asked by 
Reuter^ around this time about his views on Middle Eastern defence and 
had also given a non-commital reply. Laithwaite declared that his own 
impression was that,the Pakistanis were not actively interested in the 
Middle East at that time and any interest which did exist was designed 
to secure supplies of equipment and training. This would give Pakistan a 
greater negotiating hand over Kashmir and there was no serious risk of
r
discouraging them if the matter was not immediately taken futher. Varren
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had agreed that timing was the important thing now and he declared 
himself to be firmly to be against a four-power delegation. The four- 
power idea was that Turkey, the U.S., Britain and France should send a 
delegation to Pakistan to ask them to join a Middle East military 
pact.(77)
On 6 November, Donald Kennedy of the South Asia desk at the State 
Department, asked members of the British Embassy in Vashington to meet 
him to discuss the two countries joint approach to Pakistan and the 
Middle East and to give the State Department's views on what the next 
steps should be. The main agreement between the two countries was that 
an early approach to Pakistan to join any military pact would depend on
the reaction of India. The Americans openly said that they attached less 
importance to the Indian reaction than the British did and more weight 
to the importance of having Pakistan in the command. The Americans also 
felt that the British gave too much importance to long-term 
considerations, as the current situation was serious enough to demand
immediate action and a western build-up of influence and defence. The
State Department, therefore, were formally requesting the British to re­
think their attitude to Pakistan's membership and wanted an immediate 
joint approach to Pakistan 'to ask them to join the Kiddle East Command 
and to agree to provide farces for the defence af the Middle East in the 
event of war' . If the British felt it was desirable, then the Americans 
were willing to make an-identical offer to India.
Kennedy said that he assumed from previous discussions with British 
officials that the main reason for British hesitancy over Pakistan's 
membership of a defence pact would be the Indian reaction. He felt that
progress should not be held up for that reason as there was, in his
opinion, very little hope from India beyond neutrality and the 
government of India should be able to realise that Pakistan had 
different and legitimate interests in the Middle East. If the Indians 
were also given an equal opportunity to participate, then they would 
have no justifiable cause for complaint. The British agreed that it was 
highly unlikely that the Indians would ever agree to join the pact 
themselves but said that if Pakistan was involved without due 
consideration to Indian feeling, then great damage might be caused. The 
British line was that Indian reactions might be so strong ^  as to undo 
all the efforts t h ^ t h e  west had put in to India to 'bring about a more 
realistic view on international questions'. These efforts were believed
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to^at least achievgg£ a benevolent neutrality. As far as Indo-Pak
relations were concerned, the British believed that the Indians might
well show their anger with Pakistan on the Kashmir question and take a
harder line if Pakistan was /join the Command. Public opinion in India
might also assume that Pakistani membership of the pact had ensured
It
western military support for Pakistan^ lead to bitter anti-
Pakistani feeling in India,
The discussion moved to Pakistan's possible effectiveness in the 
proposed organisation. Kennedy argued that the requirement from Pakistan 
would be a commitment to provide forces, not immediately, but in the 
event of a general war. The American generals who had visited Pakistan 
had spoken highly of the quality of her armed forces. Pakistan would 
receive equipment in return from the U.S., which would have to be paid 
for. Pakistan was seen as being in a valuable strategic position and, as 
India would not take advantage of a general war to declare war on 
Pakistan, she would be able to reduce her internal forces considerably 
and have forces available for the Kiddle East. The British again pointed 
out the dangers of the intensification of the existing 'cold war' 
between India and Pakistan and said it could undo many of the advantages 
expected from Pakistan's membership.
Kennedy did agree with the British that it was likely that Pakistan 
would lay down certain conditions but the west was not obliged to accept 
those conditions and the Americans saw no harm in ascertaining them. 
Kashmir was specifically mentioned as an unacceptable condition. Kennedy 
mentioned that an indication of Pakistan's eagerness to co-operate was 
shown when Ghulam Mohammed had wanted to go to Tehran to meet a State 
Department official while he had been there but had been /44ssuaded not
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to. Kennedy had also mentioned remarks made by a Mr. Baig on the 
question of the possible Pakistani reaction if they felt they were being 
ignored by the west. An invitation to Pakistan to join the Command would 
show her that the west was serious. Kennedy suggested it was equally 
possible that Pakistani dissatisfaction with the west might be increased 
if they were asked to join a western sponsored defence pact without any 
support on the thing which mattered most to Pakistan; Kashmir. In 
conclusion, Kennedy said that he appreciated that both Pakistan and 
India were members of the Commonwealth, and the State Department did not
want to put any undue pressure on Britain, but as it was the considered
'H\JL ojfrf
opinion in the State Department that{ an early approach to Pakistan 
outweighed the disadvantages, he hoped the British would reconsider 
their attitude. <78)
The conversation of M. 0. A. Baig which had been drawn to the 
attention of both the British and Americans, was with the Turkish 
Ambassador in Washington. The latter had informed the British that Baig 
had told him that now that he,j (Baig)J had faxf been appointed Foreign 
Secretary in Pakistan, there was going to be a change in Pakistan's 
foreign policy. Baig said the Pakistan government had seen the 
advantages of a 'policy of blackmail in international affairs'. In the 
light of this, Pakistan was going to move closer to Russia as a means of 
pressurizing the west. Baig declared that Pakistan was 'fed up' with the 
western attitude to Pakistan and had little hope of any gain in the 
relationships with these countries under the present circumstances.(79)
Baig continued this line of argument in Pakistan on taking up his
£
post of Foreign Secretary. It may be intersting to note that Baig had
A.
been in the Pakistan Embassy in Washington and e£p<j[ was chosen by Liaquat
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to take up the job of Foreign Secretary. Laithwaite reported that Baig 
told Varren on 11 November that there was nothing for Pakistan to look 
for from the west and that a tougher line would now be appropriate for 
Pakistan. Varren hoped that Baig was not taking himself too seriously 
and asked Laithwaite for his views. Laithwaite replied that he was aware 
of similar comments from him while in America but had not attached too 
much importance to them. Baig, he felt, was very new to his post and was 
trying to use a new broom. Laithwaite added to the Commonwealth 
Relations Office that he intended to keep a closer eye on Baig and said 
that Baig was mistaken in trying to use tough tactics with the west as 
Britain was playing a firm role in Egypt and, as western support was 
crucial over Kashmir. <80)
On 26 November, the Commonwealth Relations Office prepared a 
memorandum on Indo-Pakistan relations. It started out by recognising 
that Kashmir lay at the heart of the strained relationship between the 
two countries and, without any settlement of that dispute, any hope of 
improving relations was futile. It felt that Nehru's attitude lay at the 
heart of the Kashmir dispute as he had a sentimental attachment to
which allowed no Indian minister any say in the dispute. The 
policy of the U.K. was reported as being one of supporting the principle 
of the plebiscite held under U.N. auspices but trying to avoid taking 
positions which would antagonise either side. The British felt, however, 
that the maximum pressure of world opinion should be exerted on India to 
force her to compromise. The U.S. policy was noted as one which looked 
to the U.K. and the Commonwealth to take a lead in the Security Council. 
The Americans, however, were seen as starting to lose patience with 
India and were pressing Britain to condemm the Indian attitude. This was
seen by the Commonwealth Relations Office as consistent with the latest 
American policy of writing off India as a potential ally of the west,
out, but it was seen as possible that America ;tart to lean heavily
towards Pakistan. <81)
On 16 November, Ikramullah met Kennedy and Metcalf in the State 
Department. The Americans pressed Ikramullah on Pakistan's attitude to 
the question of Middle Eastern defence. Ikramullah replied that he did 
not know what the attitude of his government was to this question and he 
did not know enough about the topic to give his own opinion. He asked 
the Americans to supply him with as much data as possible so he show his 
government. <82) It is highly unlikely that the Americans gave him a copy 
of a report on U. S. -Pakistan relations which had been written earlier 
that year. The report had noted that Pakistan's insecurity had led it to 
be more western orientated and went on to say that Pakistan's problems 
with its two main neighbours, India and Russia, had led Pakistan to look 
more to the Middle East for security and allies. This was seen as very 
encouraging for the west as Pakistan and the west had a common interest 
in trying to curb Russian influence in the area. <83)
In January 1952, the State Department wrote an intelligence report
frequently disappointed by the lack of American support in its disputes 
with India. This was described, however, as a temporary setback in a 
relationship which was seen to be improving all the time. Pakistani 
officials were described as playing down the areas of differences
the support of the other Asian countries. Thi
had not lerfd to any major divergence of views, the memorandum pointed
on Pakistan's foreign policy which pointed out that Pakistan was
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between the two states and as being keen on developing close ties with 
the U.S. (84)
The death of Liaquat was recorded in the next quarterly survey in 
February, of Pak-U.S. relations, as having a sobering effect on 
Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan and India. Pakistan's role as a 
moderator in the Muslim world was noted appreciatively. The decision to
but Pakistan was seen to be reluctant to sign any mutual security
programme, partly because of Pakistani anger over a large amount of aid
being granted to India and, partly because of the sheer indecision
following the death of Liaquat. The report described Liaquat as 'a
staunch friend' but foresaw no fundamental change in direction following 
his death. The moderate approach of Pakistan at Islamic conferences was
regarded as very helpful as 'moderation in the Muslim world was at a 
premium' . (85)
n.ews on Pakistan's tale, in the. Middle East
A split in Anglo-American co-operation over Pakistan became obvious
in March 1952, when an American decision to sell aircraft to Pakistan 
was withheld^ from the British. (86) The discussion about the possible 
role of Pakistan in a Middle East defence plan was becoming an 
international one. The idea that Pakistan should become responsible for 
the eastern side of Central Asia, while Turkey was responsible for the 
western side, was one on which the Americans and some Pakistanis were 
very keen. The Turkish Foreign Minister was not too convinced in 1952 
about the viability of such a scheme but Ambassador Varren in Karachi 
strongly favoured it. Varren argued that Pakistan had not only accepted 
but had actively sought political responsibilities in the Middle East.
sell having a good positive effect
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He cited as examples the way Pakistan had played a moderating role in 
the Iranian oil crisis, as well as disputes in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Libya and Eritrea. He believed that Pakistanis saw themselves as part of 
the Middle East and recognised the need for social and economic reforms 
and the current power vacuum and disorganisation. The Ambassador went on 
to say that he believed Pakistan's leadership was aware of the basic 
threat of communism and intended to do all it could to meet that threat. 
Varren wrote that Liaquat had told him that, once Pakistan's own 
frontiers were secure, she was willing to accept joint responsibility 
with Turkey for the security of Iran. He had no reason to believe that 
the current leadership had deviated from this stance at all. The major 
problem Pakistan felt in the security of her own frontiers, which 
Liaquat had mentioned, was obviously Kashmir. Varren believed that, 
despite this pre-occupation, Pakistan's perspective on the region had 
not been distorted or lost. It was clear, he argued, that, until 
progress was made on the Indian side, Pakistan could not be expected to 
assume any military responsibilities elsewhere. The old argument that 
Pakistan had inherited the former British responsibility for keeping the 
Russian bear at arms length was again mentioned and believed still to be 
the case. <87)
On 20 March 1952, the Foreign Office reported in detail to the 
Vashington Embassy on the talks British officials had been having with 
representatives of the State Department. Olver of the Foreign Office, 
commenting on the American view of Britain's attitude towards Pakistan, 
said it was untrue that the U.K. was coldly ignoring Pakistan's 'offers' 
to help in the defence of the Middle East. To correct this view he 
pointed out that as a result of a recommendation by the Commonwealth
Prime Ministers' meeting in October 1948, the British had offered to 
hold defence talks with Pakistan in April 1949. After some 
correspondence with Liaquat, the British proposal was turned down. The 
reason for this was that the British were unwilling to discuss 'local', 
ie Indian, threats to Pakistan and the problems of a world war. Towards 
the end of 1950, the British had again put out feelers to Pakistan but 
these were also rejected by Pakistan. When Liaquat was in London in 
1951, the British Defence Chiefs had explained the British Middle 
Eastern position to him and expressed the hope that it would be possible 
for Pakistan to play a part. Liaquat had told the Defence Minister, 
Shinwell, that he recognised the inherent dangers for Pakistan in such a 
plan. Liaquat was reported to have felt that 'it would be easy to raise 
Pakistan divisions - but he could do nothing until Kashmir was solved'. 
On 30 August 1951, the Under-Secretary, Gordon Valker had told Zafrullah 
Khan that the British were prepared to sit down and discuss with 
Pakistan, the strategy in the Middle East and his country's possible 
contribution.
Those incidents were cited by Olver as being the main ones, but he 
said there had been numerous other conversations at all levels with 
Pakistani officials. In other words, he felt that there was no 
justification for American fears that Pakistani authorities might doubt 
whether the British would be glad of Pakistan's participation in the 
defence of the Middle East. On the question of the Indian angle, Olver 
wrote that it was not really a case of what the British or Americans 
felt, but that Pakistan was obsessed with the fear of India which was 
the key to her military assistance in the Middle East; the main British 
reason for not wanting to approach Pakistan at the present time was that
i*2
negotiations on Kashmir were at a critical juncture. On doubts about 
Pakistan showing a willingness to participate in a defence plan only to 
obtain more arms against India, Olver commented that the American view 
that Pakistan was willing to pay for any arms supplies did not prove 
anything, as Pakistan had always shown a willingness to pay for arms but 
was always frustrated by having a low priority, and so not receiving the 
arms. The British did not accept that improved Indo-American relations 
had led to ' restiveness' in Pakistan and stressed that the British 
policy remained one of trying to maintain a parity in arms supplies 
between Indiajf and Pakistan . (88)
On 5 April 1952, Eric George Norris in the U.K. High Commission in 
Pakistan^ wrote to the Commonwealth Relations Office with his assesment 
of Pakistan's attitude to the problems in the Kiddle East and Arab
world. The military authorities in Pakistan were described as being far
ahead of their government in their interest in the defence and security 
of the Middle East; and whatever Pakistani politicians said in public, 
they were well aware of the potential threat to that region and
appreciated the western desire to bolster up the region's ability for 
self-defence. Norris believed that, if the Pakistan government could 
help, it would be prepared to help in return for some quid pro quo, such 
as arms and training but, in spite of hints from senior Pakistani
officials, there was no real indication that Pakistan was willing to 
play an active role. Norris pointed out that some of the Arab states 
might not be too keen an Pakistani participation at all as the Pakistan 
government tended to see themselves as the natural leaders of the Muslim 
world. Pakistan was seen as far more moderate than Iran or Egypt but was 
still supportive of Muslims in any conflict with outsiders. (89) It was
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certainly true that the Pakistan Foreign Ministry was sensitive to any 
suggestion that it was failing to follow a 'Muslim foreign policy'. On 3 
June, the Karachi High Commission reported how Zafrullah had defended 
himself against an article in the 'Economist' which claimed that 
Pakistan was veering towards the west and against the Muslim states. 
Zafrullah called a full press conference to deny this allegation and the 
British saw it as significant that he had had to resort to 'artillery to 
scotch a fly' . It was believed to show Pakistani sensitivity to the 
charge, as well as Zafrullah's own weakening position in the 
government.(90)
Ambassador Varren in Karachi felt so strongly about the State 
Department's apparent mishandling of Pakistan that he requested a period 
of consultation in Washington, so the U.S. could re-examine its policy 
towards South Asia. Varren had been particularly concerned about the way 
in which the U.S. was seemingly leaning towards India in the Kashmir 
question by taking no action. He was convinced that, if this perception 
continued in Pakistan, it would lead to increased sensitivity and 
possible unfriendliness. Varren was also concerned about the lack of 
food aid which Pakistan was receiving from America, as Russia was making 
far more attractive offers to Pakistan. Varren was certainly correct in 
his perception that the Pakistan government was growing increasingly 
concerned about the lack of any sign of real positive help from America. 
In June, the Prime Minister, Nazimuddin, had written to Dean Acheson:
'...I must confess a growing sense of insecurity is 
spreading over the minds of the people of this country. . .
The Government of Pakistan feels it is a matter of vital 
importance both for the present and future to restore full 
confidence and self-reliance among the people as they may 
have to play an important role in the future strategy of 
this region of the world'. <91)
Nazimuddin was obviously attempting a subtle bint at the need for 
increased U.S. help in the military sphere if it wanted Pakistan's co­
operation in any plans for Asia.
A review of Pak-U.S. relations in October stated that relations had 
remained much the same as before, as 'the Cabinet was unable to define 
specifically its attitude towards the west in general and the U.S. in 
particular' . The review noted that the Pakistanis had willingly co­
operated at the San Francisco Peace Conference in September 1951 and had 
supported the American line over ^  the Japanese treaty but on issues
closer to home had adopted a rather cynical wait-and-see attitude. An
example of this was ^  Pakistan's determination to place a time limit on 
the U.N.'s negotiations on Kashmir before trying other tactics. Anglo- 
Pakistan relations were seen as remaining steady in this period; but 
Pakistani hopes of playing an influential role in the Middle East had 
received a setback as Turkey had refused to attend a proposed conference 
of Muslim Prime Ministers. The U.S. hoped this would teach the 
Pakistanis that 'it is not profitable not to place undue emphasis on 
Islam in their dealings with some of their Muslim neighbours.'<60)
On 18 June 1952, the Secretary of the British Staffs Committee, V.V.
Smith, wrote a Top Secret memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff Committee
for their views on the position of Pakistan in any Middle East defence 
organisation (MEDO). The British position on Pakistan and the Middle 
East defence plan was then outlined by the Commonwealth Relations Office 
and is important enough to be quoted at length. It started by saying 
that the possibility of Pakistan's participation had been discussed in 
depth in 1951 and the conclusion was that, although Pakistan was a 
desirable member in the long-term, no useful short-term purpose would be
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served by her membership. The reason for this was that Pakistan could 
not make a useful contribution for the time being and the severe Indian 
reaction could be dangerous for the west. A review of that position was 
seen as desirable as MEDO was shaping up into a realistic possibility.
The previous proposal behind setting up MEDO was to invite selected 
Arab states who could make a useful strategic or military contribution. 
The new proposal was to invite all Arab states and, under this system it 
seemed difficult not to invite Pakistan, without running the risk of her 
feeling snubbed. Any adverse Pakistani reaction would be directed at the 
U.K. as the U.S. had favoured Pakistani participation from the 
beginning. The sticking point over Pakistan's membership seemed also to 
be her desire to see as members Iraq and Egypt, neither of which figured 
on the British list of invitees.
On balance, however, it seemed to the British government a better 
idea to invite Pakistan in 1952 than in 1951 but there was a 
possibility of Pakistan herself turning down an offer to join. The 
reason for this could be that Pakistan seemed unwilling to offer bases 
to the western allies or to station troops in the Middle East and 
Pakistan's response was seen as depending on the Arab reaction to the 
proposals. The British line was now to invite Pakistan to join without 
urging her to do so, while making it clear that the Kashmir issue would 
be harder to resolve, and Pakistan 'ought to have her eyes open'.
A Top Secret appendix whs added to give the views of the Chiefs of 
Staff. Their view was that a contribution of raw manpower to the Middle 
East would be of no value but a Pakistani offer to station troops in the 
Middle East or send troops there in the event of war would be useful. 
The British would then be prepared to give training equipment in 1952
and mobilisation equipment in 1955. From a military perspective it would 
be beneficial to have Pakistan’s participation but it was unlikely that
r
Pakistan could make any contibution with the state of her relations with
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India. The C.R.O. had agreed with the Chiefs of Staff that the Kashmir 
situation made any early Pakistani contribution impossible. The 
participation of Pakistan was described as a 'long-term object of policy 
for the United Kingdom government' . A fundamental problem was also seen 
as India's ability to make any Pakistani contribution impossible. 
Pakistan had hinted in the past that before any firm commitment could be 
made, certain guarantees against India would be needed. This was 
described as 'an impossibility' by the British. In a covering letter he 
had received from the Commonwealth Relations Office, Smith quoted them 
as saying that 'If it is firm policy to bring in all Middle East Muisjim 
countries into MEDO, then Pakistan could not be left out of the 
invitation list'.
The British conclusion was that the first important task was to 
secure some progress on Kashmir and a general improvement in Indo-Pak 
relations. Any premature call to Pakistan would strengthen Indian 
hostility and poison relations. The United States view was seen as one 
of being 'greatly interested in the possibility of securing Pakistan 
assistance in the Kiddle East'. The U.S. had been urging Britain to 
invite Pakistan to join a Middle East Command with the commitment to 
send troops in time of war. It was hoped the U. S. would let the matter
lie dormant for a while.(93)
The British government was well aware that Pakistan was now looking
increasingly to the U.S. for military and economic help. They were also
aware that Nazimuddin had sent a personal representative, Mir Laik Ali,
to Washington to purchase arms. The Counsellor at the British Embassy in 
Washington, Burrows, had called upon the State Department on 28 July 
1952 to gauge the success of the mission and was informed that the main 
purpose of Laik Ali's visit was to purchase military planes which the 
British could not supply because of limited production capacity. Burrows 
was then asked whether the British government was concerned over the 
proposed size of the Pakistan army and Burrows replied that his 
government did have some doubts about whether Pakistan was interested in 
a large army for defence against India or Russia.(94)
The British reviewed the position of Pakistan and MEDO in August 
1952 in a Top Secret report. No decision had yet been taken by the 
Foreign Office, but the intention hitherto had been to inform Pakistan 
of the proposed new organisation in the same way India would be 
informed, that is, under the Commonwealth framework and not as a 
potential founding member. Pakistan was recognised to have a unique 
position in the Commonwealth as it was one of the world's leading Muslim 
states and one whose strategic interests were involved in the proposed 
plan.
Apart from the standard reasons for not inviting Pakistan, such as 
Indian misgivings and the suspicion that Pakistan was only interested in 
membership to obtain arms against India, a new reason was that Pakistan 
might not support many British plans for the Middle East. The reason for 
now reconsidering Pakistan's membership was the change in the basic 
conception of MEDO from having a Supreme Command and a standing army to 
having a centre in Cyprus with troops only required in war. The 
political upheavals in Egypt and Iran had made Pakistan look a mare
attractive member, as well as the new arms export policy, which could 
satisfy many of Pakistan's requirements.
The main objectives of MEDQ were outlined as being to increase the 
ability and will of the countries of the region to defend themselves, as 
well as safeguarding the eastern flank of NATO and oil supplies. 
Pakistan's membership would be useful to the organisation for her 
strategic position and her bases and airfields. The good quality of
Pakistan's soldiers was also mentioned. KEDQ was likely to offer 
Pakistan increased security on her western border and an opportunity to 
play a leading role in the area with British and American support. If 
Pakistan was not invited to join, the report considered it would have a 
bad effect both on the Arab states who would want Pakistani
participation and inside Pakistan itself. Indian objections would be 
diminished in view of the proposal not to have a standing army as 
Pakistan would not be receiving large quantities of arms or special
training. A strong Pakistan could also be portrayed to India as being a
valuable barrier to communism. For the first time the Foreign Office 
said that, the Indian reaction notwithstanding, the advantages of 
Pakistani participation should be taken seriously. (95)
The Americans were left in no doubt about the strength of Pakistan's
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feeling when -irfe dec^ided to sell over two hundred tanks to India in 
September 1952. The Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army, Ayub Khan, 
told the American Consul General, Raleigh Gibson, about this very
the tanks for internal security at all but for <use against Pakistan. He 
stated that the Pakistani public was becoming restless over Kashmir and 
that the government would have a difficult time controlling this
clearly. Ayub told Gibson that he thought bought
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feeling. He said it would be^job -e^ the army to see that this agitation 
did not get out of control and hoped passions would not be raised to the 
point of hostilities against India as Pakistan was in no condition to go 
to war. Ayub felt that the U.S. should trust Pakistan far more than 
India as he believed that the latter was heading for communism and Nehru 
might have to ride with that tide. Gibson reported that he had never 
known Ayub to be more upset or serious than he was over the sale of the 
tanks to India. He was sure that Ayub would do his best to calm his 
government but was unsure how influential Ayub was.(96)
The quarterly review of Pak-U.S. relations in December mentioned 
some differences between the U.S. Embassy in Karachi and the State 
Department. The Department believed that a barter agreement which had 
been reached between Pakistan and Russia was a possible reflection of 
the re-orientation of Pakistan's foreign policy. The Embassy believed 
that the agreement with the Russians had only been signed after Pakistan 
had been disappointed with the American response before turning to 
Russia. As for a possible revival in the popularity of America after aj(l 
gift of U.S. wheat, which the Department believed in, the Embassy saw 
this as only a temporary halt in the overall slide downwards. The 
Embassy noted with alarm comments from the Punjab wing of the ruling 
Muslim League which called the U.N. a body 'which moves only in the 
imperial interests of the United States of America' . (97)
In December rumours about MEDO and Pakistan's possible membership 
reached a level where the American Embassies in Karachi and Delhi asked 
some officials for their reactions. These reports were shown in 
confidence to the Foreign Office and relayed to the British Embassy in 
Washington. The Pakistani reaction came from the acting Foreign
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Secretary, Akhtar Hussain, who said that Pakistan would 'jump at an 
invitation to join'. He felt such a move would offset the mood of anti - 
western feeling which had built up over Kashmir. Akhtar Hussain felt 
that as the Foreign and Defence Ministries in Pakistan supported such a 
move, the Cabinet would agree. The British were, however, inclined to 
take such statements with a pinch of salt. The Indian reaction was that 
they would be forced to react strongly to such a move and knew that the 
initiative must have come from the U.K. and not the U.S. The Indians 
also said they would be farced to increase defence spending to keep up 
with any military aid Pakistan might receive. The Americans were 
reported to be unaffected by these reactions and to continue as 
planned.(98)
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with the Vest
The. Pakistan Army and Alignment
The Americans gradually began to realise the growing political 
importance of the Pakistan army and its Commander-in-Chief, Ayub Khan. 
Ayub was not shy of stating his opinions and the Americans encouraged 
him to air them. In February 1953, Ayub had a long conversation with 
Gibson, the Consul General in Lahore; he told him that he had just spent 
several days discussing the army budget with several cabinet ministers, 
but he saw the wheat shortage as a more important need. He said Pakistan 
looked to the U.S. for help in this matter and, on the question of the 
Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO), Ayub complained that Pakistan 
had not been approached for membership by the U.S. He said the 
communists in Pakistan were carrying out a propaganda war against MEDO 
and the longer the wait was, the more time the communists would have for 
complaint. Ayub said that he hoped Pakistan would sign a defence 
agreement with the U.S., similar to the one the latter had with Turkey. 
He stated that Pakistan was a friend of the U.S. and pointed out that 
the U.S. had a strategic interest in Pakistan.
The conversation then moved on to the visit of an Egyptian military 
mission to Pakistan led by General Ibrahim. Ayub told Gibson that he had 
advised Ibrahim that Egypt should be friends with America. Ibrahim had 
replied that America was friends with Britain, who was Egypt's greatest 
enemy. On the topic of passible Egyptian membership of MEDO, Ibrahim 
said they had not been approached and they would never take the 
initiative to approach the U.S. for membership. (1)
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Ayub Khan's stated desire for some form of a military pact with the 
U.S. led to his ordering the Pakistani military attache in Washington to 
hand a document to the State Department in April 1953. The document was 
marked 'Top Secret' and had been written by Ayub Khan in December 1952. 
Its topic was his assessment of the Soviet military threat to Pakistan
and the armed forces required to meet this threat. The tone and angle of
discussion seems almost designed to appeal to the Americans. It starts, 
' In order to assess the forces required to meet the Russian threat to 
Pakistan resulting from her political ideology', and goes on to speak of 
Moscow's hope that 'sooner or later the whole sub-continent will fall as 
a ripe but undamaged plum into the Soviet paw'. Other Russian objectives 
in the Middle East, according to Ayub Khan, were to destroy the
influence of the western powers and gain oil and raw materials. Ayub
went on to say that the defence of Pakistan was really the defence of 
the sub-continent, and to blame Uehru for this, as he was against any 
commitments with the west in the field of mutual security. A detailed 
list was then made of the forces and equipment required to defend East 
and Vest Pakistan.(2)
The first quarterly survey for 1953 revealed a friendly attitude 
towards the new Eisenhower administration, which had been inaugurated in 
January, and believed a 'keen positive interest in MEDO shared by the 
public and many top civil and military authorities' existed in Pakistan. 
The survey indicated psychological factors rather than diplomatic 
achievements were responsible for the rise in U.S. popularity. The 
Eisenhower administration was thought to be more independent of the 
British, as well as being keen to improve Middle East security. The 
Indian offensive against MEDO was seen to have increased Pakistan's
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interest in it. The Americans took Pakistan's interest in MEDO as 
satisfying one of their basic foreign policy objectives, namely closer 
ties with neighbouring Muslim states. This would be a development 
applauded within Pakistan, as well as a strong card to play against 
India. Despite recognising this, the State Department still believed 
that Pakistan would honour any commitments made in a treaty.(3)
On 17 April, the Prime Minister Nazimuddin, was summoned by the 
Governor General Ghulam Mohammed, and asked to resign. As tfazimuddin 
still enjoyed the confidence of his Cabinet and parliament, he declined 
to da so. Ghulam Mohammed, setting a tradition regularly followed in 
Pakistan, ignored such technicalities and dismissed him. Mazimuddin 
tried to appeal to the Queen, as Pakistan was still a dominion, but was 
unable to get through. It is unlikely that it would have been of any 
use, in any case, as the Foreign Office was unconcerned by the news. The 
Pakistan Ambassador to Washington, Mohammed Ali Bogra, was appointed. 
This appointment was made for three probable reasons: firstly, the Prime 
Minister had ideally to be an Easft Pakistani due to the sensitive 
political situation there, secondly, Bogra was without any real support 
in Pakistan and so could not pose any threat to Ghulam Mohammed, and 
thirdly, as Ambassador to Washington, Bogra was well-known by the 
decision makers there and could demonstrate to the U.S. that Pakistan 
was ready to take business. The American files confirm that the State 
Department was indeed pleased to see such a friendly figure in Karachi.
The next major step towards alignment was taken in May. John Foster 
Dulles, the new Secretary of State, arrived in Karachi as part of an 
unprecedented tour of the Middle East and South Asia. Dulles had 
appointed as Ambassador to Pakistan, Horace Hildreth, soon after taking
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office. Hildreth was a professor at Temple University and was chosen for 
his matching views on American responsibilites in the new world order, 
beliefs that the American leadership shared. Possibly the most memorable 
part of Dulles' stay in Pakistan was the guard of honour which met him 
at the airport on 22 May. He later described it to the Senate Foreign 
Affairs Committee. ' I was truly impressed by the carriage and demeanour 
of their people and their army. They had an armed guard for my visit 
which is one of the finest I have ever seen in the world. The lancers 
that they have, they were fellows that had to be six foot two inches to 
be qualified and they just sat there on these great big horses, and they 
were out of this world. . . ' (4) Dulles was greatly encouraged by his 
meetings with Ghulam Mohammed and Bogra but it seemed the really 
important talk, reflecting perhapsy American recognition of where the 
real power lay, was with General Ayub Khan.
The meeting between Ayub Khan and the Secretary of State was held on 
23 May at the U.S. Ambassador's residence. The participants were the 
U.S. Secretary of State, J.F. Dulles, the new U.S. Ambassador to 
Pakistan, Horace Hildreth, Ayub Khan and Lt. Colonel Meade. Dulles 
opened the conversation with an inquiry as to the state of the Pakistan 
army. Ayub started by explaining the difficulties Pakistan had 
encountered at partition and how, with will* power and determination, 
Pakistan had built up an efficient force of approximately twenty-five 
thousand men. He admitted that heavy armour was still required and 
therefore infantry was still the main strike force. Ayub expressed 
gratitude for the sale of three hundred and fifty Sherman tanks, as well 
tank destroyers. He believed that the most critical problem facing the 
armed forces was one of ammunition supplies and stocks. His aim was to
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keep a six-month supply but the economy had not permitted that and so 
reserves varied from one to five months. Ayub pointed out that, despite 
these handicaps, the discipline and training of the Pakistan army made 
it a force to be reckoned with, Dulles asked Ayub to be specific on the 
military needs of Pakistan. Ayub then handed Dulles the same document 
given to the State Department a month earlier. Dulles examined it at 
length and expressed interest and agreement with the thoughts in it. The 
topic moved on to the air force and air bases in Pakistan. Ayub stated 
there were six squadrons based around the country and it was an 
efficient service but restricted by the lack of funds. As for air bases, 
Ayub said there were many of these, many with long runways which could 
yet be extended. Hildreth inquired about the state of the navy, to which 
Ayub replied it was very small and was just designed really to protect 
Karachi and Chittagong.
Vhen the subject then moved on to Kashmir, Ayub argued that it was 
necessary to put pressure on Nehru as he seemed content to bide for 
time, something Pakistan did not have. He attempted to reassure the 
Americans that any military aid which Pakistan received would not be 
used against India, as he felt war would weaken both countries and be 
too expensive. Meade reminded the Commander-in-chief of the statement 
Ghulam Mohammed had made to the effect that Pakistan was willing to go 
to India's aid if she was attacked by another power. Ayub thanked Meade 
for the reminder and Meade said that he had already informed Dulles of 
this fact. Ayub continued on this theme and expressed his belief that 
after Nehru, India might split up into separate states, which might turn 
to communist influences. This scenario worried him as it would be 
dangerous for the future of Pakistan.
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Dulles then spoke on the perceived change in Soviet tactics which 
seemed to be directed at South East Asia. Ayub said that he was well 
aware of the global conflict between communists and the rest. Ayub felt 
that the U.S., as the undisputed leader of the free world, should not be
afraid to aid those counties who were willing to co-operate with them.
k
He reiterated the potential, both in manpower and in bases, that 
Pakistan had and said the present government in Pakistan was extremely 
anxious to co-operate with the U.S. Ayub said he firmly believed that, 
if the U.S. gave Pakistan military and economic aid, it would result in 
India dropping its intransigent attitude towards Kashmir and world 
security.(5)
After this positive discussion, Dulles returned from his trip to 
Pakistan convinced that Pakistan would be a reliable ally and
recommended to the Foreign Affairs committee of the Senate that aid to
Pakistan was necessary for U.S. interests. The 'Northern Tier' concept 
was a result of this visit as Dulles believed that there was more 
concern of Soviet intent where borders were near to it. Turkey and
Pakistan were seen as the potential guardians of the flanks, with the
responsibility to defend Iran and Afghanistan.
Dulles even sent a message to the Pakistan Prime Minister, that he 
had 'passed on my sincere feeling that the combination of the strength 
of religous feeling and martial spirit of your people makes Pakistan a 
country that can be relied upon as one of the great bulwarks in that 
area against communism. . . I shall continue to follow this matter, urging 
quick action, as I completely share your view that it is in our common 
interests to assist your country in this regard'.(6)
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Amarlcaji moves ia  sensL a i4
The U.S. then tried to weigh up the political consequences of a 
decision to grant military aid to Pakistan. The Intelligence Advisory 
Committee to the State Department estimated that the non-communist 
regimes in both India and Pakistan were likely to continue for some time 
to come. There was little likelihood of a resumption of hostilies over 
Kashmir and Pakistan seemed to be willing to provide the west with base 
rights and possibly troop commitments in return for substantial military 
and economic aid and security guarantees. The Committee recognised that 
the conclusion of a military assistance agreement between Pakistan and 
the west would be resented by India but would probably not lead to 
war.(7)
■Ajl
In commenting on the dismissal af^/Hazimuddin government in April, 
the State Department was not worried about the legality or wisdom of the 
move and dismissed the former government as 'ineffective' in their next 
quarterly survey. The survey stated that the new cabinet was j/t stronger 
das/ than the old one and more friendly towards the U.S. Nazimuddin was 
described as 'vacillating and mullah-bound' . The State Department was 
obviously familiar with Bogra through his tenure as ambassador. He was 
described as having 'real friendliness with the U.S.' The Americans 
were also encouraged by Bogra's remarks on the need to come to a 
settlement with India on all issues. (8)
The State Department sent the American Embassy in Karachi a 
'Psychological Intelligence Report' on 15 June. The basic idea of this 
report was to try and analyse South Asia's response to U.S. policy 
objectives. While a copy of this report is unavailable, the reply by the 
Karachi Embassy gives the researcher many clues as to its contents. The
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reply is long and detailed but important enough to be quoted at length 
as it is an examination of Pakistan's whole perception of, and 
relationship to the U.S. and the west. The first point raised in the 
reply was that it was a mistake to bracket Pakistan constantly with 
Ceylon and India because conditions were so different in these countries 
now that it was no longer true; although Pakistan was 'basically 
suspicious of U.S. policy and intentions' until early 1953, it was no 
longer the case because of changing internal and international 
conditions. The report accepted the old Pakistani line that the 
communists were influential in India, whereas Islam in Pakistan 
prevented the spread of communism. Economic conditions in Pakistan were 
seen as a reason for Pakistan to look to external help; and membership 
of the Commonwealth was the reason for close ties with the U.K. and the 
west. For these reasons the Karachi Embassy felt that Pakistanis were 
not nearly as suspicious of U.S. intentions as the Indians.
The report went on to say they believed that many Pakistani cabinet 
ministers were now openly pro-American in their statements but felt that
an ordinary persons views were hard to know because of widespread 
ignorance and illiteracy. The increasingly friendly attitude in Pakistan 
was seen as due to recent positive American acts such as the wheat gift
moves. The change in the presidency in America was also seen as a 
positive move as Eisenhower's statements on the importance of Asia to 
the U.S. were appreciated in Pakistan. Bogra, whose appointment was 
seen as accelerating a more sympathetic approach to America, spoke of 
the U.S. in such favourable terms that the danger that he might be 
regarded as 'too American' was mentioned. Closer economic and cultural
t
and a lack of concrete Soviet action^ despite their conciliatory
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contacts with America, along with a corresponding disillusionment with
Russia, were obviously positive developments appreciated in the embassy.
The conclusion of the report was that the government and the people were
not fanatically pro-American nor were the poor in danger of succumbing
to communism. The previous six months were seen as crucial as Pakistan
could have turned either east or west as it was previously uncommitted.
The battle was not won, Withers said, but a beachhead had been
t A J O R e ­
established; a long time / needed before local suspicions could be
removed, as well as sporadic criticism, but a general drift towards
America was seen as inevitable, unless unforeseen domestic or
international events occurred, and even then, the goodwill built up
would not disappear overnight. <9)
Hildreth sent the State department the text of an assessment report
he had received on arriving in Pakistan as ambassador. The brief resume
said that U. S.-Pakistan relations were better than ever before. Various
reasons were given for this including American recognition of the fact
that Pakistan's basic motive had been to improve its military balance
with India. Apart from that, Pakistan's ambitions in the Middle East
needed some form of military arrangement with the U.S. The decision to
become a republic, although it still had to be announced, was seen as
part of a gradual shift away from the U.K. and towards the American
system, American methods and America itself. The realisation of the
world position of the U.S. and the potential she had to help countries
like Pakistan was seen as crucial. Pakistani officials were said to
watch American moves in Asia carefully, particularly in the Muslim world
and Israel. Bogra was seen as a big help in the shift towards the U.S.
as he was a popular figure who went out of his way to praise America and
receive American visitors in Karachi. The wheat gift which the Americans 
had given the Pakistanis was a major psychological factor in the new 
favour with which America was viewed. (10) The only jarring note for 
Bogra and the U.S. was the criticism for the way in which the gift was 
received. Bogra ordered camels to carry the wheat from Karachi harbour 
with placards round their necks reading 'Gift from the U.S.A*. This was 
seen by many as undignified and lacking in national self-respect.(11)
On 5 September, Ambassador Hildreth sent a top secret telegram to 
Dulles on his analysis of Pakistani attitudes and suggested certain 
lines of action with respect to Pakistan. Hildreth emphasised that 
Pakistan was not prepared to follow the U.S. blindly or to agree with 
all U.S. actions. He listed a number of differences, the main one of 
which was Pakistan's intense dislike of Israel and U.S. involvement in 
the whole affair. Pakistan's recognition of Communist China was also at 
variance with the U.S., although Pakistan was known to be aware of the 
communist threat.
The other main area of difference was Pakistan's support for the 
North African liberation movement and her fierce criticism of the French 
and American roles. Hildreth believed these differences should be seen 
in perspective. The argument he put forward was that Pakistan was a 
Muslim country and aspired to leadership in that community. Pakistan was 
seen to be closer to Turkey than the Arab states and envied Turkey's 
position as a close military ally of America. Israel and Africa were not 
vital to Pakistan and so she could not obstruct close military ties 
developing. Pakistan's vital interests were closer to home, that is, 
India. By participating in MEDO or any similar organisation, Pakistan 
could break away from the fetters of Indian relations. Kashmir, however,
was still the focal point of all her foreign relations and the U.S. 
attitude towards that problem was seen by Hildreth as determining her 
attitude towards America.
The Ambassador then went on to answer same specific questions asked 
by Dulles. The first of these was whether Pakistan accepted U.S. 
leadership of the free world. Hildreth believed that Pakistan did accept 
this, but as her interests were centred in the sub-continent and the 
Middle East, all American actions were interpreted in the light of their 
effect on these regions. The second reply to Dulles was that Pakistan 
was not yet confident of continuing American support. Hildreth pointed 
out that he heard frequent complaints of American aid to India, despite 
the latter's professed neutrality. The third question was one relating 
to America living up to its responsibilities in Asia. He believed 
Pakistanis were unconvinced on this point. The main reason for this he 
believed was the failure of the U.S. to bring any pressure to bear on 
India over Kashmir, something Pakistan believed would force the Indians 
to be reasonable.
Hildreth pointed out that the common Pakistani belief was that the 
U. N. was little more than an American agency. In his view, the effect of 
domestic American events on Pakistan was slight; specific American 
issues were reported in the Pakistani press but aroused little interest. 
He then went on to outline the basic U.S. objectives in Pakistan. These 
were the creation of a strong Pakistan which was non-communist and 
similar to Turkey. Other objectives were a settlement in Kashmir and 
better relations with India. To contribute towards these objectives 
Hildreth had a number of suggestions, starting with a bilateral military 
assistance agreement with Pakistan. He saw this as strengthening the
22
pro-western government as well as improving the defensive potential of 
the Middle East. The only serious objection to the move was its likely 
effect on Indo-Pak relations. The Ambassador believed it was necessary 
to keep the Indian government fully informed of such a move and to offer 
her a similar agreement. He thought that the U.S. should obtain a solemn 
commitment from Pakistan that no military equipment received under this 
agreement would be used against India. Hildreth believed that even with
American weapons Pakistan would still not be in a position to initiate
action against India and so the latter could not really abject. The
other suggestions he had to make were the continuation of technical
assistance and economic aid and a reassessment of policies in areas
which affected Pakistan in the U.K. and elsewhere. The U.S. could also, 
suggested Hildreth, help promote better Indo-Pak relations without
case
in which/the Delhi Embassy might play
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some role.(12)
Ayub. Khan in America
The visit of Ayub Khan to the States in late 1953 has often been 
seen by historians as a watershed in Pakistan's foreign policy. There 
was little doubt that Ayub was going to discuss the details of a
possible American aid package, although he was technically going to
inspect American milija^ry installations. Hildreth sent a message to the 
State Department on 15 September 1953 reporting that Ayub had told a 
member of the American Embassy that he was not going to the U.S. for 
'pleasure or sightseeing' and wished to see top policy makers in the 
State and Defence Departments. Ayub said he had never believed in the 
MEDO concept as the Middle East was in a mess and bilateral agreements
seeming to ^activelyj interfere^/
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were far better. Ayub asked the Americans whether they were afraid of an 
agreement between Pakistan and the U.S. because of the Indian reaction 
or the fear that Pakistan might use the arms granted against India.
Ayub answered these points himself by saying that a bilateral 
agreement with Pakistan would be the best way for the U.S. to get India 
on their band-wagon. In the latter instance, Ayub was prepared to give 
any guarantee that might be required that American arms would not be 
used against India, unless India attacked Pakistan first. Ayub added 
that he could not understand why the Americans had been so patient with 
Nehru after his numerous rebuffs to Washington and his support of 
communists. He stated that the U.S. needed bases south of Russia and 
Pakistan might be willing to make a contribution. The Deputy Chief of
the Pakistan Army, General Musa, told the same American officer that, at
a recent meeting of defence officials in Pakistan, Ayub had stated that 
he was going to the U.S. to 'see what contribution Paks could make to 
the free world fight and how best contribution could be made' . Ayub had 
also promised to speak bluntly at the War College in America as 'one 
friend could be plain spoken with another friend'.
Hildreth reiterated his belief that the visit of Ayub Khan would be 
an excellent opportunity to discuss regional defence problems. He said 
that, if the Americans believed in any closer arrangements with 
Pakistan, then as Ayub was the 'strongest individual in Pakistan', he 
was the right person to talk to. Ayub was seen as consistently following
the line that Pakistan's best friend was the U.S. and if Ayub's 'Grand
Tour' was in any way rebuffed by the Americans, it might have an adverse
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affect on him and jeopardise any chances of an agreement in the future. 
Hildreth ended his message with the hope that senior State Department
figures would talk with Ayub. (14) It is interesting to note that no 
mention of this visit is made by Ayub Khan in his autobiography.
The ball was, therefore, in the court of the United States. On 25 
September, the Assistant Secretary of State in the Hear Eastern 
section,Byroade, wrote a memorandum to Dulles. Byroade pointed out that 
Ayub Khan was due to visit Washington in one weeks time and raised the 
question of what, if any, measures the Americans could take to 
demonstrate to the Pakistanis the American interest in the military 
contribution the former could make to the defence of the free world. 
Hildreth's warnings not to snub Ayub were noted in order not to endanger 
any possibility of an agreement. Byroade declared himself convinced that 
the Americans should offer some military assistance to Pakistan in spite 
of the certain adverse Indian reaction.
To minimise Indian reaction, Byroade believed that the military 
assistance given should be specifically to arm a brigade for use in 
Korea, with the arms to be permanently kept by Pakistan. The tentative 
estimate to arm a brigade of three thousand men would be around fifteen 
million dollars. The Indian reaction would be muted as the decision 
would not be obviously directed at them as the arms would not be for 
Pakistan's domestic use and would not upset the military balance in 
Asia. The other advantages of such a move would also be, believed 
Byroade, that another Asian country would be added to the U.K. command 
at a time when some of the allies in Korea wanted to withdraw and that 
a Pakistani regiment would free a corresponding American unit. Byroade 
said that the risk in such a measure was worth taking as the 
alternatives would weaken the pro-American government in Pakistan and
prejudice any chance of American hopes of building her up as a bulwark 
against communism. (15)
On 30 September, Byroade prepared a brief for Dulles who was due to 
meet Ayub Khan that afternoon. Dulles was reminded that the American 
advisers in Pakistan were quite impressed with him and, as he had an 
extremely frank approach, he would probably offer complete co-operation.
Dulles was reminded not to mention to Ayub the American idea that a
lyiTf qa^cisL
Pakistani peg±i»at should be equipped for Korea. Vhile discussions with 
Ayub were seen as important, Dulles was reminded that Ayub had not been 
given any authority by the Pakistan government to negotiate and was 
technically invited by the American army to inspect U.S. military 
installations, and so, while Ayub should feel that he had made progress, 
the real discussions would take place in Karachi with Bogra, the Prime 
Minister. Byroade recommended that Dulles should give Ayub the 
impression of the friendly feelings 'which we do in fact have for 
Pakistan'. Dulles was told not to forget to mention his impressive guard 
of honour at Karachi!(16)
Later that day Dulles opened the conversation by asking Ayub what 
the purpose of his trip to the U.S. was. Ayub replied emphatically that 
it was to seek military assistance for the Pakistan Army. Dulles had 
smiled and said that, although it was not his business, he hoped Ayub 
would get what he had come for. Ayub remarked that everyone he had met 
so far had said the same thing and he wanted to know who would finally 
dec^ide such matters. Dulles replied that it rested with the President 
to give such instructions saying that he could only tell the Defence 
Department if he did not want aid to go to Pakistan. Dulles then pointed
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out the adverse Indian reaction to any military aid to Pakistan, in the 
same way as the Arabs objected to any aid to Israel.
Ayub countered by saying that no-one would get anywhere if everyone 
was to wait for all opposing factions to agree. He considered that Nehru 
was trying to dominate the Middle East and South East Asia and the two 
obstacles in his way were American influence and the state of Pakistan. 
He believed the way to deal with Nehru, and possibly settle the Kashmir 
dispute, was to go ahead with the strengthening of Pakistan and restore 
a balance between India and Pakistan. Dulles agreed that he did not 
consider the Indian factor to be fundamental to the present situation 
and, from a purely political point of view, he was prepared to assist 
Pakistan but he was unsure whether America could supply all the military 
equipment Pakistan needed. Ayub then closed the conversation by saying 
he hoped that Dulles would tell Eisenhower all the things he had just 
been told.(17)
The Governor General, Ghulam Mohammed, left Karachi on 19 October 
for a six week tour that included America for 'medical reasons'. As Ayub 
was already in America, there was inevitably speculation on defence 
talks taking place.(18) Ghulam Mohammed was to join Ayub in discussions 
regarding military aid. Ayub was said to have briefed him that the talks 
were going well. The Pakistan parliament or Cabinet were not consulted 
or even informed about the discusiions, although Bogra and Zafrullah 
'actively participated'.(19) Dulles felt such a valuable opportunity 
should not be missed and recommended that Ayub should meet Eisenhower 
himself. In a note to Byroade on 1 October, Dulles said that he had 
mentioned it to Ayub at lunch and 'he seemed to agree'. It is not hard 
to imagine how Ayub must have jumped at the chance! Dulles said he
S 7
personally would be glad to arrange the meeting on Ayub's return to the 
States in mid-October. (20).
On the same day, Dulles noted approvingly that the historic 
political decision to grant military aid to Pakistan had been approved 
by President Eisenhower on 31 October. Dulles said that he 'wholly 
concurred' with the decision. This decision was so novel that even 
Admiral Radford of the National Security Council was unaware of it when 
Dulles mentioned it to him. (21) The Americans did not mention the 
decision to Ayub and continued to talk to him as if no firm line had yet 
been decided. On 12 November^ Ghulam Mohammed met President Eisenhower. 
Unfortunately no archive material was available of their talks, but it 
hard to believe that they discussed nothing more than stockbreeding, 
which was all Ghulam Mohammed would reveal to reporters! (22) Ayub Khan
Uwas later to describe the talks as 'highly complicated' and occaisonallyOf
'extremely slow' but eventually successful.(23)
A glimpse of what was in jfh^ American minds is provided by the 
diaries of a reporter for the New York Times. Sulzberger noted on 23 
November that Eisenhower looked grim, and said Pakistan wanted to help 
the western cause but needed military aid to do so. Eisenhower said the 
Pakistanis were 'vital, brave people like the Turks and the Greeks'. The 
President's patience with Nehru was obviously wearing thin as he 
described the Indians as simply being a 'nuisance' and resented the 
delay that their attitude was causing to aid for Pakistan. Byroade also 
met Sulzberger and declared that the U.S. did not want any bases in 
Pakistan, and only wanted to build up the defence of a friendly state. 
Byroade did not mention that the U.S. had seen bases in Pakistan as 
vital to the defence of the 'free world for decades and once military
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aid was given to Pakistan, the latter would find it hard to refuse any 
request for bases.(24)
Ihe. British Match, the. U. S. take control
The Anglo-American discussions on the pros and cons of military aid 
to Pakistan continued in late 1953. On 16 October, a meeting took place 
in Washington between Beeley and Crowley on the British side and 
Jernegan and Smith on the American side. The British had asked for the 
meeting in order to report back on London's response to the American 
proposal, relayed to the British a week earlier, about granting military 
aid to Pakistan. Beeley started by saying that, 'broadly speaking, 
London did not like the U.S. proposal'. The U.K. would also like to see 
Pakistan militarily strenghtened, he said, but there was the problem of 
the Indian reaction. India would consider that the U.S. was spreading 
the cold war to the sub-continent and had decided to take the Pakistani 
side in the Kashmir dispute. Indian reaction might be so sharp as to 
threaten certain British bases in India which were of importance to 
western defence. Furthermore, reported Beeley, there was the question of 
the Pakistan government's attitude. The British government hoped that 
the U.S. would not put Pakistan in the position of finding it 
embarrassing to refuse western assistance. Both Liaquat and Nazimuddin 
had said that the Kashmir problem had to be solved before Pakistan was 
ready to take any responsibility for wider defence. Bogra's actions had 
also shown a similar tendency and it was doubtful whether Pakistan would 
want to send any troops to Korea. The U.K. hoped that the Americans 
would only grant military aid to Pakistan after it was requested by the 
Pakistan cabinet and not just by Ayub Khan. The British also hoped that
there would be no security leak as it could lead to a violent Indian
reaction.(25)
Ayub Khan's return visit to America started with a meeting with 
Byroade on 21 October. The Pakistani Ambassador, Amjed Ali, U.S. 
officials from the Defence Department, South Asia desk and the Mutual
Security programme, were also present. Byroade said that Ayub had 
indicated an interest in the possible content of a mutual assistance 
agreement and he had ther-fore prepared a purely speculative draft which 
should not be taken to illustrate the U.S. position. Grey, of the Mutual 
Security programme, upon request, read out the draft paragraph by 
paragraph and answered all questions raised. Since the draft had not
been cleared by the State Department, it was decided not to give Ayub a 
copy. Ayub believed that everything which had been mentioned could be 
cleared through negotiation. Vhat Ayub really wanted to know, however, 
was what the U.S. wanted from Pakistan in return for military
assistance. The Defence Department official said that America's primary 
interest lay in strengthening Pakistan's defence capability and its 
association with the west and in accepting the political assurances 
contained in an agreement. No specific military commitment to provide
troops outside the area was involved. Byroade mentioned that the U.S. 
might be interested at a later stage in developing some regional defence 
groups and he hoped that Pakistan would discuss her participation in a 
'friendly and co-operative spirit'. Ayub said this would, of course, be 
the case.
Byroade emphasised that the U.S. had still reached no decision on 
military aid to Pakistan but, when it did, negotiations would be carried 
out in Karachi. Hildreth would be brought up to date and, depending on
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the decision, would take up the question with the Prime Minister. 
Byroade also said that at the start of any such programme there would 
not be any large sum of money available as it would concentrate on 
providing Pakistan with useful, specific items; a military assistance 
group would then be set up which would develop a thorough programme on 
the spot. Byroade said that as the majority of Pakistan's equipment was 
presently British, the problem of co-ordinating equipment would have to 
be sorted out between British and American engineers. Ayub indicated 
that the majority of Pakistan's engineering equipment and tanks were in 
fact American, while guns and small artillery were British. He added
he foresaw no problem. The question of the Indian reaction came up and 
Ayub felt that after a 'horrible fuss' the Indians would calm down. 
Byroade tried to emphasise that the American grant of military aid would 
be a major step for Pakistan and not one which she should take lightly. 
Ayub and Amjed Ali said that, if the decision was made to grant military 
aid to Pakistan, then that decision should not be changed, no matter 
what the reaction from others. All present at the meeting finally agreed 
on the great need for absolute secrecy. (26)
Before finally leaving the U.S., Ayub Khan wrote on 2 November to 
General Bedell Smith, who was the Under Secretary of State, saying what 
a great pleasure the trip had been for him and hoping that Smith would 
keep an 'eye on things' from his angle, as he, Ayub, would keep an 'eye 
on things from his angle' . (27) At a press conference on 19 November, 
Eisenhower emphasised that aid to Pakistan would have to be handled 
with great care because of the Indian reaction. The Pakistanis were 
afraid that this meant that the administration had decided not to give
that would be willing to discuss this problem and
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aid. A diplomatic offensive was launched by Amjed Ali to get the U.S. to
clarify their position, but a tight lid was kept on the real position,
much to the frustration of the Pakistan government.(28)
In Karachi on 2 December, Hildreth met Bogra to clear the ground for 
a visit by Vice-President Richard Nixon. Hildreth asked Bogra if he was 
going to 'stick by ship and in which direction he was going to sail it'.
The Prime Minister admitted to being unhappy with the situation but said
he was going to sail the ship out of its present crisis and towards the 
west. He felt he could regain some ground lost to the 'reactionaries' 
during his illness. Bogra believed he still had the majority of the 
cabinet with him, and even the East Pakistan delegates would soften 
their anti-American stance. He showed Hildreth the Soviet note of anger 
and warning over the rumoured American military aid package. Bogra 
expressed resentment over the note which demanded an explanation of
Pakistan's dealings with the west and over its bases. The Pakistani 
Prime Minister pleaded strongly with Hildreth to make sure that, once
any decision was made public by the U.S., they should stick by it
against all pressure. Hildreth quoted Bogra as saying, 'Take what time
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you need but once the decision is made stick bjr/and don't leave us out 
on a limb' . Hildreth assured him that he would emphasise this point and 
pointed out that it would be disastrous for the U.S. to renege on a 
decision made if it expected any of its allies to have faith in American 
commitments.(29)
The visit of Nixon to Pakistan led to telegrams of advice and 
requests being sent from Washington to Karachi and back regularly. On 4 
December, the State Department cautioned the American team against
taking a patronising tone with Pakistani officials. It was seen by
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Washington as desirable that Nixon should give positive encouragement to 
the Governor General and Prime Minister. Nixon was told to emphasise how 
the U.S. was aware of the magnitude of the problems Bogra had to face 
but the U.S. was confident that his sincere approach to these problems 
would be successful. Nixon was instructed to avoid all questions on 
military aid to Pakistan by saying that he had come to hear the 
Pakistani position and had been away from America for some time and was 
not aware of the latest line of thinking himself.(30)
The Vice-President arrived in Pakistan on 7 December for a three-day 
tour aad, in talks with Ghulam Mohammed two days later, he was told that 
if military aid was granted to Pakistan, he, Ghulam Mohammed, would 
personally fly over to Delhi to see 'his old friend' Nehru. He said 
that, although Nehru would be angry, he believed that his anger would 
blow over without his moving closer to the communist world. Ghulam 
Mohammed warned that on the other hand not giving any aid to Pakistan 
would have 'a disastrous effect'. He pointed out that military aid would 
be a pre-requisite for Pakistani membership of any Middle Eastern 
alliance. Bogra in conversation with his important American visitors 
said that he did not believe that India should be afraid of Pakistan. 
Other Pakistani cabinet ministers had told the Americans that the 
position of Bogra, who was known to be openly pro-American, would be 
severely damaged if aid was not granted. The result would be that other 
Pakistani politicians would not be so willing to stand up to the Russian 
threat.
Eildreth said that the final evaluation should take three factors 
into consideration. Firstly, the importance of Pakistan to the defence 
of the Middle East; secondly, the Indian reaction and thirdly, the
negative impact in South Asia if no aid was granted to Pakistan after 
the prospects have been publisised. He emphasised his belief that the 
risks were worth taking. Nixon also urged Dulles to delay the decision 
of the National Security Council until he can personally consult with 
him and the Defence Secretary. Nixon was reassured that no action would 
be taken until his report. <31) G.V. Choudhry, after examining the 
Pakistani archives of the time, believes that Nixon, more than anyone 
else in the Eisenhower administration, sympathised with Pakistan's 
defence problems and he assured the Pakistani leadership of his support.
Nixon was to prove true to his word. (32)
On his return from the States, Ayub Khan sent a message to the 
Pakistani Military Attache in Washington, Brigadier Jilani, dated 3 
January 1954. The message was intercepted by the Americans and a copy of 
it sent to the State Department. The message read : 'Please tell Mr.
Keyes on my behalf that delay over decision matter I discussed with you 
is going to do no good to your or our interests. A lot of goodwill 
exists in this country for your country. This liable to evaporate if no 
confirmation from your side. Also India very busy poisoning Middle East 
and Southeast Asian counties against us and you. All this will come to 
an end once an agreement between Pakistan and U.S. is reached. See that 
this is done quickly. Thereafter events will take the course as I
predicted and told you'. <33) This letter fs a piece of concrete
evidence of American interception of Pakistani mail and shows how aware 
they must have been of Pakistani intentions and ideas.
The. final details
On 4 January, Jernegan, of the Near Eastern Section, wrote a Top 
Secret memorandum for the President on military aid to Pakistan. It
pointed out that 'all high officials' in the Pakistan government badly 
wanted military aid from America and that Pakistan had recently been 
forced to make some cuts in her defence budget for the next year. The 
Americans were unsure as to how much the cut was but the military 
attache in Karachi had estimated that the Pakistan army was even weaker 
as a result than it was six months ago. Hildreth was warned by Bogra 
that the American indecision was placing him in an embarrassing 
position. The report noted that the Indian reaction was as feared, but 
Ambassador Allen in Delhi believed that it would not be fatal to Indo- 
U.S. relations. The Americans had asked the Turkish government whether 
it would be interested in some loose defence arrangement with Pakistan, 
which would involve consultation and defence planning. They believed 
that such an agreement would provide a framework for military assistance 
and reduce hostile reactions from other countries. The preliminary 
reactions from Ankara were seen as favourable but tactics had yet to be 
decided. The Pakistan government had been informed of the approach to 
the Turks and they were confident the Turks would happily agree to the 
suggestion. India had asked other countries to express their objections 
to the U.S. but no official objections had been received. The British 
government was said to have promised support for the U.S. programme and 
Thailand and Ceylon had expressed 'positive support'. (34)
The British were beginning to realise that they were being kept out 
of the picture. The Ambassador to Turkey, Sir Knox Helm, reported on 2 
January that neither the U.S. Ambassador in Turkey flor the Turkish 
Foreign Ministry had said anything to him about the possibility of any 
talks with Pakistan. Helm expected the Turks to be flattered by the role 
the Americans wanted them to play but thought they would also be
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cautious. The Ambassador said that Turkey had been impatient for some 
time for action to be taken in strengthening the Middle East and the 
possibility of this had been discussed with Ghulam Mohammed on his visit 
in December 1953. (35) The Indians reaction to the possibility of 
American financial aid to Pakistan was to ask the British not to supply 
Pakistan with arms purchased with U.S. dollars. This was not a request 
considered practical in the Foreign Office. They felt it would be better 
if the Indians 'displayed a greater sense of proportion'.(37)
The U.S. Ambassador reported from Delhi on 8 January that the High 
Commissioner there had been informed by London that the U.S. had decided 
to give military aid to Pakistan, provided it was under the aegis of a 
pact with Turkey, which would also be open for Iraq and Iran to join. 
The High Commissioner was asked whether such arrangements would make 
the idea of aid more acceptable to the Indians. Middleton, who was the 
acting High Commissioner, replied that, in his opinion, the arrangement 
would be less palatable to the Indians, as it would appear that a 
regional group was being set up under western influence. The Pakistan 
government had been stressing that the aid haid no strings attached. 
Allen explained to Middleton that the point of the Turkish connection 
was to make it clear to the Indians that the focus of the group would be 
the Middle East and not India. He admitted that Middleton was right in 
the opinion that the Turkish card would not calnn India down, especially 
her fear that, if Pakistan joined a western alliance, the west would 
support Pakistan aver Kashmir. Any larger group was also thought likely 
to do the same. The fact that Turkey, Iran and Iraq were Muslim states 
would also stir the old Hindu fear of Muslim revivalism. Allen still, 
however, regarded the Middle East tie-up as useful as it would enable
C\L
the U.S. to justify aid to Pakistan to the world in general and might 
mean India's abandonment of neutralism as there would be a direct link 
to the western world.(37)
The Foreign Office was unsure about Pakistani reaction to the 
question of military aid or, as one official put it, 'we are still very 
much in the dark about their attitude'. A note in the Foreign Office had 
stated rather regretfully that, ' It is rather surprising, to say the 
least, that the Americans should have launched the wholly new idea with 
its wide implications for the Middle East generally, without a word to 
us first'.(38)
On 14 January, at 3 p. m. , a top level meeting took place at the 
Vhite House to discuss the question of military assistance to Pakistan. 
The participants were President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, Admiral 
Davis and Byroade. Dulles opened the meeting by outlining the recent 
exchange of cables with the Turks in which they had agreed to take the 
initiative in the formation of a security pact with Pakistan. This was 
to be formulated in such a way that other nations, particularly Iran and 
Iraq, would be open to join. Dulles stated that the point had been 
reached where the U.S. should not proceed further unless committed to 
the course ahead. Dulles said there were many problems to be worked out 
in secret with the Turks and Pakistanis.
Dulles gave Eisenhower a summary of his own views in which he 
stressed the danger of not going ahead, especially as Nehru had now 
expressed opposition to the plan; this would establish Nehru as the 
leader of a large part of Asia which would not be able to act without 
his approval. Dulles mentioned how certain Asian countries had supported 
the U.S. before in the face of Indian opposition, as for example, the
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support he had received over the terms of the Japanese peace treaty. In 
the general discussion that followed, the President stated that he 
believed the U.S. should proceed. There was not to be any public 
statement until after 23 January in view of the Korean situation. He 
also stated his concern at the situation in India and wanted all action 
to be taken to soften opinion there. Eisenhower agreed with the draft of 
a statement to be made on the subject at the appropriate time and also 
instructed that a letter should be sent to Nehru prior to any public 
announcement.(39)
A Top Secret memorandum was written by a special assistant to Dulles 
on 18 January 1954 with the title, 'The probable effects of a U.S. 
decision to grant or deny military aid to Pakistan' . It disclosed that 
the Intelligence Advisory Committee had estimated that a decision to 
grant modest military aid to Pakistan would increase the Bogra 
government's prestige at home and increase friendly relations with the 
U.S. The other main effect would be that it would arouse grave concern 
and indignation in India, and the danger was that the friction in 
relations with India would allow the latter to drift away from the west, 
and be more susceptible to communist pressures. An American decision not 
to grant aid to Pakistan would cause great disappointment there and 
weaken the pro-U.S. lobby, leading to changes in the cabinet and prime 
minister, while there was little likelihood of any improvement in U.S.- 
Indian relations. (40)
Pakistani, complaints at. the. delay
Ambassador Hildreth faced pressure in Pakistan from powerful 
parties interested in military aid from America. On 27 January, he was 
summoned by Ghulam Mohammed, who was very sick by this time. His speech
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was defective to the extent wh«re Hildreth had difficulty in
understanding him. The Governor General bitterly assailed the U.S. for 
an hour for the awkward personal position in which the American
government had placed him. He told Hildreth that he had to read the
comments and plans of people like Nehru to dispose of the government of 
Pakistan, as if it was a pawn in a game, and, because he was not assured 
by the U.S. of anything, he was unable to make any reply. He went on to 
complain that U.S. reporters told him more than the State Department and 
said he was on the verge of writing to the Turkish president to tell him
that he was not a beggar or a pawn.
Hildreth told Ghulam Mohammed that he sympathised with his position 
and had urged the State Department to act and would report back at the 
end of the week, even if there was no definite news. The Ambassador
assured him that he was convinced that a positive reply was coming but
Ghulam Mohammed reiterated how badly he had been used. He pointed out
that the situation was developing where he might have difficulty in 
getting the cabinet to agree to any proposal. He had not been approached 
by the Turks or Americans and felt humiliated by press reports, in spite 
of promises on his visit to America that the whole idea would be kept 
entirely secret. The Governor General pointed out that he would not be 
prepared to discuss raising any more money for defence, as it would be 
at the cast of economic and educational development. He went on to say 
that he felt that the State Department was too much influenced by the 
British. When Hildreth said he doubted such a claim was true, Ghulam 
Mohammed replied, 'Forgive me if I disagree'. Ghulam Mohammed went on to 
say that he now felt it had been a mistake to meet Eisenhower as, 
although he had been treated very well during the visit, he had been
treated shamefully since his return; the U.S. press was turning against 
Pakistan which could not say anything on the subject.
Hildreth felt that Ghulam Mohammed was discouraged as he only 
expected aid to be disappointingly low and was bitter about his own 
treatment. Hildreth felt, from this conversation and one with Zafrullah, 
that there might be trouble when American intentions were known, and 
said that he intended to speak to Bogra as he was easier to deal with 
than Ghulam Mohammed, (41)
Hildreth did indeed write to Dulles to ask what was happening over 
aid to Pakistan in early February. Hildreth assured Dulles that he was 
'proud and happy to serve under a Secretary of State who was performing 
so ably and courageously' . He said the reason he had not written this 
before was to avoid giving the impression that he was trying to 'butter 
up' Dulles. However, he felt that as this letter also contained a 
complaint, he was free to write the above. The Ambassador said that for 
the past few weeks the question of military aid to Pakistan had been the 
leading news item throughout the world. Negotiations had been going on 
with the Turks, about which the Pakistanis had been kept uninformed but 
were aware of, to their intense irritation. Almost every item in the 
'Top Secret' wires had been written about in the press in the U.K. and 
U.S., Hildreth continued. Ghulam Mohammed had exploded as recounted in 
the telegram earlier, Hildreth had been accordingly authorised by 
Washington to make apologies and to assure Ghulam Mohammed that he would 
hear from Turkey immediately.
That morning, however, Hildreth had seen a news story from New York 
which was 'shockingly consistent with our Top Secret cable information, 
giving the order of events and the whole programme, even stating the
amount' . He said that because of the accuracy of past news stories, the
public recital of information, about which even the Embassy was unaware,
was shocking. Hildreth thought that it made the U.S. government look 
ridiculous and was exceedingly irritating for the Pakistanis:
'presumably the history of military aid to Pakistan is duplicated in
other parts of the world. If so, something is decidedly wrong. I have no 
idea where the blame lies but experienced officials in the Embassy agree 
with me that the sad history of public stories on the military aid 
question warrants my writing to you on the above lines'. Hildreth added 
a postscript which said that conferences had been held with the 
Pakistanis which had made them feel better.(42)
Rumours continued to grow in Karachi that there was a split in the 
Pakistan cabinet over relations with the U.K. and the U.S. This was 
highlighted in a conversation between a Pakistani official and a U.S. 
Embassy officer. According to the Pakistani, A.G. Soofi of the Ministry 
of States and Frontier Regions, the Pakistan cabinet was split on the 
question of U.S. military aid. The leader of the pro-British faction was 
alleged to be the Interior Minister, Gurmani, who was supported by Sir 
Feroze Khan Noon and they hoped to bolster their own positions by 
currying favour with the British and pro-British factions in Pakistan. 
The Embassy believed that the cabinet was united over the question of 
military aid from the U.S. and that the Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali 
Bogra, was aware of the intrigues and that Gurmani was possibly about to
be removed. (43) Evidence from Pakistani writers suggests that the pro-
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American group consisited of Ghulam Mohammed, Bogra and Zafrullah Khan. 
The Finance Minister (and next Prime Minister), Chaudhri Mohammed Ali,
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was seen as being neutral and supportive of American aid as the best 
option for the country. (44)
British frustration at. being: ignored
British frustration at being ignored and taken for granted by the 
Americans in their strategic planning in general, and in the Middle East 
in particular, was close to spilling over by the time of the Berlin
Conference in January. The brief written for Macmillan, the Foreign 
Secretary, at the conference said that Macmillan should take up with 
Dulles the divergence between 'certain aspects of U.S. policy in the 
Middle East and British interests and responsibilities. In failing to 
consult Her Majesty's Government in advance, as over the proposal for 
joint planning between Turkey and Pakistan... the United States 
Government has disregarded our position and made it's maintenance more 
difficult'.
On the subject of U.S. aid to Pakistan, the pent-up annoyance was 
even more obvious. It was emphasised how the Americans, without any 
prior consultation with the British government, proposed to Turkey that 
she should announce her intention of holding staff talks with Pakistan. 
This was the obvious excuse needed to announce American military aid to 
Pakistan, and was intended to form the basis of Middle Eastern defence, 
with which the Iraqis and Iranians could be associated later. The 
Foreign Office felt that the scheme was unlikely to prove useful and
might 'in fact be positively harmful by explicitly excluding western
participation, and thus ignoring existing British commitments' . In
short, it could make no real contribution to Middle Eastern defence and 
might cause the countries concerned to wonder whether the British could
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be counted upon for any real support. The scheme was also open to 
question as being provocative to the Soviet Union without proving to be 
a deterrent. The British were relieved to learn that the Turks were 
unenthusiastic the idea, as they felt it was premature. The Foreign
Office said that the Turkish objections gave the British the chance to 
point out to the Americans that Anglo-American agreement was essential 
to any progress in the defence of the Middle East. (45)
Hie. Turkp-E.akist.aii Eac.t
The decision to give military aid to Pakistan had, as shown, been a 
decision taken, not by the National Security Council in Washington, but 
by Eisenhower and Dulles. The National Security Council met in early 
February to hear the report of Vice-President Richard Nixon. He gave the 
Council a two hour report on his nineteen nation tour. He was said to 
have impressed them so much that he received a standing ovation. The 
National Security Council agreed with Dulles that aid to Pakistan should 
seem to come after she had decided to join Turkey to defend the Middle 
East. (46) The Turkish government view was given during consultations 
with the Americans as to what agreement could be drafted with Pakistan.
A senior Turkish politician said openly that Turkey was not interested 
in any military arrangement with Pakistan 'because any contribution that 
Pakistan could make was negligible' and, if they do have a pact it would 
be 'as the result of an American alliance with Pakistan, not as a direct 
arrangement between Pakistan and Turkey'. (47) This statement did not
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come as a real surprise to anyone but must still have been embarassing
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to the governments of America and Pakistan.
On 13 February, the Turkish government sent a draft treaty to 
Karachi for comments. The agreement was mainly relating to economic,
political and cultural co-operation. The Turkish Ambassador in Karachi 
proposed that, if Pakistan agreed with its terms, the Turkish
government would like six days before the treaty was released to inform 
its allies and friends. (48) The Foreign Office, on 9 February, noted 
with some alarm that the more information that was being received about 
the Turkish and Pakistani talks, the clearer it was that the 'U.S. moves 
had begun earlier and gone further than we previously realised'.(49)
Speed was now of the essence for all parties. On 19 February, an 
announcement was made that the Pakistan and Turkish governments had 
agreed on the principle of joint co-operation. Although Bogra and some 
members of the Cabinet hailed the pact as being the first step on the 
road to Muslim unity, few were fooled. The same day, a formal request 
was made for U.S. aid. An official request written by Zafrullah Khan was 
needed by Dulles before the U.S. government could go ahead with its 
plans to give military aid to Pakistan. This was to try and persuade a 
rather sceptical world that the U.S. was only now considering the 
possibility of aid now.
Zafrullah started by saying that Pakistan was a peace-loving state 
and had fulfilled its responsibilities under the U. N. Charter. He wrote 
that during Pakistan's short history, it had given ample proof of its 
being one of the free nations in the world andj one that believed in 
collective security for the maintenance of peace. Pakistan's position 
made it an area of vital importance to both east and west and it had 
already declared its intention of co-operating with the Turks. Although 
Pakistan had committed maximum resources to its defence, it was still 
seen as necessary to seek assistance which would enable it to strengthen 
the army and secure economic development. The crux came with the
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statement that 'Pakistan requests the supply of aid, equipment and other 
assistance by the United States within the scope of the U.S. Kutual 
Security legislation. Before making this request Pakistan has informed 
itself of the requirements of that legislation and finds itself in 
agreement with them. Pakistan desires to make it clear that the 
assistance that it asks for will be utilised for the purpose of 
maintaining and promoting internal security.., and enabling it to 
participate in the United Nations system for collective security'. 
Zafrullah endedj^. by saying that economic and defensive strength were 
both necessary to secure national and international security. It was 
hoped that the U.S. government would give an urgent and favourable reply 
as soon as possible. (50)
On 25 February, Eisenhower declared that the U.S. was ready to aid 
Pakistan militarily, but this was tied to Pakistan and Turkey agreeing 
on a defence strategy. This was exactly what the Pakistan government had 
been hoping and expecting to hear for some time; but the initial 
euphoria was dampened by the Indian reaction in dealing with the 
problems of the Indus waters and Kashmir.
Ghulam Mohammed, in a letter to Dulles on 27 February, congratulated 
him on the declaration of arms aid to Pakistan but reminded]that on his 
visit to the State Department he had warned Dulles about the increasing 
problems over Kashmir and the canal water^ Ghulam Mohammed said he had 
just read the World Bank proposals over the distribution of the river 
water and did not think that they constituted a fair settlement; indeed, 
'they seem to have been guided by political considerations rather than 
justice and fair play. I expected and looked forward that the U.S.A. 
will exert their influence in favour of justice, but unfortunately my
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impression has been belied' . This was strong stuff from someone well 
known to be pro-American and shows the depth of feeling in Pakistan at 
the time over these issues. Ghulam Mohammed went on to say that Pakistan 
had taken a calculated risk in accepting American aid over these issues 
and was depending on American promises. He hoped Dulles would forgive 
him for this letter but he felt he must speak frankly to 'the one man 
whom I regard as a great friend of Pakistan and a well-wisher of Muslim 
countries'. (51)
Ghulam Mohammed's letter raised a few eye-brows in Washington. 
Byroade immediately recommended to Dulles that he should write a rather 
stiff letter back, making it clear that U.S. military assistance did not
mean any change in the American stance of impartiality in Indo-Pak
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disputes. The letter was also embarrasing, as it did not come through
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the normal diplomatic channels, but was sent direct. Ambassador Hildreth 
was bypassed in the process, as was the Pakistan Cabinet. Dulles was 
told to recommend that Hildreth should personally hand over the reply 
and request that Bogra be informed of the initial letter and the 
reply. (52) Byroade also wrote to Hildreth with a copy of the Ghulam 
Mohammed letter enclosed and warned him that he would find it 'an 
astonishing document' . (53) Whether the request that the letter be
shown to Bogra was agreed to by Ghulam Mohammed is unfortunately not 
known.
Once American military aid had been granted, the Pakistanis started 
to speak more freely about the Indian threat than when aid was still in 
the balance. This worried the Americans who were being informed by the 
British on this point as Pakistan was well aware of the U.S. aversion to 
any mention of her defence against India. An official in the U.K. High
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Commission informed the U.S. Consul General that the Punjab Chief 
Minister, Feroze Khan Noon, had informed him that he felt Indian
foreign policy was imperialistic and that he had no real fear of Russian 
aggression. Noon was reported to have said that the best effect of the 
Turko-Pakistan agreement would be to limit Indian expansion westwards. 
The British official said that he had questioned Noon on this point to 
confirm there was no possible misunderstanding but Noon had repeated 
himself with considerable emphasis. The same British officer had 
questioned a Pakistani general and believed that Noon's views were 
prevalent among the Pakistan army. The Consul General reported that such 
views had never been expressed to him, possibly because it was well 
known in Pakistan that America's main priority was to oppose communist 
expansion and so Pakistanis spoke to Americans only of their concern 
about the same objective.(42)
The Turko-Pakistan pact was finally signed and published on 2 April. 
The agreement was ^ inconclusive as no decision on joint defence 
planning was reached but had important symbolic importance. The two 
countries agreed to try and co-operate on cultural and regional security 
matters. The military aspects were said to be covered by Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter which allowed for legitimate self-defence. Bogra
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calimed the treaty to be the first 'concrete step toward the 
strengthening of the Muslim world'. There were few dissenting voices on 
the treaty from the Pakistani press and, there is little doubt that the 
American decision to initiate an agreement between Pakistan and Turkey, 
was the most popular way for the announcement of military aid to 
Pakistan.
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A U,S, Military Mission
A U.S. Military Mission visited Pakistan in March 1954 to make an 
assessment on the spot as to what Pakistan's requirements were and how 
far the U.S. could go in meeting them. The secret aspects to the talks 
were what Pakistan would be required to do. On 3 April, the American 
team met senior members of the Pakistan cabinet, along with the heads of 
the Pakistan armed forces. Hildreth was present, as were senior 
Pakistani civil servants. Bogra opened the proceedings by thanking the 
Military Team for the understanding and sympathetic way that they had 
carried out their survey. He said that Pakistan's decision to receive 
U.S. military aid was a correct one and was in the mutual interest of 
both countries. In fact, the Prime Minister claimed that the U.S. had 
more to gain from the agreement than Pakistan; Pakistan would also 
benefit but had taken the risk of incurring hostility from Russia and 
India as a result. The Soviet government was said to have already sent a 
second protest note. Pakistan had taken the risk because of her desire 
to combat communism and her desire to stand alongside the western 
democracies. The U.S. gain was seen by Bogra as having the prestige of 
having an independent and neutral country aligning herself firmly with 
the U.S.
Ambassador Hildreth then pointed out that the recommendations of the 
team would be their own, and not his, as he was not a military man. 
However, he appreciated what Bogra had said and was sure that it would 
be relayed to Washington. General Meyers, the leader of the U.S. 
Military Mission, emphasised the technical nature of the team, and that 
political considerations were not their concern. The Finance Minister, 
Mohammed Ali, then thanked the team and wanted a few points to be
cleared up. He said that the Meyers plan, which had been briefly 
outlined, was only trying to make good the deficiencies in the first 
phase 3f Pakistan's Five-Year plan. However, Pakistan had not been able 
to achieve any target of that plan due to the slump in world commodity 
prices and that yardstick was unreliable. The military programme, 
moreover, was designed with the idea that Pakistan's best hope of 
defence against communist aggression hitherto had been the expectation 
that the Russians would not attack a neutral country. Now that Pakistan 
was a firm western ally, her defence requirements had to change 
completely. When she approached the U.S. for military aid it was to 
enable her to meet the communist threat effectively and, if "he 
objective was that she should be in a position to safeguard peace in the 
regiOD, then the U.S. military plan should be modelled on that basis. 
The communists had already targeted Pakistan for hostile statements; and 
there was now no hope of a settlement with India over many problems 
being reached.
Kohammed Ali said that Pakistan was willing to take the risks of 
being allied with America in the interest of democracy, and in the hope 
that American aid would enable Pakistan to lighten its excessive defence 
burdei thus, speeding up economic development. The common man vas 
prepared to accept the decision of his government and the belief *as 
widespread that there would be direct benefits of increased resources. 
If, towever, there were to be very small benefits, as outlined by 
Meyers, then Mohammed Ali felt that many people would openly question 
whether the acceptance of any aid had been worth the political price and 
no democratic government could ignore public opinion. He said that, 
unless Pakistan and the U.S. were agreed on a common objective, and if
that was not going further than shoring up the deficiency of old plans, 
there was really nothing to be gained. Hildreth said that he had 
appreciated the 'lucid and restrained statement' Mohammed Ali had made.
Mohammed Ali had hit the nail uncomfortably on the head, Meyers 
tried to say that he was concerned about Pakistan's present capability 
and not about long-term planning. Mohammed Ali persisted and said that 
until basic objectives were agreed upon, Paklistan would never be able to 
develop in the future.
The American Army Attache, who had been present at the meeting, 
added his own comments to the report sent 1to the State Department. He 
said that Pakistan had high hopes that U.S. aid would have allowed the 
expansion of her army at no extra cost to herself. Pakistan believed 
that no orderly expansion was possible until a final figure was defined. 
Pakistani hopes were seen as high as no American official had 
discouraged Ayub Khan or Ghulam Mohammed since they had presented plans 
for expansion eighteen months previously. Mirza had even mentioned that 
the sum of fifty million dollars annually wouild be needed.
The Americans saw complete co-ordination amongst Pakistani officials 
in their attempt to increase the amount of American aid. Past events 
were being distorted as, for example, when the Pakistanis claimed that 
the U.S. had taken the lead in setting up the military aid programme and 
totally ignoring how they themselves had been requesting it for two 
years previously. The Pakistani claim that the military aid had 
destroyed any chance of a settlement over Kashmir was different to 
previous statements that a strong Pakistan was the best guarantee/'a 
quick settlement. It seemed clear to the U.S. Embassy that Pakistan 
would exert pressure in the near future to get agreement on a long-term
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military programme but the pressure was seen as being in a friendly 
spirit. The Pakistani demands were not seen as unreasonable and the 
military attache concluded that with frank discussion an acceptable 
policy could be agreed upon,without a deterioration in relations.(55)
Hildreth added his own observations on the important meeting which 
had taken place. In a despatch of 8 April, Hildreth observed that the 
remarks of Mohammed Ali had been directed more at him than at the 
military men. The thought, also repeated in private conversations, was 
that Pakistan was receiving insufficient aid for the risks it was 
incurring. Hildreth recounted an incident which he noted had not 
appeared in the minutes sent earlier. Hildreth asked the Pakistani 
government officials to remember the atmosphere of November 1953 vhen 
Vice-President Nixon was visiting their country, Nixon had asked the 
Prime Minister and one of his assistants what would happen if Pakistan 
was not granted any military aid. The assistant had replied that 
'Pakistan would feel like a girl who had been led up a primrose path 
under a spotlight and then abandoned1 . Hildreth had asked the assistant 
if the analogy was a fair one as it might be more accurate to say the 
the U.S. had been chased down the primrose path and he had laughingly 
replied that it might be more accurate but the result was the same. 
Hildreth recalled that the Pakistanis had all laughed and enjoyed the 
point but Mohammed Ali had given an alternative analogy. That was that 
of a man going to his neighbour to borrow a gun to shoot a mad dog, and 
being given a needle and thread to repair a hole in his trousers 
instead. Zafrullah Khan had then added, 'Especially if the mad dog was 
intelligent enough to know that you had gone to borrow a gun'.
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In his report Hildreth then dealt with the claim that Mohammed Ali 
had made about there being no hope now for any settlement of the Kashmir 
and water disputes with India. He felt that the 'long-term aspects and 
implications of military aid to Pakistan with concomitant economic 
support deserve the most careful and thorough consideration on the basis 
of our long-term policy for the Middle East. In my opinion, a programme 
of military assistance to Pakistan makes no sense from either a military 
or political point of view as a one year hand out of some military 
equipment' . The Ambassador concluded by saying that the exaggerated 
views of the Pakistan military had to be 'shaken into reality'. Hildreth 
certainly believed in a firm hand in Pakistan as he said that 'it 
behoves the U.S. Government to co-ordinate^ military and political 
policy for this country', He believed that to leave the Pakistanis 
without further guidance about American intentions would result in a 
deterioration in relations.(56)
The growth of American involvement and the sudden loss of British 
influence in Pakistan left the High Commissioner in Karachi, Sir Gilbert 
Laithwaite, feeling ^ i^/tha^ was time to face a new situation. He wrote 
in a telegram to the Commonwealth Relations Office that the British 
position in Pakistan was weak and getting worse 'because of the 
difficulty of seeing what can be done effectively to remedy it. 
Financially and in terms of supply, we cannot, unfortunately, hope to 
compete with the United States'. Pakistan now recognised that 'it is not 
we, but the Americans who now have something to give, and who are ready 
and anxious to take political, diplomatic and military initiatives which 
for good reasons are not open to us' . He pointed out that B r i t a n  should 
not 'adopt a dog in the manger attitude' and there was nothing for it
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but to welcome American aid, even if it fes- in 'certain repectslpalatable
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to us'. He ended by admitting that 'This is a depressing and in some 
senses rather humiliating analysis. But it is no good blinking at the 
facts'.(57)
The information coming from Hildreth in Karachi prompted Jernegan to 
send detailed instructions and advice on 22 April. Jernegan hoped that 
the Ambassador would have been able to clear up after the visit of the 
Military Mission, which seemed to have ruffled some Pakistani feathers. 
It was intended to reassure Hildreth that, although there was some 
confusion in Washington, there was no chaos or utter contradiction as 
Hildreth had been implying. Jernegan wrote that the first element to 
understand was that the nature and importance of the Middle East to the 
U.S. had not yet been clearly defined. That meant that the amount of
investment needed in the area was still being debated, but there was a 
movement towards accepting the real need for the U.S. to protect its 
interests in that region. The State Department had long been convinced 
that this should be a matter of high priority for the U.S., he
continued, but the Pentagon felt that U.S. resources were inadequate for
any fresh undertakings. A complete reconciliation had still to be 
achieved even as the decision to supply aid to Pakistan had been
decided.
When the decision was finally reached, Jernegan believed that there 
was a recognition amongst those who made it that it would be necessary 
to carry it through on a significant basis. Eisenhower and Admiral 
Radford were said to have been of this opinion. Jerengan hoped that they 
had been able to move quickly and so limit any damage that the Meyers 
Mission might have caused and he had no doubts that the U.S. would be
able to follow through with a programme for Pakistan which would 
convince 'even the doubters that the U.S. supports its friends'. He 
expected the programme would take time to work effectively as this had
been the case with military aid programme elsewhere. He said that the
'logic of the situation is too clear and the supporters of the Pakistan 
programme too strong to permit any other development1 . Ambassador 
Hildreth was told not to allow the inevitably slow start or confusing 
statements to discourage either himself or the Pakistanis. Jernegan
ended by saying that there were solid reasons for believing that the
programme was the start of important developments and everyone should 
proceed with that in mind.(58)
Ihs. £ relationship
On 26 April, Ghulam Mohammed met Hildreth and expressed the hope 
that the two might exchange ideas freely about the Middle East. Ghulam 
Mohammed first produced a telegram written by the Pakistani Ambassador 
in Iraq, which referred to a talk with Muri Said, the Prime Minister of 
Iraq, about the possibility of Iraq joining the Turko-Pakistan Pact. 
Hildreth said that it seemed clear that any approach to the Iraqi 
question was the business of the two main parties and not of the U.S. 
His understanding was that, as things had to take a turn for the worse 
as far as U.S. military aid to Iraq went; the State Department was 
demanding that Iraq should make up it's mind over the Turko-Pakistan 
agreement as the U.S. was losing interest; and only a telegram from the 
U.S. Ambasador in Iraq pleading that the U.S. should grant aid to Iraq 
had allowed a change of heart and without reference to any pact, it 
seemed, that aid had subsequently been granted. Hildreth noted that the 
Iraqi government must have suspected that the amount of aid to be
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granted had some relation with Iraqi co-operation to Turkey and 
Pakistan.
Ghulam Mohammed then turned the conversation to Saudi Arabia. He 
said that he did not want to hold anything back from Hildreth and so 
showed him a memorandum of a conversation between King Saud and 
Zafrullah Khan. Saud had expressed the hope that Pakistan might use her 
influence with Turkey to persuade her to sever her diplomatic ties with 
IsraeL. The bait was that Saud in return would make sure that all Arab
r
counties, with the possible exception of Egypt, would join the Turko-
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Pakistan Pact. Zafrullah had replied that this was certainly not the 
time for Pakistan to try and bring any pressure to bear on Turkey as 
Turkey's greatest worry about the Pact was that it might become too
Islamic and might create problems of unwanted or excessive Islamic
activity in Turkey. Ghulam Mohammed commented to Hildreth that, apart 
from that argument, trade between Turkey and Israel was too profitable 
for Turkey to break off diplomatic ties. Ghulam Mohammed felt that the 
fact Saud had suggested such a thing suggested two points: firstly, that 
Saudi Arabia and other Arab states would like to join the Pact; and
secondly, that the only real hurdle was the question of Israel.
Ghulam Mohammed moved on to his own talks with Saud, which he 
described as firm and frank. He felt that there were two key points in 
Saud's position. The first of these was that Saud had stressed his long 
friendship with, and admiration for, the U.S. His main sadness was that 
the U.S. was building up his enemies, the Israelis, and that something 
would have to be done about that. Ghulam Mohammed felt that by the
King's constant reference to this point, he wanted to be more closely 
allied with the west and just to be given an assurance that Israel would
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not expand any further and would return a reasonable portion of land to 
the Arabs. The second major subject in the talks with Saud had been that 
of U.S. military aid. Saud was described as indignant about the U.S. 
offer of military aid as he felt it intruded upon his sovereignty. 
Ghulam Mohammed 'really bristled' upon this point and said: 'I don't
believe they are impinging upon your sovereignty. Certainly the United 
States has not tried to impinge upon our sovereignty and I am not a 
stooge on the payroll of the United States. Anyone who believes that 
they are impinging upon my sovereignty or that I am their stooge is a 
fool'. Ghulam Mohammed had pressed Saud on this point and had examined 
the form of military aid the U.S. had offered the Saudis telling him 
that it was 'bunk' that the U.S. was trying to impinge upon his 
sovereign rights. Israel seemed to Ghulam Mohammed to be Saud's sticking 
point and the rest was 'irrational argument'.
Ghulam Mohammed told Hildreth that he was going to send Saud a 
detailed report of how he viewed things aind the Ambassador then 
announced that he was going to America to report personally and Hildreth 
suggested that it would be useful if he could have a copy of the report 
Ghulam Mohammed was going to send to Saud. Hildreth then rechecked the 
facts with Zafrullah Khan and received his confirmation. (59)
Pakistan completes the., formalities
The formalities of a Pakistani alliance with the United States were 
completed when, on 19 May, a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was 
signed in Karachi. (60) The main terms were that the U.S. would furnish 
Pakistan with arms and services which the U.S. felt Pakistan needed. The 
arms were to be used for internal security, self-defence and collective 
defence of the region. Mo aggressive acts were to be permitted. Pakistan
Hi
in return was to make a full contribution to the 'defensive strength of 
the free world'. The agreement was signed by Zafrullah Khan and the U.S. 
Charge d'Affaires in Karachi. J.K. Emmerson, who was a senior member of
text without any explanatory material had given rise to numerous 
misunderstandings: that the unfriendly section of the press in Pakistan 
was exploiting picked phrases in the agreement to the detriment of the 
U.S. Emmerson reported that there was a widespread misconception fiaaj
that a large number of high ranking U.S. army officers were going to 
take over the Pakistan army. He, therefore, requested additional 
information from Washington regarding the agreement and suggested that 
Hildreth should consider making a major speech on his return to Pakistan 
spelling out how the agreement was to work and how it would not result 
in any loss of Pakistan's sovereignty. Emmerson also advised that, now 
that military aid had been granted, the public relations role was 
becoming more difficult than before as doubts and disappointment were
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naturally appearing while the amounts were being decie'ded. Even staunch 
Pakistani friends of the U.S. were reported as becoming more 
critical.(61) The completion of formalities was over and now, as far as 
Dulles was concerned, the serious business of constructing the Northern 
Tier could begin. As far as the Pakistan leadership was concerned, the 
nightmare of having to fight an unequal battle with India, alone and 
weak, was at last seemingly lifted with an alliance with the most 
powerful country in the world. Using that power to defend Pakistan 
against India, however, was to prove as elusive for Pakistan as a solid 
anti-Soviet alliance in the Middle East was to prove for the Americans.
Karachi Embassy, reported on 27 May that the publication of the
1/7
In June, Emmerson wrote an evaluation of Pakistan's foreign policy 
entitled, 'Pakistani attitudes toward India and the United States'. He 
believed that Pakistan was obsessed by India with a feeling of envy and 
frustration, but this was now less acute as the pact with Turkey had 
enabled the Pakistanis to look towards the Kiddle East, and that the 
Pakistan government thought that in aligning themselves with the west, 
they had taken a very serious step, as the agreements with Turkey and 
the U.S. had been signed within a few months of each other. There seemed 
to be a vast change from the way the U.S. was perceived in the previous 
year. At the time of the message, Emmerson believed the U.S enjoyed a
taking by aligning herself with the west and emphasised that her
position must be strong enough to command respect from their new 
potential enemies. They argued that any half-hearted development would 
be worse than none at all. It was in that context that a storm blew up 
when U.S. grants to India were reported. He found a feeling in Pakistan 
that America was inclined to take Pakistan for granted and to appease 
India. He accepted that it was impossible for the U.S. ever to expect 
Pakistan to like U.S. economic aid to India, or the Indians ever to like 
U.S. military aid to Pakistan, but he felt that the U.S. could only
continue to explain its grounds for doing both these things. Emmerson
recommended that the U.S. should remember not to take Pakistan for 
granted: the Pakistan government was a very new and hesitant member of
the western camp and 'a pat on the back was inexpensive and yet
sometimes vastly effective'. (62)
du.4;
wide popularity. Pakistanis still that Pakistan was
On 23 June, Emmerson reported that Bogra had asked him to call the 
previous evening to show him a letter from the U.K. High Commissioner 
which proposed that the government of Pakistan should send one 
representative from each of the armed services to the U.K. for general 
talks on Middle Eastern defence, with particular emphasis on shippin?. 
The letter stated that these talks were envisaged as continuing the very 
close and frank discussions between the British Chiefs of Staff and 
Iskander Mirza during the latter's visit to London. Laithwaite had 
stated that there was no commitment attached to the talks and was sure 
that the U.S. would not object. Bogra told Emmerson that in view of the 
close Pak-U.S. friendship, he wanted to consult the Americans before 
replying. Bogra felt inclined to favour the proposal as he believed the 
U.K. could make a helpful contribution as Pakistan would be completely 
dependent on sea transportation if it was to make a defence 
contribution. Bogra also said, however, that he did not want any 
conflict between the talks with the British and the U.S. aid programme
Emmerson agreed with the latter point and said it would be 
unfortunate if there was a lack of co-ordination in military talks
Department would say. Bogra requested a reply as soon as possible so he 
could reply to the British. In reporting to Washington, Emmerson added 
that the High Commission had not discussed this matter with the Embassy 
and the U.S. Military Attache had learnt from his British counter-part 
that the British felt they were making useful progress with Mirza. 
Although the British told Bogra that the talks involved no commitment, 
Emmerson felt that it was clear that they would be conducted on the 
basis of certain agreed assumptions and seemed certain to crystallise
between the U.S. and U.K. He promised to enquire the State
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Pakistani thinking to some extent. The purpose of the U.S. Military 
Mission might be complicated from the outset by the existence of same 
Pak-U.K. understanding which might not be consistent with U.S.
objectives. He felt that this underlined the necessity of early Anglo- 
American talks aimed at developing an agreed position on the Middle 
East. Emmerson, therefore, recommended that the U.S. should request the 
Pakistanis to defer all discussions with the British until the U.S. 
Military Aid Programme was established. (63)
Dulles replied on 28 June by telling Emmerson tkat he should inform 
Bogra that the U.S. appreciated the fact that he had consulted the 
Americans prior to replying to the British request that talks on Middle 
East defence should be resumed. While the U.S. did not wish to object to 
the resumption of talks, Dulles said that the Americans hoped that the 
Pakistanis would treat the views and conclusions reached as tentative,
and would appreciate being kept informed of the mature of talks and
views exchanged. Dulles added a section for the information of the 
Embassy only. It stated that America was keenly aware of the need for 
talks with the U.K. on the Middle East but, as it could not be predicted 
when such talks would be completed and^ detailed "talks with Pakistan 
could begin, he had felt it was unwise to ^activ^ely /discourage^ the 
inclination of the Pakistani authorities to accept the British
proposal.(64)
The U.S. Embassy in Karachi wrote a long and important evaluation on 
U.S. policy towards Pakistan on 10 July. This reponrt was said to have 
been prompted by the critical economic situation iin Pakistan and the 
urgent appeals by the Pakistan government for help. The Embassy believed 
that the substantial economic requests by the Pakistan government
presented the opportunity for an examination of the policy of the U.S., 
including her intended objectives and the prospects for their 
accomplishment. The report started with the basic assumption that it was 
in the interest of the U.S. to see Pakistan economically and militarily 
stable and anti-communist. These assumptions were said to have been 
implicit in the military aid agreement that had been signed recently. 
The unanswered questions were seen as what the importance of Pakistan 
was in the U.S. eyes and what level of investment the U.S. was willing 
to make in Pakistan to attain the objectives mentioned earlier.
The question as to whether the U.S. wanted to see Pakistan develop 
into a strong military power, was not one which the Embassy felt they 
could answer, as it involved the world wide strategy of the U.S. but the 
Embassy did say that, if the U.S. wanted to see Pakistan built up into a 
power to complement that of Turkey, then the magnitude of the future 
investment should assume some calculable shape. The Embassy did not 
foresee any change in the 'ruling group* in Pakistan. This group was 
characterised as being anti-communist, pro-American, fully supported by 
the Pakistan army and powerful enough to maintain political stability in 
the country. Pakistan's involvement in the Middle East was seen as 
diminishing her 'obsession' with India. The signing of the military aid 
agreement was seen as placing the two countries in a relationship of 
military partnership, at least as far as Pakistan was concerned. Once 
the high Pakistani hopes for a two billion dollar commitment by the U.S. 
were dashed, Ayub Khan was seen as looking to the Americans as senior 
associates, for guidance and instructions. Now that an agreement had 
been reached, the Pakistan military were getting impatient that they had 
not been assigned a role in the strategic concept of the area.
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Bogra had reported that, on his recent visit to Turkey, he had taken 
the line that the two countries should make joint plans which should 
then be submitted to the U.S. The Pakistanis could then say to the U.S. 
that, if they were given certain things, they could do certain other 
things, depending on the type and quantity of aid. The British
invitation for talks had been accepted by Pakistan and Ayub was leaving
To
in August/attend. The Embassy said that the final decision about the 
extent to which the U.S. was prepared to underwrite Pakistan was linked 
inextricably to economic, military and political factors. Previous 
decisions to assist Pakistan had been determined by a belief in the 
survival of Pakistan and its potential development as a firm member of 
the free world. The Embassy had believed that the decision to aid 
Pakistan militarily was influenced by public statements of Nehru which 
made the 'refusal of aid difficult for any self-respecting nation'. The 
Embassy now believed that, if the U.S. was going to increase its 
investment in Pakistan, she would be justified in trying to pressurise 
the Pakistan government into becoming more 'realistic' in its aims. 
Pakistan was seen as trying to become too strong, too quickly and then 
presenting the bill to the U.S. The problem was, however, that, if the 
pro-western government of Pakistan was not helped, its reputation which 
was a real asset to the best interests of the United States would 
suffer. The report stated in its conclusion that the Embassy believed 
Pakistan to be a 'tolerable risk' but said the investment in her should 
be scrutinised with 'unrelenting care'. The prospects for returns should 
be compared with those expected in India and the Middle East. American 
influence was seen to be expanding in Pakistan through decisions taken 
already. But as the report tellingly concluded, 'with influence comes
responsibility'.(65) Vhat is conspiciously absent from this assesment is 
an account of what the U.S. could, or should, be doing for the 
democratic experiment which had been going on in Pakistan since 1947. So 
preoccupied is it with the Cold Var, and the attitude of the Pakistani 
leadership towards that problem, that the State Department and the
Le
Karachi embassy, seem^barely , aware of the political factors within 
Pakistan, the weakness of political parties and the absence of general 
elections.
This report summarised some of the contradictions and problems that 
the United States was faced with in its new relationship with Pakistan. 
The Dulles plan for the creation of a Northern Tier, of which Pakistan 
and Turkey were to be the two flanks, in protection of the Kiddle East, 
had some serious handicaps. If Pakistan was to play a role comparable to 
that of Turkey and be an 'eastern bastion' of the west, then it needed a 
huge investment from the United States: economically, politically and
militarily. The economic burden was a debatable issue but with American 
concern that China was now a serious threat in South East Asia, American 
attention was not focussed on the Middle East. The political price for 
America was the possibility of unremitting Indian hostility. Despite 
great annoyance with Nehru over his strictly neutralist approach, the 
Americans never discounted (|| India and aid still flowed to Delhi. The
potential alliance that India and America could form was too tantalizing
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a prospect for the State Department ever to give up on. Militarily, the 
cost of constructing a formidable army in a poor and physically divided 
country was huge. Pakistan could obviously not afford to pay for the 
weapons it neepded to deter any Soviet attack and so huge military 
grants would have to be made, diverting them from other areas of mare
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pressing concern. For Pakistan, in comparison, the choices were simpler.
The Pakistan goverments objective from May 1954 onward was simple: to
A
squeeze as much out of the alliance as possible. The possible pressure 
exerted by a smaller power on its larger ally could be considerable and 
the U. S. -Pakistan example has been seen as a case study for this 
problem. (66) In return for American military and economic aid, Pakistan
vv<|s taken into two further pacts, one 1 not conceivably interest
Pakistan; the South East Asia Treaty Organistion. How and why Pakistan
A*
subscribed to that pact is examined next.
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Chapter 2.
Pakistan and the. South East. Asia Treaty Organisation 
The. Origins ol SEATQ,
South East Asia was to be an area of great concern to both the 
western powers of Britain and America throughout the fifties. The 
British empire had all but collapsed world wide but Malaysia, or Mala
as it was then known, remained a colony. The Americans had been 
relatively unconcerned about South East Asia following the end of the 
Second Vorld War, but the invasion by communist North Korea of South 
Korea in June 1950, changed the situation dramatically. The United 
States realised to its horror that the communist menace was not confined 
only to Korea but was spreading to Vietnam. In Vietnam, a nationalist
communist movement was threatening by 1954 to over-run the whole of
O
Indo-China. In March 1954, Dulles declared that the situatin was so
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serious that it ought to be met by the united force of the 'free 
community' . Shortly afterwards, he said this united action should be
taken by j ten states involved in that region, but Pakistan was not
mentioned as one of them. (1)
The idea of a South East Asia Treaty Organisation or a South East 
Asia Defence Organisation,as it was sometimes called, was first 
seriously discussed in the Geneva Conference in May 1954. This was 
called after the French surrendered at the battle of Dien Bien Phu on 7
withdrawal from Vietnam. The Geneva Conference focussed attention on the 
future of Indo-China. Right in the middle of deliberations at the Geneva 
Conference, Sir Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, wrote to 
the Foreign Office, and said that a South East Asian defence agreement
otc-SC-ueS'
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was needed to create a deterrent to communism. He went on to say that he 
hoped that 'ultimately India, Pakistan and Ceylon may be able to provide 
the local military backing that the western powers, because of tteir 
commitments elsewhere, cannot furnish alone'. The idea of using Indian 
and Pakistani troops was also mentioned by him. (2) Eden's speech to the 
Geneva Conference had pointed out that the governments of Pakistan and 
Burma, which were not represented there, were being kept fully informed 
of the Conference developments day by day as they were seen as being 
affected by the outcome, and might wish to play a part in the defence of 
the region in the future.(3)
Just a few days after this telegram was sent, the British delegation 
to Geneva informed the Foreign Office that they had heard that Dulles 
had already invited the Colombo Powers to join in a pact for the defence 
of South East Asia and that Burma had refused. (4) It was clear even at 
this stage that there were serious Anglo-American differences over the 
strateg3y(ind concept of a South East Asian defence organisation. In a 
possible attempt not to be left far behind Eden sent a message on 18 May 
to the governments of India, Pakistan and Ceylon which said that Britain 
had decided to hold talks on the defence of South East Asia aid was 
inviting all interested countries to attend without any commitment. (5) 
Just the day before this telegram was sent, Selwyn Lloyd of the Foreign 
Office was asked a Parliamentary Question on what proposals Britain had 
received from the Colombo Powers on the question of South East Asia 
defence. Although Lloyd answered that discussions with those powers were 
continuing, a Foreign Office official noted that a more truthful ar.swer 
to the question would have been 'None, Sir!' . (6)
Some of the substantial Anglo-American differences over the 
question of a South East Asian defence organisation were starting to 
come out into the open. On 20 May the Foreign Office had been informed 
that President Eisenhower in a press conference had gone so far as to 
suggest that collective security in South East Asia was such a basic and 
important goal of U.S. policy that it would go ahead, without British 
participation if need be. (7) The British Ambassador to Washington, Sir 
Roger Makins, suggested that the main reason for the Anglo-American 
division over this question stemmed from the U.S. feeling that, if the 
first steps towards SEATO were worked out quickly, it would help the 
western position at the Geneva Conference while the British had 
disagreed with that assumption. Makins also felt that some differences
were caused by the British being more mindful of Asian opinion than the
Americans. (8) Eden replied to that view by saying that the Anglo-
American rift over this question was more fundamental than Makins was
suggesting. Eden said that the Americans had tried to convert the Five- 
Power Chiefs of Staff talks into a formal alliance and that had weakened 
the western position at Geneva, adding that 'but for the Americans, 
these Staff talks could have begun long ago' . Eden felt that the 
inclusion of Siam (Thailand) and the Philippines would result in only a 
token Asian presence and the British wished to avoid that. In a stinging 
criticism of the American attitude, Eden argued that the Americans 
'appear to contemplate an organisation that would assist them to re­
conquer Indo-China. Her Majesty's Government, for their part, would not 
be prepared to participate in such a venture'. (9) Eden also told the 
House of Commons on 23 June that the defence of South East Asia without 
the good-will of India and other free nations was impossible. (10)
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On 27 May, the High Commissioner in Delhi informed the Commonwealth
Relations Office that he had just met his American counterpart. The U.S.
$
Ambasador, Allen, who had just returned from Washington where he had met
A
both Dulles and Eisenhower, said that he had emphasised to Dulles that a 
step by step approach was needed for there to be any chance that India 
would contemplate joining SEATO. Dulles was reported to have asked 
whether the Indians could not 'organise a scheme of collective defence 
among South East Asian countries with the U.S. and U.K. standing behind 
in support' . Dulles did not specify whether Pakistan was going to be one 
of those countries joining an Indian sponsored defence organisation. 
Allen replied to Dulles that he thought such a scheme would have to be 
very carefully planned with the Indians but was still unlikely to 
succeed. The High Commissioner felt the whole scheme was a virtual 
impossibility. <11^
Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, the High Commissioner in Karachi, had a talk 
with Mohammed Ali Bogra on the contingencies the Five-Power Staff Talks 
had been planning for South East Asia. Laithwaite told him that the 
British government had tried to keep the Pakistan government informed of 
the talks throughout. Bogra expressed his gratitude at being kept 
informed, even though Laithwaite had told him that India and Ceylon were 
also being kept informed. Laithwaite welcomed the fact that Bogra had 
sent a message to Eden regarding the Indo-China situation as it was 
important that Pakistan be involved. (12) On 19 July, the British Embassy 
in Washington discussed with the Foreign Office the problem of defining 
the treaty area, if Pakistan was to join SEATO, and India did not. A 
visit by the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary at the end of
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June had tried to resolve Anglo-American differnces over the form of a
South East Asian defence organisation. A study group was set up with
JL'
officials to try to iron out differnces between the two western powers.
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This joint Anglo-American study group, which had been meeting in
Washington, had come across the problem of Kashmir, as Pakistan could
argue that it was of concern to it as signatory, and India was not
involved. (13)
Any indications from the west that Pakistan might not be invited to
join SEATO were treated with some resentment in the Pakistan Foreign
Ministry. Murray, of the High Commission, was reproached by the acting
Foreign Secretary in Pakistan, Agha Hilaly, for a suggestion from London
that none of the Colombo Powers would wish to join SEATO. The 'Colombo
Powers' was a term used to signify India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and
Indonesia. This was after a series of meetings between these countries
in April and May 1954. Hilaly, while acknowledging that the chances of
India or Indonesia joining were remote, felt that Burma offered the U.K.
some scope for helping to develop a foreign poLicy independent of India.
Even more to the point, Hilaly said that he felt that Pakistan would
wish to be associated with the defence of South East Asia or, at least
take part in discussions about the establishment of a defence pact. This
was in spite of any Pakistani commitments in the Middle East. Hilaly
emphasised that Pakistan took all decisions affecting her own interests
regardless of any common Asian line. Laithwaite added that this
obviously implied India. Hilaly said that the fact that East Bengal was
a part of Pakistan made her a South East Asian country.
Hilaly continued that, although he hoped that Ceylon would join, he
I
could not rule out the possibilty that Pakistan might be the only member
of the Colombo Pact to participate in SEATO. He admitted that the issue 
did raise many large problems for Pakistan and that he had no idea what 
the view of his Cabinet would be an the subject. He said it would 
depend to some extent on what the reaction of other Colombo Powers would 
be. Hilaly told Murray that the Americans had not up to that time 
raised with Pakistan the question of SEATO. Laithwaite commented that, 
although the participation of Pakistan in any SEATO talks would annoy 
the Indians, it was unlikely that that would sway Pakistan in any way. 
Hilaly's comments were seen by Laithwaite as very valuable as he was 
'thinking aloud' what the view of the Foreign Ministry was. Laithwaite, 
therefore, urged that any other information which could be passed to the 
Pakistanis should be sent as should an indication of whether the British 
government was still keen on Pakistan joining SEATO even if she alone 
was involved.(14)
On 24 July, the State Department sent a circular to its Embassies in 
Asia which reached Karachi the following day. The circular stated that 
agreement had been reached between America and Britain in Geneva on the
first moves towards a confe ce on South East Asian defence. The British
government was to consult the governments of Australia, New Zealand, 
Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan on the possibility of these 
governments participating in establishing a collective security 
agreement in South East Asia. France would also be approached and the 
U.S. was also to ask the Philippines and Thailand to join. The two sides 
had also agreed at Geneva that preliminary discussions should be 
completed by 7 August and representatives should meet not later than 1 
September to discuss the details. The procedure for the birth of the 
South East Asia Treaty Organisation, (SEATO), was finalised. The
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circular continued to say that the information then available suggested 
that India, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon would not be willing to 
participate in such a scheme. In such a case, the U.K. government would 
like these governments to adopt a favourable attitude towards this group 
or at least not be hostile to it.
British and. American views on Pakistan1s participation
The attitude of Pakistan was unknown to the State Department but 
they anticipated that the Bogra goverment might be willing to 
participate from the outset in an effort to establish collective 
defence. Before taking a definite position, the Americans had 
anticipated that Pakistan would like to hear the American view of the 
pact regarding the most desirable course of action. In view of the other 
Colombo Powers, the Americans had doubts about Pakistan becoming an 
influential member of the group as it might well affect the Indian 
attitude to the proposed pact adversely. This in turn was seen as having 
an unfavourable effect on the other Colombo Powers. The Americans had 
also felt that, if Pakistan did not became an initial participant, she 
might be able to exert some constructive influence on the other South 
Asian countries; this could lead to a favourable attitude being taken 
towards a South East Asian defence pact and perhaps later their own 
smaller grouping. This was seen by Dulles as 'tentative thinking' on 
Pakistan; and the U.S. wished to have an opportunity to consult with the 
U.K. and others 'before expressing any definitive views' to the Pakistan 
government. Before that happened, however, the previous view was used in 
discussion with Pakistani government officials. (15)
The attitude of the Pakistan government was not seen as crucial by 
the U.S. Embassy in Burma. On 27 July, a telegram was sent to the State
Department which said that the government of Burma had already stated on 
several occasions that it would not join SEATO but would not appose it 
either. (16) Amjad Ali, the Pakistan Ambassador to the U.S., discussed 
some aspects of SEATO with State Department officials on 27 July. Amjad 
Ali said that communist 'cells' in Burma were a cause for concern to the 
Pakistan government because of the delicate situation in East Pakistan 
and so Pakistan was interested in the final proposals for SEATC. He
requirement now was for equipment. Jernegan, of the Near Eastern 
section, suggested it might be better for Pakistan to remain oucside 
SEATO if no other Colombo country joined. The ambassador had not 
answered the question directly but said that, if Pakistan wanted to 
join, it would do her best to persuade Ceylon to do likewise. He had 
said that, if both joined, it would have real advantages, leaving the 
implication open that it would not if Ceylon refused.(17)
The important factor governing Pakistani membership, as far as the 
U.S. was concerned, was that of India. On 28 July, Allen in New Delhi 
agreed in a report analysis for Washington that Pakistani participation 
in SEATO would increase Indian hostility to it but added that India was 
sure to oppose such an organisation anyway. Allen then listed the pros 
and cons of Pakistani membership of SEATO. The arguments against were 
that U.S. military aid to Pakistan was already an important reason why 
India was improving her relations with China. Further Indian concern 
could drive the two large Asian powers even closer together. Allen also 
said that, in view of Pakistan's economic condition, it may be desirable 
to discourage her from increasing her commitments too much or from 
leaning on the U.S. for additional support. While Pakistani abstention
added that his count rN had the 'bodies' that were needed; the
would not soften the Indian reaction, it might lead to less public 
criticisms against SEATO if Pakistan was not a member.
The positive aspects were seen by Allen as the favourable effect its 
membership would have on Burma and Ceylon. While the Burmese were seen 
as unlikely ever to admit it, they would feel more assured of prompt 
help, Just as the Afghans did, now that Pakistan had signed a pact with 
Turkey. The closeness of East Pakistan to the vulnerable areas in South 
East Asia could serve as a justification for Pakistani participation. If 
Pakistan's security interests were primarily directed towards the Middle 
East, Allen believed that it would be more difficult to justify the 
introduction of American military equipment into East Pakistan, whereas 
Pakistani membership of SEATO would enable American personnel and 
equipment to be based in Dacca. Allen had also foreseen the problem of 
trying to discourage Pakistan if it wanted to join. Allen thought that 
the views of the Pakistan government should be the chief determinant and 
that Indian's attitude would be softer if one other Colombo power could 
be induced to join. Ceylon seemed to be the best candidate and Pakistan 
was seen as the best country to sound he:r out. If Burma could be 
persuaded to take up a benevolent attitude, then it was seen as unlikely 
that Nehru would lash out at all his neighbours.(18)
On 28 July, Laithwaite sent a telegram to the Commonwealth 
Relations Office recognising the problem of tactics regarding the 
possible participation of Pakistan in SEATO. He felt that the Indian 
reaction to SEATO would not put Pakistan off joining; in fact he 
believed it might be a welcome chance for the Pakistan government to 
emphasise 'their political independence andL their active support for 
western policy'. Laithwaite felt that with the extent of American aid
to Pakistan still undecided, the Pakistan cabinet might want to take a 
line which would please the U.S. The Cabinet was still expected to weigh 
up the political considerations of being the only Colombo power to join. 
Ceylonese reluctance was seen as having considerable influence on 
Pakistani thinking. Laithwaite, therefore, recommended that all the 
Colombo powers should be told that they could attend any conference on 
South Asian defence without any commitment to join any organisation that 
emerged.
The High Commissioner had not spoken to Zafrullah or Hildreth at 
that stage but felt it important that the U.K. and U.S. should agree in 
advance on the line to be adopted if Pakistan was to be the only CoLouba 
power ready to participate actively in SEATO. Laithwaite pointed out 
the danger to the U.K. position if they felt unable to welcome a 
Pakistani offer to join and the U.S. welcomed such an initiative. He
said this would 'further increase American influence and expose us to 
the criticism that a Commonwealth country was better understood by the
Americans than by the United Kingdom' . (19) The High Commissioner in
Delhi warned on the same day that India would not join any SEATO type 
organisation and would resent it if Pakistan did. He pointed out that 
India feared that Vest Pakistan would be strengthened by a Middle East 
defence pact and East Pakistan through SEATO,(20)
On 29 July, a Foreign Office official outlined the official 
arguments in favour of Pakistan's participation in SEATO. Tahcuriin
started by saying that he was aware that Eden was anxious to secure 
Pakistani participation in SEATO even if she was the only Colombo pcwer 
at the meeting. He wrote that some doubts had been expressed in the 
Commonwealth Relations Office and Dulles was still believed zo be
undecided on the question. Tahourdin, however, then listed seven 
advantages in Pakistani participation in support of Eden's views. 
Pakistan's association with SEATO would not be seen as a new departure 
as her differences with India over this question were long-standing and 
generally recognised. Secondly, if Pakistan was to join from the outset 
it would be easier for countries like Ceylon to join later. Thirdly, 
Pakistan could make a more useful military contribution than either Siam 
or the Philippines. The last point was connected to the next as Pakistan 
was seen as a useful Asian counter-balance to 'the American proteges - 
Thailand and the Philippines'. Fifthly, if Pakistan were to be excluded 
then it would be blamed on the U.K. rather than the U.S. The American 
reasons for wanting to exclude Pakistan were seen as hard to understand 
as it would exclude all Colombo powers and the U.S. would be able to 
dominate SEATO. Lastly, East Pakistan was seen as giving Pakistan a 
direct interest in South East Asian security.(21)
This positive approach to Pakistan was spelt out in a mesage from 
the Commonwealth Relations Office to Delhi and Karachi on the following 
day. The telegram said that, although the U.K. hoped that there would 
not be too negative a reaction from Nehru if Pakistan was the only one 
of the Colombo powers to join SEATO, 'there can be no question of our 
dissuading Pakistan or Ceylon from joining if they feel so 
inclined'.(22) This British position was in contrast to the American 
thinking at that time. Makins reported from Washington that the State 
Department had inquired how the British approach to the Colombo Powers 
was going. Makins wrote that it seemed clear to him that Dulles had not 
made up his mind on Pakistan. Hildreth had been instructed not to 
discuss the project with the Pakistanis, partly as they wanted to test
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the Pakistani reaction, and secondly as the State Department was said to 
be divided 'on the value and wisdom of distinguishing between Pakistan 
and the other Colombo Powers in the context of South East Asian 
security'.(23)
Dulles told Karachi on 30 July that the Pakistani Ambassador in 
Washington admitted to an officer in the State Department that he had 
urged his government to join SEATO. The Ambassador had also said that he 
believed he had convinced Zafrullah Khan of the need and would be glad 
to resume his efforts in that line if he knew this was what the U.S. 
government wanted. The Department officer had not given a direct answer 
but had raised the question of whether Pakistan might not be more 
effective if she was initially outside the organisation and used her 
influence to induce the other Colombo powers to join. The Ambassador had 
replied that, if Pakistan makes up its mind to join, it would do all it 
could to convince Ceylon to do likewise.(24)
On the same day, Laithwaite informed London that his weekly talk 
with his U.S. counterpart had revealed that the State Department line 
was that it might prove disadvantageous for Pakistan to join,
particularly in isolation. Hildreth had made no approach to the 
Pakistanis on the subject and said that he was trying to avoid the
subject but was afraid it would be raised as General Sexton was visiting 
the country. This confirmed the news from Makins in Washington. Hildreth 
raised the subject with Ghulam Mohammed who had said that they were
awaiting a report from Zafrullah. Laithwaite had gone on to report a
conversation with the Australian High Commissioner in Pakistan, who told 
Laithwaite in the strictest confidence that, in a talk with Zafrullah, 
the latter had claimed to know the time-table set by Dulles and Bedell
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Smith and, while he had not talked to Bogra, he was confident that the 
majority of the Cabinet would instantly agree to participate in any 
proposed conference. Zafrullah had said it would depend on the nature 
and clarity of the invitation and proposals. The Australian High 
Commissioner was reported to be embarrassed to find his intructions from 
Canberra had told him to tread carefully because of Anglo-American 
doubts over the advantage of Pakistani participation. Laithwaite had 
said it was now obvious that the Pakistanis were expecting an invitation 
and were not put off by the possible adverse reaction it could 
generate. (25)
The Geneva Conference had ended in some disarray with Dulles 
refusing to sign the peace treaty, or Final Declaration, as it was 
called. He did promise, however, not to disturb the basic principles of 
the Declaration by the 'threat or use of war' (26) Dn 30 July, Dulles 
held a Staff Meeting to discuss SEATO. He said that he was now disturbed 
at the way Eden had been 'dragging feet' over the issue. The Under 
Secretary, MacArthur, agreed that Eden had been unhelpful but said that 
'Pakistan would definitely join if asked; that Zafrullah Khan had made 
this commitment to him as he boarded his airplane to leave Geneva'. This 
is an extremely important statement, particularly in hindsight. It means 
that Zafrullah was merely trying to bargain for the most acceptable deal 
in Manila, but Pakistan's signature was not in doubt.(27)
Hildreth continued the flurry of telegrams on Pakistan's membership 
of SEATO on 3 August. He wrote to Dulles that Zafrullah had said that he 
was seeing the Prime Minister to suggest to him that the Pakistani 
cabinet should approve at its next meeting the sending of a telegram to 
Ceylon. This would be to invite the Ceylonese Prime Minister to hold a
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discussion on SEATO in Colombo. Zafrullah felt that this would flatter 
Kotelawala. the Prime Minister, so much that he would not be able to 
resist and might bring him into the western camp. Zafrullah also told 
Hildreth that he was sure that he could convince Bogra and the cabinet 
that Pakistan should attend the SEATO conference as a participant and 
not as an observer. Zafrullah also hinted that the Prime Minister wojld 
agree with him that Pakistani attendance as an observer would be a hedge 
and, as they had cast their die with the west, they should not give the 
appearance of hedging. Bogra was due to leave for Saudi Arabia with 
Ghulam Mohammed on 5 August, and so Hildreth sought instructions before 
acting on the suggestion that Bogra should write to Kotelawala. Bcgra
was not due to return until 13 August and so Hildreth saw time as being
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of/^essence. (28)
On 4 August, Hildreth summarised the views of his Embassy on 
Pakistan's participation in SEATO. Hildreth reported that with each day 
there were increasing signs that the Pakistanis were willing to join 
SEATO and were increasingly willing to take the initiative in inviting 
Ceylon also to join. This was in spite of a non-committal attitude from 
the U.S. Embassy and a somewhat negative position indicated in an 
earlier telegram. Hildreth believed that the point had already been 
reached where it was awkward to discourage Pakistani participation and 
it was becoming increasingly more so. Hildreth said that, in the opinion 
of the Embassy, there were very dubious advantages in counselling delay 
in Pakistani membership. The available information seemed to Hildreta to 
indicate that the passage of time rather than any hope of winning over 
India anc Indonesia was hardening attitudes amongst these powers and 
allowing opposition the time to move in. Nehru's concept of an
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alternative South East Asia pact exclusively for Asian powers seemed, to
Hildreth, designed to frustrate and negate U.S. policy in that region.
The initiative which the Pakistanis seemed willing to take appeared to 
hold some promise to Hildreth as it would include two Colombo powers and 
seriously embarrass Nehru. Hildreth wrote ' If this sound reasoning as 
Embassy believes seems high time we got started'. Hildreth ended by 
noting, however, that, if Pakistan felt it was taking this initiative 
with U.S. support.it would expect returns in increased political, 
economic and military support. (26)
Negotiations or Pakistan1 s possible member ship
On 4 August, the Pakistan Ambassador to Washington, Amjed Ali, met 
Jernegan and Smith from the South Asia section of the State Department. 
Amjed Ali had requested the meeting and first noted that the proposed 
time for the visit of Bogra had been changed from early to mid-October.
Jernegan replied that this was due to reasons unknown to him and had
been quite embarrasing for them all. The ambassador then raised the 
question of Zafrullah's candidacy to the International Court of Justice. 
The next few minutes were spent in discussing the way various countries 
were going to vote. Amjed Ali then moved to the main purpose of his 
meeting, which was to discuss developments in connection with the South 
East Asia security organisation. Jernegan offered to bring Amjed Ali up 
to date and gave him a review of recent developments.
The British government had approached the Colombo powers to invite 
them to discuss the formulation of a collective security organisation of 
which they would also be members. Negative replies were received from 
India and Indonesia. Burma declined to attend but was adopting a 
position of benevolent neutrality and Ceylon decided to study the
proposal in detail. No official reply had been received from Pakistan 
but Zafrullah had said that Pakistan favoured membership. Jernegan 
continued that they had received confirmation that Ceylon had asked 
other Colombo powers that they should meet in Rangoon to determine a 
joint position. It had seemed probable to the Americans that this move 
was partly the responsibility of Nehru who had in mind to construct a 
rival regional organisation. There were no details of Nehru's 
alternative available at the time but it seemed likely that it would 
include some clauses relating to defence and designed for the Colombo 
powers.
Amjed Ali launched into an extensive discussion of objections to any 
grouping Nehru might propose, giving his view that one of the basic
principles of any pact would be that the members should not have any 
military arrangement with any other countries outside the Cclcmbo 
powers. Such a clause would be destructive of American efforts in the 
Middle East and South East Asia. Jernegan explained that the Americans 
did not have the details of Nehru's plan and therefore the Department 
had not reached any response to it. However, he gave his perscnal
opinion that the formation of the Colombo powers would be useful as it 
could bring those powers closer together. This was obviously referring 
to India and Pakistan! At the worst, Jernegan said, the group wculd 
declare itself opposed to aggression and intervention from any quarter. 
This was still seen by Jernegan as helpful to the U.S. At best the 
organisation would be something which was similar to what the U.S. had 
in mind but with no non-Asian members. Amjed Ali declared that the
Indian plan would in effect be similar to the Locarno pact. Jernegan
disagreed with that by saying that Locarno was an agreement betveen
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opposing states whereas this plan would be between countries on the 
basis of collective security. It had been clear to the Americans that 
"^ lie Pakistan Ambassador was greatly disturbed over the prospect of a 
South or South East Asia group under Nehru and the calm American 
acceptance of such a scheme.
The discussion then moved on to the Middle East, with Amjed Ali 
making an inquiry about Egypt. Jernegan had told him that the U.S. was 
close to signing a military assistance treaty in the very near future 
with Egypt. Amjed Ali was surprised by this and asked whether the U.S. 
intended to ask Egypt to sign the pact with Turkey and Pakistan. When 
Jernegan said there was no intention to do so at the time, he further 
inquired whether there would be any objection if Pakistan asked Egypt to 
join in a tri-partite alliance. Jernegan replied that the U.S. would 
favour such an idea. The ambassador said as the Haj was soon to take 
place in Mecca it would be a good opportunity for Pakistan to approach
any other Muslim states the Americans had in mind but Jernegan was not
able to suggest any other likely candidates. After some general
discussion over other matters the meeting drew to a close. <30)
On the same day that Amjed Ali had been discussing the possibilities 
of South East Asian defence with the Americans and the future, if any, 
of Pakistan participating in such a group, the Pakistan Prime Minister, 
Mohammed Ali Bogra, accepted the British invitation to attend a
conference to discuss the proposal. Although acceptance of the
ii
invitation itself did not of the terms of
membership, it was an important gesture.
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Bogra wrote:
'My colleagues and I have carefully considered your secret- 
personal message of 30th July. I am glad to be able to 
inform you that Pakistan will be represented at the proposed 
meeting which is planned for the beginning of September to 
consider possible measures of collective defence for South 
East Asia and South IVest Pacific. Our participation in the 
meeting does not imply prior acceptance of any scheme that 
might emerge from the discussions in the meeting. Any 
recommendations made by the meeting will be considered on 
their merits. Like you, we too attach much importance to 
the meeting and would emphasise that a meeting of a level 
lower than Ministers would not carry much weight. I am 
hoping it may be possible for our Foreign Minister to attend 
on our behalf. We agree that meeting should take place at 
some suitable place in the region. We have no particular 
preference but should like to be consulted on choice of the 
place of the meeting before a final decision is reached'.(31)
The Pakistani decision to accept the invitation pleased the Foreign 
Office immensely. Tahourdin recorded on 5 August that the acceptance was 
'very satisfactory'. He also said that he had been informed by Australia 
House that the Australian Government were now also strongly in favour of 
Pakistani participation. Another Foreign Office official called it an 
'excellent development' and said that Britain should now do all it could 
to exploit it, especially as regarded Ceylon.(32) The Pakistanis were 
soon busy discussing the possible venue for the meeting with the 
British. Hilaly informed the British that he had been dismayed by a 
Burmese suggestion that a meeting of Colombo countries to discuss the 
SEATO proposal should meet in Delhi. He added that Pakistan would 
certainly use her influence with Ceylon and Burma in trying to take a 
softer line on SEATO and perhaps even persuade them to attend the 
conference without any commitment. (33)
On 6 August, Amjed Ali was again at the State Department in 
conversation with Jernegan. This time he had been invited to come and
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listen to a briefing on U.S. thinking on SEATO but the conversation 
began with Amjed Ali telling the Americans that he had received a 
telegram from Ayub Khan in Karachi which had depressed him. Ayub was 
reported to be 'dejected and broken-hearted' by his conversations with 
General Sexton, the Chief of the Military Mission in Karachi, where he 
had learnt of the small amount of U.S. aid available. Ayub had 
reportedly told Bogra that it would be better not to have been in a 
defence agreement with the U.S. for those amounts. Jernegan tried to 
reassure Amjad Ali by saying the amount per year might seem small but 
larger amounts were coming and the sum total was large. (34)
The briefing was conducted by the Assistant Secretary of State, 
Merchant, who welcomed the news that Pakistan was to be represented at 
the forthcoming meeting on South East Asia defence. Explaining the 
American viewpoint, Merchant said that the U.S. had, since the previous 
March, felt a sense of urgent need for a collective security grouping in 
South East Asia. Dulles had considered that it would have been best 
formed before the Geneva conference, but for a variety of reasons it had 
been postponed. The American thinking with regard to the general timing 
had been that there would be a meeting of foreign ministers of the 
countries concerned in that area in early September. The Americans 
thought a site such as Baguio or Manila might be suitable, but as yet 
there had been no firm decision. The Americans also felt that, in 
advance of the meeting, it would be useful if each of the countries 
made a public announcement to the effect that they were going to be 
represented at the meeting to plan collective security and that there 
should be a conference of experts at the working group level to develop
a draft agreement and reduce the problems to those few involving 
principles.
The French were unwilling to make any public announcement of intent 
before the final clauses of the Vietnamese and Cambodian armistices had 
gone into effect, which would be 7 August for Cambodia and 11 August for 
Vietnam. The British were awaiting the result of their approaches to the 
Colombo powers before setting a date. Australia, New Zealand and 
Thailand were all agreed as to the establishment of a working group. The 
Americans felt that the working group should meet in Washington because 
most of the experts who had been working on the problem for some tine 
had been there. The British believed that the experts should gather at 
the site of the foreign ministers' conference a week in advance of the 
main conference and work out an agreement prior to the main gathering. 
The Americans regarded that plan as undesirable as they were unsure how 
long the preliminary conference would last.
With regard to the treaty itself, the fundamental American position 
was spelt out to Amjed Ali. Firstly, it should be a deterrent to evert 
aggression. Secondly, it should provide for consultation and action 
amongst the members in meeting communist infiltration and subversion in 
individual countries. Thirdly, it should provide for economic co­
operation amongst the member states and other states in the area. 
Lastly, it should be a simple organisation with no elaborate secretariat 
or staff such as NATO had. Merchant handed Amjed Ali a document which he 
described as the second draft of a working paper giving an outline of 
U.S. thinking. The date had not yet been set for the meeting of experts 
but the Americans hoped that the circulation of the draft would help set 
the wheels in motion.
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The ambassador inquired about two aspects of the American proposals. 
Firstly, with regard to economic co-operation, he wanted to know if the 
treaty would merely recognise the fact that economic support was 
necessary or if it would go further. Galloway, of the U.S. financial 
team, said the U.S. was unsure if this organisation was the correct 
vehicle for economic co-operation, so only a general clause had been 
thought necessary. Amjed Ali then asked whether economic help was
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limited to those states who were members or ify would apply to India, 
Burma and Indonesia. Merchant indicated that it had not been the intent 
of this treaty to exclude non-members from economic co-operation.
Amjed Ali's second main point was concerning the use of force. He 
said that it was his understanding that the U.S. did not contemplate the 
setting up of regional forces. In the event of a communist conspiracy on 
the Burmese border and a request from Burma for help, would the 
organisation go to the assistance of Burma? Merchant replied that it was 
a hypothetical question, but he felt that if Burma was to make an 
appeal, the organisation would go to her aid. Amjed Ali continued by 
saying that it was his understanding that th.e organisation would not 
provide for the creation of military forces, but he failed to see how 
overt aggression could be met without the creation of such forces. 
Jernegan explained that it was his understanding that the organisation 
would assist member states to strengthen their own forces. On the basis 
of individually stronger farces the members would be able to resist 
aggression individually and collectively. Merchant added that his view 
was that a constant exchange of information between member states would 
take place leading to agreement among members ion what action to take in
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the event of an attack. The very fact that such an organisation existed
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was seen by Merchant as having a deterrent ^ffect on such aggression.
Amjed Ali then referred to a conversation which he had with Jernegan 
a few days previously. The ambassador had said, and now repeated, that 
the people of Asia have the impression that the U.S. had created a pact, 
MATO, in the west which was supported by military force and were now 
trying to create one in the east which would not be supported by such 
forces. The Asian people, according to Amjed Ali, would now think that
the U.S. was not serious about an Asian regional agreement, in other
words, that the U.S. talked big but the proposed pact would have no 
teeth. Merchant noted that Australia, Mew Zealand, the Philippines and 
Pakistan were interested in having a military establishment to meet the 
situation, while Jernegan pointed out that in the beginning MATO itself 
did not have a military organisation and Galloway noted that it did not 
come into being until after the Korean war. The meeting concluded with 
some general talk on the meeting proposed by the Prime Minister of 
Ceylon to discuss South East Asia defence proposals. (35)
The first issue to be resolved before the main conference on South 
East Asian defence was held, was the problem of where the working party
should meet to agree some terms of reference for the conference. The
Americans had suggested Washington as the venue. Amjed Ali was 
instructed to inform the State Department that Washington did not suit 
Pakistan but, if necessary, she would reconcile herself to attending 
there but would only be represented by its ambassador there.
Laithwaite volunteered this information to the Commonwealth 
Relations Office in a telegram on 10 August. He also said that for
Pakistan the ideal venue for both the working party and the main
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conference would be Ceylon. This was because Pakistan could easily send 
a well-briefed team there, and the Philippines was seen as the next best 
alternative. Australia was as unwelcome as Washington because of the 
distance and the fact that it was non-Asian. Laithwaite revealed that 
he had been very tentatively sounded out as to the possibility of 
holding both meetings in Karachi. The High Commissioner replied it was 
unlikely to be accepted because of the reaction of India and other Asian 
states. The Pakistan government agreed to withhold any official 
announcement regarding SEATO until an agreed date and place of the 
meeting was decided. It was also reported to be reluctant to see any 
Colombo Power conference being held to discuss the implications of SEATO 
but would say nothing against the proposal in case it was accused of 
being western puppets.(36)
News that Ceylon had finally made up Iher mind not to join SEATO 
reached Pakistan on the morning of 11 August. Laithwaite reported that 
the news had 'extremely depressed' Hilaly and had also taken him by 
surprise. Hilaly, the acting Foreign Secretary, was said to be feeling 
that Pakistan was now out on a limb and cross-examimed Laithwaite and 
Dodds Parker, the British Joint Under Secretary of State, who was 
visiting Karachi, on the value of Pakistan being the only South East 
Asian country participating in the proposed organisation as he did not 
count Thailand as being of any importance. Hilaly suggested that 
Pakistan might be of mare use to the U.K. as a member of the Colombo 
group rather than being expelled from it for joining SEATO without 
deriving any new advantages which Pakistan already enjoyed through 
contacts with the Commonwealth and the U.S. He felt that the Ceylonese
had been afraid of being left out of any Indian scheme for a South East 
Asian federation.
Hilaly then read to his British visitors the Ceylonese telegran 
which had basically said that Ceylon had made up her mind not to join 
SEATO and it was unlikely that any Colombo Powers' meeting would now 
take place to discuss the idea. Hilaly added that, although the British 
were unenthusiastic about the idea of that meeting, it might have prove! 
to be useful in persuading Ceylon and Burma in taking a more positive 
look at SEATO. Hilaly continued that he was now doubtful about the 
reaction of Zafrullah and Bogra to this latest piece of news as Pakistan 
was now out on her own. Laithwaite did what he could to try and 
encourage Hilaly by saying that Pakistan 'had added to her stature ty 
the clear and independent line she had taken' . By the terms cf 
Pakistan's acceptance, she was still entirely uncommitted and reserved 
the right to consider the scheme on its merits. Pessimism at this s*age 
was said to be premature and there was no need to be depressed even if 
Ceylon had backed out.(37)
R. H. Scott of the British Embassy in Washington, discussed the 
latest thinking regarding SEATO with Amjed Ali on 12 August. Soott 
informed the Foreign Office that the ambassador had received a cop/ of 
the draft treaty which the Americans had prepared and seemed to be well
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aware of the position. Amjed Ali had put foward some suggestions which 
may be seen as a useful guide to what Pakistan really hoped the treaty 
and pact might achieve. The first of these was that all parties to the 
treaty should commit or earmark certain troops for the defence of the 
treaty area, even though these troops need not leave their national 
boundaries until needed. Pakistan believed that there was a serious
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possibility of trouble on the Burmese boirder and to cope with the 
situation, troops would need to be ready. The ambassador said that the 
treaty could serve as a useful way of developing the idea of common 
responsibility as this would make it easier for Asian countries to ask 
for and accept help from outside. The third! main point which he raised 
was that economic aid was necessary to alLow for the build-up of the 
extra defence forces.
Scott believed that it was clear that Amjed Ali was hoping for
additional troops to be sent to East Pakistan as the Pakistani 
contribution to the pact but for this to be paid for by the Americans. 
Amjed Ali emphasised that the treaty should be 'loose' enough to calm 
the fears of Ceylon and Burma and might even induce them to join at a 
later date. Scott arranged at the end of the discussion for the Pakistan 
Ambassador to be kept informed on any amendments and developments.(38)
Meanwhile back in Karachi, Laithwaite met Zafrullah Khan on 16
August at a social gathering, and said that Britain was very glad about
the 'courageous and sensible' line that Pakistan had taken over SEATO. 
Zafrullah replied that Pakistan was anxious to give what help it could 
and Laithwaite reported that Zafrullah had not appeared to be worried 
about the Ceylonese withdrawal. (39)
The Foreign Office spelt out its own reservations regarding SEATO on
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20 August. It was noted that Britain only accepted /SEATO to avoid a 
serious breach with the U.S., Australia ancd New Zealand, 'all of whom 
put strong pressure on us'. British hopes were that SEATO should become 
an organisation which should supersede &NZUS (the Australian, New 
Zealand and United States defence agreement of 1952). SEATO was also 
seen as the instrument through which the U.S. should increase her
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spending in that region. Britain realised that none of her objectives 
could be achieved unless the Americans co-operated and so SEATO was 
necessary. (40)
Ambassador Horace Hildreth reported to the State Department on 17 
August on the theme of Pakistani disappointment over the amount of aid 
being offered. The acting Foreign Secretary had echoed the sentiments of 
Ayub Khan, the Prime Minister and Finance Minister and others in saying 
that the increased commitments through Pakistans attitude to SEATO would 
deserve more than token support. Hilaly also said that Bogra and Gtulam 
Mohammed felt that their energetic efforts to persuade other countries 
to join the western alliances had gone unrecognised and Pakistan was 
being made to look ridiculous. Hildreth commented to Dulles that, 
although there was a lot to commend about the Pakistan government 
viewpoint, they always tended to overstate their case.
Hilaly went on to say that Zafrullah would attend the meeting 
scheduled at Baguio and the working group session starting an 2 
September. He felt that the Pakistan government was handicapped by a 
lack of knowledge of the previous staff talks and working group 
discussions on SEATO, and would find it difficult to make decisions on 
only a few days' meetings. He therefore asked whether there was any 
advice for Zafrullah before he left. Hildreth pointed out to Washington 
that he realised the great advantage of both Pakistan and Ceylon 
attending the conference and said he assumed that Pakistani atteEdeace 
and affiliation to SEATO was still desirable even if Ceylon did not 
attend. He added that the Pakistanis were convinced that the U.S. wanted 
them to join SEATO. Hildreth then requested guidance from Dulles on this
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question as he thought it very important that the Pakistan government 
should know the role the U.S. wanted them to play. Hildreth said that, 
although the U.S. had deferred to the U.K. on this point before, he felt 
that Zafrullah expected, and should be given, further guidance before 
leaving.(41)
In response, Dulles commented on the question of Pakistani 
expectations following the Mutual Assistance agreement and talk of SEATO 
in a detailed message to the U.S. Embassy on 23 August. Dulles said that
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he was convinced thatj it was in the interest of healthy U.S.-Pakistan 
relations that the 'self-stimulated and publicized' expectations of U.S. 
aid, should be replaced by a clearer understanding of the objectives and 
capabilities of the U.S. and of Pakistan's own responsibilities. The 
development and maintenance of an effective military machine, the costs 
of which Dulles thought Pakistan could pay for from her own resources, 
would require growth over a period of years with a well balanced 
economy. The Secretary of State pointed out that it was not within U.S. 
financial capabilities that such an economy could be created by massive 
economic aid. It had to be built by Pakistan herself; but American 
willingness to support such efforts had been demonstrated by the fact 
Pakistan had received a large amount of aid even before the defence 
agreement had been signed. Dulles said that Pakistani officials had 
expressed such full and sincere gratitude for this help, that it was 
embarrassing to have to repeat them, but U.S. resources were not 
unlimited or unchecked.
Dulles' message then moved on to the question of priorities. Turkey 
received a high priority as it was self-reliant, adjoining Russia and, 
although under threat, willing to fight regardless of outside help.
Pakistan's case was different, mainly because of adverse economic 
conditions: it was implicit in the military aid agreement that the U.S. 
wanted Pakistan to attain that degree of military strength and sound 
economic base which would enable it to play an effective role in Middle 
Eastern defence. The first objective had to be that the Pakistan army 
was properly equipped at its present strength, before thinking of 
enlarging its size. Even that objective was seen as involving a heavy 
monetary outlay. The Heinz Mission was instructed to evaluate the basic 
requirements. Dulles felt that after this initial phase, it would be
possible to see a clearer picture and was pleased to note that Pakistans 
military and civil authorities appreciated the importance of long term 
planning. Dulles concluded by saying that the U.S. could not express 
things more concretely at the present in terms of dollars and later 
troop strengths than this. (42)
On 24 August, Hildreth reported to Dulles that Hilaly, the acting 
Foreign Secretary, was leaving for Manila on 27 August and would be
accompanied by General Sheikh, the Army representative, and Rashid 
Ibrahim of the Economic Ministry. Zafrullah Khan was due to leave on 1 
September. The Foreign Ministry expressed concern over the attitude the 
Pakistan government should take over SEATO. Hilaly was said to have been 
concerned that, if Pakistan joined SEATO and was the only South Asian 
country to do so, she would be isolated, Hilaly had reportedly made the 
same comments to Laithwaite in Karachi ten days previously and was asked 
which club Pakistan really wanted to belong to and whether Pakistan did
not have more prestige and influence thanks to the club she was now in.
This was thought to have allayed Hilaly's fears but they had apparently
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resurfaced. Hildreth requested any guidance to the Pakistan delegation 
to be sent as soon as possible as they were due to leave shortly.(43)
Replying on 25 August, Dulles pointed out that the State Department 
had clearly outlined the U.S. position to the Pakistan Ambassador in 
Washington. This concerned both the functions of SEATO and its likely 
implementation. Amjad Ali had been given a draft of the treaty which he 
had forwarded to Karachi and in their most recent conversations, the 
Americans had answered all his questions regarding SEATO. Dulles 
repeated for the benefit of Hildreth that the U.S. did not visualise any 
special role for Pakistan in SEATO other than attending the conference 
and signing. The official U.S. line was that the Americans believed that 
it was in Pakistan's national security interest to join SEATO. However, 
this was seen as a decision for the government of Pakistan to make and 
the U.S. did not wish to influence it.(44) This meant, of course, that 
the Americans need not feel obliged to Pakistan for joining SEATO and so 
Pakistan should not expect any increased aid.
The Run- up to Manila
The first official Pakistani reaction to the draft treaty drawn up 
by the Americans and British was on 26 August. Zafrullah informed 
Laithwaite that he had two main points to make immediately. The first 
was that, there should not under any circumstances be any reference to 
communism in the treaty and, the second was that, Pakistan would not 
contemplate any wording which might allow Formosa to be brought in at a 
later stage. (45) On 30 August, a letter from the British Embassy in 
Washington to the Foreign Office revealed an interesting insight into
the Pakistan Foreign Ministry. Crawley, a British diplomat, said that he 
had been keeping his Pakistani counterparts informed as instructed and 
he had come to realise that this had meant that he was giving them 'an 
opportunity for the first time of being aware of their own government's 
thinking'.(46)
Anglo-American differences persisted throughout the drafting stage 
of the SEATO treaty as to what form it should take, who should be 
allowed, or invited, to join and what the main purpose of such an 
organisation should be. Dulles tried to persuade Eden to attend tie 
SEATO conference in the Philippines at the last moment. He further asked 
Eden to allow the representatives of Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam to 
have unofficial observers at Manila, arguing that, as one of the main 
aims of the organisation was to protect South East Asia from communism, 
those states should be present. Dulles said that it would subject those
making of a treaty which was designed for their benefit. Dulles then 
moved on to the 'prospective role' of Pakistan. He wanted to clarify 
whether Pakistan would be counted as in the 'treaty area' and if it 
would sign the agreement if excluded. Dulles clarified his main 
objection regarding Pakistani membership, which was that, if Pakistan 
did sign the agreement and was deemed to be in the treaty area, then it 
was 'imperative to make clear that the treaty deals only with aggression 
from the Communist area so as to exclude our getting involved in India - 
Pakistan disputes'. (47)
Before the Pakistan delegation was to leave for Manila, Zafrullah 
met Laithwaite on 1 September and informed him of the Pakistan Cabinet 
conclusions on SEATO. These were that the Pakistan government was in
states to humiliation if they were prevented from observing the
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general agreement with the British and Australian line and could not 
accept any reference to communism in the treiaty. There should be no 
designation of area, even of Vietnam or Cambodia, until after the treaty 
had been concluded. There should be no help) given in the case of 
aggression unless there was prior consent from the government concerned. 
The treaty was also to be re-drafted to incluide Vest Pakistan in the 
treaty area. The Colombo Plan was to be unaffected by the treaty and 
economic provisions of any treaty should be comfined to the parties to 
the treaty. Finally, there should be/’ caveat as regards military 
obligations to be undertaken by Pakistan. (48)) G.V. Choudhry believes 
that the Pakistan Cabinet was worried about the prospect of having to 
make any military commitment as a member of SEATO. He says that ^ot 
(5/eretheyj concerned at possibly having to prowide troops, not only to 
protect fellow-members of SEATO, but also tho:se areas the treaty was 
trying to defend, such as Indo-China. The military establishment, led by 
Ayub Khan, were still recovering from the shock at the proposed level of 
American aid under the mutual assistance agreement and wanted a firm 
commitment from America of a certain amount oif aid for membership of 
SEATO. Ayub Khan was reported to have said, 1 If America wishes us to j(<j 
help countries outside Pakistan, an agreement has to be reached as to 
what we shall be required to do and what force will do it’. (49)
The full SEATO conference in Manila did mot get underway until 6 
September but the countries attending had sent -their experts on ahead to 
discuss the various proposed clauses drawn up by the Anglo-American 
working party in Vashington aver July and August. The first point the 
Pakistan representative raised on 3 September was whether the whale of 
Pakistan would be covered. The American delegate said that, if the
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aggression was communist-inspired, then the whole of Pakistan would be 
covered but, if it was not communist, then the further one got away from 
South East Asia, the less it became a threat to the security of the U.S. 
The British delegation reported that the American delegate was under 
absolute instructions to limit commitments to the case of communist 
aggression, although, if an alternative could be devised with different 
wording but the same meaning, it would be considered. The Pakistan 
representative reserved his right to submit an amendment to that 
Article.(50)
On the following day, the Pakistan delegate put forward his 
suggestion on the question of economic aid. The draft was sent by the 
Commonwealth Relations Office to Karachi on 6 September. The draft 
stated:
"In order to promote economic stability and social 
well-being and thereby remove a basic cause of weakness 
in the Treaty area, the parties recognise the urgent need 
for fuller and more effective development of economic 
resources in the area, and undertake to co-operate with one 
another for the purpose. The parties appreciate the 
desirabilty of supplementing the economic and technical 
assistance available to the area and of continuing the 
utilisation of existing bilateral arrangements for the 
purpose where they are regarded as adequate".
The British delegation reported that, despite discussions on this 
draft, no alternative was agreed upon but the Americans made a number of 
objections. These were that the Treaty was not designed to provide new 
economic aid , that it was important not to raise expectations which 
could not be fulfilled and, finally, that the economic considerations 
should not be limited to the proposed Treaty area. The Pakistan delegate 
agreed with this but pointed out that as Article III was the only non­
military one, it needed emphasising as it was the article which would 
have the most attraction for the Asian countries. The French 
representative agreed with this view but the British delegate waited 
for instructions on this point from London. <51)
The. South Easl Asia Treaty Conference
The First Plenary Session of the Manila Conference was held on 7 
September. There were delegations from eight countries, namely; Britain, 
America, Thailand, Australia, the Philippines, Pakistan, France and New 
Zealand. The conference lasted only three days as the major ground-work 
had been done by the Americans and British over the summer, as well as 
the Ministers conference in the first week of September. Zafrullah Khan 
led the Pakistan delegation to Manila and,, though Pakistan clearly 
stated that she had agreed to attend the conference with an open mind, 
there was little doubt that Zafrullah was keen to see Pakistan enter in 
such a large alliance. Zafrullah's aim, therefore, was obviously going 
to be an attempt to obtain some promise of fresh economic and military 
aid and, if at all passible, some promise of security against an Indian 
attack.
In the proceedings of the Second Plenary Session, Zafrullah 
attempted to water down the military aspects of the Treaty so as to make 
it more acceptable to the other Colombo Powders. Zafrullah proposed a 
change to Article V which had stated 'The Council shall set up such 
subsidiary machinery as may be necessary to achieve the military and 
other objectives of this Treaty'. Zafrullah proposed to change this to 
read 'all the objectives of the Treaty'. The Australians and French 
argued that, as it was obviously a military treaty, there was little 
point in beating about the bush. Zafrullah said that he did not object
to the use of the word 'military' but that it created the impression 
that the 'other' objectives were of little importance. (52)
The problem of defining the 'Treaty area' involved Zafrullah as he 
hoped that the whole of Pakistan would be covered. Pakistan was then 
covered by an amendment which stated ' the general area of South and 
South East Asia, including the entire territories of the Asian parties' . 
However, if Zafrullah hoped that this would mean that Pakistan was going 
to be protected by the might of America against India then he was to be 
sadly mistaken. Dulles included a reservation under Article IV, 
paragraph 1, that the U.S. obligation to the Treaty would extend only in 
cases of Communist aggression. Zafrullah tried to argue that 'all 
aggression is evil' but Dulles was unmoved. (53)
The American attempt to specify that the Treaty should refer 
specifically to communism was blocked, much to Zafrullah's relief, by 
Australia and New Zealand, who feared the possibility of a Japanese 
resurgence. Australia also had an ongoing dispute with Indonesia over 
New Guinea, which was a non-communist state. The deletion of the word 
'communist' did not help Pakistan in this case either, as Australia and 
New Zealand publicly declared that they did not feel bound by SEATO to 
take any action against a fellow Commonwealth state.(54)
The Pakistan Foreign Minister also attempted to obtain some pronise 
of practical military help as a result of the Conference. He talked to 
Dulles on 8 September about the need to build up Pakistan's armed 
forces, stressing that Pakistan was willing to do everything that she 
could in building up her forces but the financial resources were sinply 
not there. Zafrullah mentioned the heavy existing tax burden and said 
that he would be glad to let the Americans look at their budget to see
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if anything else could be squeezed out of it. Dulles replied by pointing 
to the very heavy burden that the U.S. was already bearing in terms of 
assistance to friendly countries and said such matters were not the sole 
decision of the State Department but of others, particularly Defence. 
Zafrullah stated his belief that Ceylon was wavering in regard to SEATO 
and would have come if she had not been strongly dissuaded by India and 
he suspected, the U.K. He told Dulles th.at the U.K. had tried to
dissuade him from coming to Manila as anything other than an
observer.(55) How Zafrullah could possibly have got this impression
after August when the U.K. was doing everything to try and persuade
Pakistan to attend is hard to understand. It is possible, however, that 
Zafrullah was trying to exploit the almost visible Anglo-American split.
The Australians gave the American and British delegations a shock 
when the Australian Prime Minister, Sir jRobert Menzies, instructed 
Casey, the Foreign Minister, only to sign the Manila Treaty under the 
same reservation as Dulles. The Australians were thought to be worried 
about any commitment to act against India in event of war with Pakistan. 
Casey urged Menzies to reconsider as he told the British delegation; he 
was convinced that Menzies was mistaken.
The Americans were said to be strongly opposed to any Australian 
reservation and Dulles stated that ‘it would have an unjust effect in 
the United States since Australia would be regarded as running away from 
commitments in their area'. Casey went ahead and signed the agreement 
and had stated that the Australian government could decide whether to 
ratify it. Casey was said to have been persu.aded partly by Zafrullah to 
sign. Zafrullah was said to have 'waved asid<e any idea that Pakistan if 
attacked by India would expect help under the treaty'.(56) This implies
that Zafrullah was only trying to obtain language acceptable to ‘he 
Cabinet in Karachi, and public opinion, and not really attempting to 
obtain real security for Pakistan from this Treaty.
treaty. He added the qualification of 'Signed for transmission to mj 
Government for consideration and action in accordance with the 
Constitution of Pakistan'. According to G. V. Choudhry, Pakistan's 
accession to SEATO 'was due only to one person, Zafrullah Khan, whs 
exceeded the mandate of the Cabinet and scorned the advice of the 
military' . Bogra was said to have written to Zafrullah on 9 Septenber 
asking for an explanation,and the Foreign Minister replied after two 
days, arguing that a refusal by Pakistan to sign would have jeopardised 
Pakistan's military and economic aid and be greatly misunderstood by the 
Americans. (57)
The South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty was signed, therefore, 
on 8 September by the representatives of all the eight participating 
countries. Eden demonstrated his coolness to the whole idea by not 
attending and so Britain was represented by Lord Reading, Minister of 
State in the Foreign Office. ' SEACDT' was not an abbreviation likely to 
catch on and the pact was still known as 'SEATO', the name officially 
adopted in 1955. The Americans were reluctant to allow the use of that 
term at first because of the comparisons that would be made with 
NATO.(58)
Zafrullah Khan then made the controversial decision to sign the
I bC
The draft of the Treaty had been a controversial matter, even after 
all the preliminary meetings. One of the most contentious sections in 
the Treaty was Article IV, Paragraph 1. This had stated:
Each Party recognises that aggression by weans of armed 
attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or 
against any State or territory with the Parties by unanimous 
agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own 
peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to 
meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional 
processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council of the United 
Nations. (59)
This section as well as the wording of Article VIII which had 
defined the Treaty area as including 'also the entire territories of 
Asian parties' caused some concern in London. The Foreign Office noted 
on 8 September that this final form of words had been drafted without 
any consultation with them and said that the reasons had yet to be fully 
explained. It was thought that Zafrullah Khan had insisted on the 
inclusion so as to leave no doubt that the whole of Pakistan was inside 
the Treaty area. The Foreign Office felt that the last addition made it 
clear that Article IV<1) now applied to an Indian attack on Pakistan. It 
also noted that as India was not covered in the Treaty area, a Pakistani 
attack on India would not be the concern of SEATO. Only the United 
States had contracted out of any obligation in a conflict not involving 
communism. (CO)
The explanation for the wording of Article IV was given by a member 
of the British delegation to Manila, Sir G. Fitzmaurice. He argued that 
the need to suppress any reference to communist aggression was 
'politically essential' in order to make it more acceptable to Asian 
countries and to avoid too direct a threat to China and the Soviet
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Union. The principal difficulty in not mentioning communism had been 
the contingency of an Indian attack on Pakistan. This problem was seen 
as impossible to overcome as many alternatives had been considered and 
rejected. Fitzmaurice argued that such a situation was not a new 
theoretical problem as Britain was bound under the Charter of the United 
Nations and, if Pakistan had appealed to the Security Council for help, 
Britain was seen as 'politically and morally' unable to use her veto. It 
was accepted that explanations would have to be made to the Indians and 
criticism would have to be answered. On the whole, he felt that it was 
'a choice of evils and on balance the course actually followed was 
thought to be best*. <61)
Disappointment and delay from Pakistan
As far as Pakistan was concerned, however, there was little in the 
Treaty to be excited about. She had previously hoped for a standing army 
to be developed along NATO lines or a joint military command to be 
established but Dulles was firmly opposed to both these suggestions. (62) 
Pakistan failed to obtain a single promise of increased economic aid; 
there was no promise of large arm shipments to enable the Pakistan army 
to build up East Pakistan; and the Americans officially stated what the 
British had unofficially told them, that Pakistan could not expect any 
help in case of a war with India, even if the latter was the aggressor. 
This could not have been a great surprise for Pakistan as they must have 
been aware of the realities.
There was little knowledge or interest in Pakistan regarding SEATO. 
Even Ayub Khan, known for his western sympathies, described SEATO as a 
'political stunt' .(63) Those in Pakistan opposed to the Treaty, 
accused Zafrullah Khan of the lowest personal motives in signing the
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Manila Pact. Within a month, of signing the Treaty, Zafrullah was elected 
to the International Court of Justice with British, American and French 
help.(64) Zafrullah seemed to know his political career was over as he 
did not even return to Karachi, but went to America from Manila. There 
is also the little known promise that he had made to the American Under 
Secretary, MacArthur, in July that, if Pakistan was invited to attend 
the conference, she would join. Zafrullah's cont/oversial signature at 
the Manila Conference reached the ears of London as the British 
Ambassador in Burma reported, through conversations with his Pakistani 
counter-part, that Zafrullah seemed to have 'gone rather further than 
his Government intended, and that there had been genuine embarrassment 
between the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister about something the 
latter had done in order to be as co-operative as possible with Mr. 
Dulles and Mr. Casey' . (65)
The reluctance of Pakistan to ratify the Manila Treaty unless 
offered something tangible in return was obvious as Pakistan simply 
delayed any decision. On 30 September, Mohammed Ali Bogra, the Prime 
Minister of Pakistan from April 1953, met Eden in London to discuss 
Pakistan's ratification of the Manila Treaty and was said to have 
'haggled a lot and adopted a stupid and rather blackmailing attitude on 
the lines of "what do we get out of it if we become members, what about 
India, etc." '. He was pressed strongly on the loss of prestige Pakistan 
would suffer if she failed to ratify the Treaty and agreed that he would
The Pakistan Prime Minister went on from London to America in 
October. On 18 October, Dulles received him in Washington The other
rethink on his return Washington.(66)
participants at the meeting were Amjed from the Near
Eastern Section and Thacher from the South Asian desk. Dulles started by 
explaining that, with regard to the Manila Treaty, or SEATO, the U.S. 
had made it clear from the outset that it could not ask the U.S. Senate 
to accept the concept that any dispute in the region would be considered 
a threat to the peace and security of the U.S. Dulles gave the example 
of a dispute between Burma and Thailand, rather pointedly saying that it 
did not involve a communist power.
Bogra tried to argue that such a dispute would almost certainly pose 
a threat to the security and viability of the U.S. as Burma would only 
undertake aggression against Thailand if Burma came under communist 
control. Bogra pointed out that Pakistan was the one nation amongst the 
signatories which feared aggression from a non-communist state. This 
meant, Bogra argued, that the U.S., in its view of the Manila Treaty, 
was condoning aggression from a non-communist state. Dulles replied by 
saying that the U.S. did realise that the danger from non-communist 
countries existed but that, unless it was communist inspired, it would 
not be a threat to the security of America. Dulles said that the U.S. 
would be obliged to consult the other signatories of the Treaty.
Bogra then discussed the risks which Pakistan had taken by aligning 
herself with the west in her relations with India, Russia and 
Afghanistan. He felt that the risks incurred, to himself personally and 
to his country as a whole, were justified by the need to preserve 
freedom for posterity. Pakistan had, in effect, undertaken to play a 
dual role in the defence of the free world, one in the Middle East and 
the other in South East Asia. With such responsibilities, Bogra felt 
that he would be derided in Pakistan if he could only obtain the sum of
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thirty million dollars from the U.S. That sum was seen by Bogra as only 
adequate to fill the existing gaps in the Pakistan army.
Dulles responded by saying that some consideration was now being 
given to the possibility of increasing the first year programme of
military assistance to Pakistan. Dulles pointed out, however, that he 
thought that Pakistan had taken the anti-commun.ist course it had because 
of a feeling that it was right, not to make itself eligible for certain 
amounts of dollar aid. Far more important thain the receipt of aid was 
the admiration and sympathy that Pakistan liad won for herself in
America, who, Dulles said, would be reliable ifriends whenever Pakistan 
was in trouble, as the gift of wheat had proved in 1953. Dulles pointed 
out that America's friends must be aware that the U.S. did not have
limitless resources and that the U.S. budgetary situation was such that
any appropriation made for a foreign nation woiuld probably result in a 
reduction in America's own armaments. (67)
Dulles realised in November 1954 that there had been no positive 
response from India over the fact that America had specifically limited 
her involvement at Manila to anti-communist acltion. Dulles sent Byroade 
a memorandum asking whether the U.S. had tried to make capital out of 
that fact and saying that the reservation was 'of course, not pleasing
to the Pakistani but it showed clearly our unwillingness to get involved
as a partisan in possible disputes between India and Pakistan'. Dulles 
pointed out that there had been no Indian indication of appreciation, 
specially as the U.S. was the only state to take that line.(68)
By 25 November, Pakistan had still not decided whether to ratify the 
Treaty. Murray, who was acting as High Commissioner in Karachi, reported
that the Pakistan Cabinet was still considering the proposal. The
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Foreign Ministry was reported as not treating ratification as a foregone 
conclusion. The chief difficulty was said to be the American reservation 
to Article IV and similar Australian views. Bogra was believed to feel 
that with that reservation the Treaty was not 'worth while for Pakistan 
to ratify* . The Foreign Ministry, however, had submitted a paper to the 
Cabinet which recommended ratification despite the lack of protection it 
offered. Murray believed that, in view of the American aid recently 
announced, the Pakistanis would not fail to ratify. (69)
The Commonwealth Relations Office authorised the High Commission in 
Karachi to use their discretion in showing a U.K. paper on the economic 
aspects of SEATO to the Pakistan authorities. Murray felt that it would 
not have been a good idea to pass that information on to the Pakistani 
authorities as 'they would be extremely disappointed at the implication 
that countries which sign the Manila Treaty will receive no more 
economic and technical assistance than countries which do not.,, the 
Government of Pakistan have always felt that there would be economic 
rewards for participation'. He felt that the Pakistan government was 
already hesitant over ratifying the Treaty and this news would give them 
another reason for delaying. As Amjad Ali was attending the meetings of 
the Working Party in Washington, Murray requested advance warning if it 
was to be shown there as 'it would be polite in that case to give a copy 
to the authorities here'.(70)
In trying to persuade the normally enthusiatically pro-western Bogra 
government to ratify, Dulles sent a note to Bogra, informing him that 
even if the attack on Pakistan was non-communist the U.S. 'would be by 
no means disinterested or inactive'. Dulles promised that he would meet 
with the other members of SEATO to decide what action to take. (71) This
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was still short of any firm promise, but the Pakistan government was 
always going to have to ratify the treaty, despite their reservations. 
Amjed Ali had requested further information on the proposed action on 
Article III of the Manila Treaty which dealt with the economic aspects. 
Dulles replied that the State Department was still working on their 
policy regarding economic aid but emphasised that the U.S. was not going 
to make any special arrangements for members of SEATO. (72)
Pakistan did eventually, ratify the Treaty on 19 January 1955, as 
the first meeting of the SEATO council was starting. There were reports 
that the Pakistan government only ratified under 'intense' pressure from 
Britain and America.(73) There is little doubt that, without Pakistan's 
membership of SEATO, the Asian content looked militarily insignificant. 
Thailand and the Philippines were almost entirely dependent on the U.S. 
for their military and economic aid and the alliance would easily have 
been accused of being an American show. Although the Pakistan government 
had been reluctant to ratify for the lack of “tangible gain, it had little 
choice due to the need of American economic and military help. Bogra 
had to face his critics because of the lack of tangible gain for 
Pakistan, but the U.S. Secretary of State, J.F. Dulles had his domestic 
critics also. The Treaty had been ratified in the Senate by a decisive 
eighty-one votes to two and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
warmly praised the wisdom of the Secretary of State. (74) Not everyone 
was convinced, either that it was a useful agreement, or that Dulles 
knew exactly what he had done.
At a dinner party soon after the Manila Conference, Valter Lippman, 
the noted journalist, criticised the pact by pointing out that it was
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composed largely of Europeans, plus Pakistan, which was seen as nowhere 
near South East Asia. Lippman's biographer gave the following account;
"Look, Valter," Dulles said, blinking hard behind his 
thick glasses. "I've got to get some real fighting men into 
the south of Asia. The only Asians who can really fight are 
the Fakistanis. That's why we need them in the alliance. Ve 
could never get along without the Gurkhas."
"But Foster," Lippman reminded him, "the Gurkhas aren't 
Fakistanis, they're Indians. "
"Veil," responded Dulles, unpeturbed by such nit-picking 
and irritated at the Indians for refusing to join his alliance,
"they may not be Pakistanis, but they're Xoslems. "
"No, I'm afraid they're not Xoslems, either, they're Hindus."
"No matter," Dulles replied, and proceeded to lecture Lippman
for half an hour on how SEATO would plug the dike against
communism in Asia. (75)
It may be relevant to note that if one is to 'nit-pick' as Lippman 
had, then the Gurkhas are not Indian either! They are, in fact, 
Nepalese.
Pakistan, and SEAIQ L catrospficti-Ye look
Pakistan's membership of SEATO, therefore, if one accepts the 
available evidence, came about by the decision of her foreign minister 
to exceed his brief and decide to take a foreign policy initiative
himself. There can be few examples in modern history of such an event,
but then, Pakistan had very rapidly built up a number of dubious firsts. 
All that can be said in Zafrullah's defence is that any Pakistani 
foreign minister at that time and place, would have been subjected to 
great pressure to so the same. From the archives available, it seems
that there was a rift between the Pakistan Foreign Ministry and the army
sad the question of membership. Conversations recorded in Karachi with
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ministry officials, and in Washington with tihe Pakistan ambassador, show 
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a real enthusiam for the idea of another pact.
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There are probably two reasons why the Foreign Ministry felt that 
SEATO was a good idea: firstly, the mutual assistance agreement and the 
pact with Turkey earlier did not provide any territorial guarantee for 
Pakistan, something Pakistan had longed for since independence and not 
received; and secondly, there seemed to be a feeling amongst the Foreign 
Ministry that membership would give Pakistan a feeling of greater 
security in East Pakistan, the Achilles heel of Pakistan's defence. 
Ayub Khan's reservations regarding SEATO w<ere unlikely to be just an 
objection to using troops in countries and areas irrelevant to 
Pakistan's own security, it was probably that he felt that Pakistan was 
not getting enough money and arms in return for doing so. Given the 
situation, however, Ayub could not prevent Pakistan from adhering to the 
pact.
Dulles has been accused of creating SEAT<0 as a means of carrying out 
'collective security' in the name of unilateral action, as became mare 
blatant during the Vietnam war. Pakistan made it clear from the start 
that she could not spare any troops for SEATO and refused a request to 
do so in 1962 in Thailand. Any faint hope that Pakistan had of trying to 
induce some solidarity from her allies on ithe question of Kashmir was 
also soon despatched. The two visible gains which Pakistan got from the 
pact were that SEATO training centres were set up in Asian memeber 
countries, and Pakistan managed to train hundreds of its workers under 
this scheme and secondly, the prestige and importance of being 
represented where India was not, rubbing sihoulders with some powerful 
fellow-members.
The disadvantages were that Pakistan did, despite efforts not to, 
alienate the communist powers, and the Pakistan government was regarded 
as li'tle more than a western puppet. Already bad relations with India 
also suffered which^ ironically increased and justified the need for 
defence spending. Another factor why Pakistan delayed the ratification 
of the Treaty was for internal problems. During Prime Minister Bogra's 
tour of the United States in October, he was recalled by Ghulam Mohanmed 
and told to resign. Once he had done so, Ghulam Mohammed re-appointed 
him prime minister, having asserted his political supremacy. In the new 
cabinet, Ayub Khan was appointed Defence Minister and Sikander Mirza was 
made Interior Minister. Ayub Khan later claimed that Ghulam Mohammed had 
offered him the post of martial law administrator at that time which, he 
had declined. (76) Given the direction and nature of Pakistani politics, 
however, such a result was inevitable.
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THE BAGHDAD PACT
The. origin oi the Pact
Few areas in the world have dominated world attention as the Middle
East^'since the end of the Second World War. With the independence of
many of the states controlled by Britain and France, the Middle East has
proved to be one of the great headaches and political minefields of
international diplomacy. Two factors contributed to the importance of
the region: firstly, the discovery of enormous quantities of oil on
which, the western economies grew to depend, secondly, and related the
previous point, the proximity of this area to the Soviet Union. The
British had controlled the lion's share of the Arab states in the region 
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but I the new- post-war this position/under fire from Arab
nationalists and gradually the Americans, with the Soviet threat always
hanging over the region. The British had military advisers and bases
scattered around the Arabian peninsula, including Iraq, Egypt, Oman,
Jordan and Kuwait. This impressive looking position was belied by the
fact Britain could not afford to keep large forces there and could only
pretend at being a Great Power.
The Baghdad Pact can be viewed as the accidental, rather than the 
natural, successor to the ill-fated Middle East Defence Organisation, 
which had never got past the planning stage. Egypt, under Abdul Gamal 
Nasser, was an Arab nationalist government and was in no mood to play 
any part in the American or British strategic plans for the region. The 
'Northern Tier' concept was one on which the Americans had become 
particularly keen, especially with the advent to power of the Republican 
Party under Eisenhower and Dulles. The American hope in 1954 was that
m
the Turko-Pakistan Pact would, lead to the establishment of a new 
regional pact, which did not, however, come about. The British were 
interested in a regional pact based in Cairo, with western backing.The 
idea of MEDO foundered on the rock of total disagreement by everyone who 
was supposed to be a member.
Iraq was a natural focal point of interest. Under its Prime 
Minister, Dr. Jamali, Iraq had accepted American aid and support in 
defence issues relating to the Middle East, It was inevitable that Iraq 
would have to do more to justify that aid and the ascent of a new Prime 
Minister, Nuri Said in December 1954, helped the western orientation. 
The Iraqis had had a previous defence agreement with the British dating 
from 1930 in addition to military ties with the Americans, which allowed
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the British the use of two air bases and^/to station troops. (1) According 
to an experienced American diplomat and former Ambassador to India, Loy 
Henderson, Britain believed by the mid 1950's that the only way it could 
maintain troops and bases in Iraq was as part of a larger defence 
agreement. Britain, therefore, had a greater sense of urgency in 
achieving cjj some defence agreement with Iraq even than the Americans. 
(2)
In January 1955, the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, led a 
Turkish delegation to Baghdad to try and work out some understanding on 
a defence agreement. Nuri Said told British diplomats in Baghdad that he 
did not expect the meeting to prove particularly useful or productive. 
All that Nuri was prepared to discuss with the Turks were general issues 
regarding regional defence in accordance with Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter. The main reason for this reluctant attitude was Arab 
mistrust that Turkey desired to resurrect the Ottoman Empire. (3) As the
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meeting was about to get underway in Baghdad, the State Department 
informed Sir Roger Makins, the British Ambassador in Washington, that 
they were concerned about reports that Britain was not encouraging Iraq 
to ally herself with the Turko-Pakistan Pact of 1954. The Americans 
agreed with the British that it was important not to press the Iraqis to 
join against their will, but felt that any advice on the matter had to 
be carefully phrased, so as to avoid giving Iraq the impression that the 
western powers were not keen to secure Iraqi membership of that 
agreement.(4)
delegation was pushing the Iraqi side hard for some commitment to a 
defensive regional pact but the Iraqis were unprepared for that at the 
time and were only interested in general statements of agreement, 
similar at most to the Turko-Pakistan Pact of the previous year. 
British diplomats were asked by the Turks to lend their weight and 
influence in trying to get the Iraqis to be more flexible and 
accommodating in their approach. The Tuirkish team also wanted the 
British government to issue encouraging statements from London which 
would help to shake Iraqi resolve not to sign a defence pact. (5) On 13 
January, however, the Turkish and Britislh governments got the outcome 
they had been hoping for when a communique was issued from Baghdad which 
stated that Turkey and Iraq were going to meet at a later date to 
discuss the details of a defence pact between them.(6)
The Turkish and Iraqi expectations of the meeting were quite
different as both sides on 12 January. The Turkish
This announcement by the Turks and Iraqis was welcomed in Pakistan. 
The Foreign Ministry issued a note describing the announcement 'as an 
important step towards the establishment of a collective security system 
for the region in which Pakistan, by reason of her geographical 
position, her vital national interests and close religous and cultural 
affinities with the other countries of the Middle East, must naturally 
be clo^4)y concerned' . (7)
If the Iraqis and the Turks had differing views on Middle Eastern 
defence, it was no less a gulf than existed between the British and 
Americans. The State Department believed fervently that an alliance of 
the northern states of the Middle East; Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Iraq, 
was the best bet for a secure defence of the Middle East. The 
differences came out when, on 11 January, Evan Vilson of the U.S. 
Embassy in London met Evelyn Shuckburgh, who was an Additional Under 
Secretary of State, 1954-56. Shuckburgh claimed that Britain still 
believed in the Northern Tier concept but was keen to encourage the 
'indigenous approach', that is, the notion that the countries of the 
area should themselves form pacts without outside interference. This 
was a reversal from 1954 when the British line was that no pact in the 
Middle East was viable without themselves and the Americans had stressed
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the need/local management.
Britain had since been impressed by the strength of Egyptian 
opposition to any proposed defence pact which threatened the position of 
the Arab League and, as any Middle Eastern defence agreement without 
Egypt was bound to be very weak, it seemed wise not to push the Northern 
Tier concept too hard at the moment. Vilson said the State Department
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felt that the Northern Tier concept was still the 'most reliable 
concept' for defence in that region and that British thinking in the 
region was not as positive as it used to be. Vilson pointed out that the 
U.S. had no desire to see Egypt angry with the west either, or 
implacably opposed to Iraq but they felt that, if Iraq's membership of 
the Northern Tier led to the breakup of the Arab League, it could lead 
to a new grouping around the Northern Tier.
Shuckburgh claimed that Britain was not any less keen about the 
future of the Northern Tier than the Americans but that there was a 
difference of emphasis between them. The Americans were pressing rather 
hard for the Northern Tier to become a reality, while the U.K. was not
convinced that it was the wisest way of approaching the problem. Britain
felt that the present rise of Arab nationalism, as exemplified by Egypt, 
was not ready for this. Egypt was seen by the British as the key to the 
whole Middle East defence structure and so Egyptian opinion did count.
ShuckAburgh added in his report that a possibility did exist that Nuri,
by joining the Northern Tier, would receive enough aid to make Nasser 
change his attitude and also apply for western aid. This was seen by the
U.S. policy works it would be a great success, but it is risky and if it 
fails, Britain must avoid being blamed for its failure'. (8)
The American concept of Middle Eastern defence also included the 
possibility of Israel being included in the proposed pact. Jernegan, a 
senior State Department figure, told Harold Beeley in the British 
Embassy on 9 February that the U.S. had not ruled out the possibility of 
Israel, Jordan and the Lebanon joining the formative pact. Jernegan said 
that although American policy was to encourage as many Middle Eastern
Foreign Office as a risky policy, and had added, ' If the
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countries as possible to join together in a pro-western alliance, they 
realised that it would make American accession to such a pact more 
difficult. This unrealistic hope of the Americans shows how seriously 
they under-estimated the force of Arab feeling against Israel, (9)
The agreement itself, which became known as the Baghdad Pact, was 
signed on 24 February in Baghdad. It has been suggested that Iraq joined 
partly out of traditional rivalry with Egypt but, whatever the reason, 
the Egyptian reaction was extremely hostile. The details of the Iraqi- 
Turkish understanding in February were vague. The parties agreed to co­
operate for security and defence purposes but the military details were 
left to be worked out at a later conference. The major concession given 
by Turkey to Arab public opinion was to sign an Exchange of Letters with 
Iraq on the Palestine question. These stated that both sides recognised 
the need for a fair settlement of the Palestinian question in accordance 
with United Nations resolutions calling for a return to the 1947 
boundaries. This Exchange was obviously the price that Iraq demanded
country with diplomatic relations with Israel. Any failure to mention 
the Palestine problem would have made the agreement unpopular throughout 
the Arab world. As mentioned earlier, the Iraqis were rather reluctant 
to sign any specific pact with the Turks and even this agreement went
further than Nuri Said had anticipated. This was due largely to British
$
pressure, as admitted by the Ambasador there. (10) In Iraq, the view 
according to a well-known British journal was that 'the government had 
gone beyond public opinion in signing the Pact with Turkey'. (11)
The Turks were keen to assume the mantle of leadership as they would 
became the link between NATO and the Middle East. The Turkish government
from Turkey for an alliance with her as Turkey was the only
176
wanted to encourage Pakistan also to join by telling them how welcome 
they would be. The Turks also asked the American and British governments 
to inform the Iraqis of this proposal and encourage them to send
similar messages. A Foreign Office minute noted that, although it had 
refrained from telling any country to join, it could not prevent the 
Turks and Iraqis from doing so, indeed it would welcome that. The 
Commonwealth Relations Office felt that, if Pakistan was to be 
approached, it should as a Commonwealth member, be approached by the 
British as well. Sir Alexander Symon, the recently arrived High
Commissioner in Karachi, had already reported that the Pakistan
government was giving the matter 'urgent consideration'. The Foreign 
Office felt that any hesitation on the Pakistani side was due to the 
fact that the Arab world was divided on this question and so Pakistan 
did not wish to take sides.(12)
In addition to the text of the Pact there was an Exchange of 
Letters. This caused the United States some concern and certainly 
strengthened Israeli feeling against the Pact. The U.S. was mainly left 
to worry about how to limit the damage and prevent other signatories 
from subscribing to the Letters. The last thing the Americans wanted was 
to turn the focus from communism to Israel in this Pact, however 
unlikely the prospect. The Americans asked the British for support in
trying to prevent Pakistan from subscribing to the Letters when it 
joined the Baghdad Pact. The Foreign Office noted that the Commonwealth 
Relations Office had been unwilling to do so strongly on the grounds 
that 'it may be unpalatable'. They only suggested that Symon should have 
the discretion to raise the subject when the timing was right. Sir 
Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, had commented alongside the word
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'discretion' in the margin, 'From what I saw of the High Commissioner 
this is not his strong suit anyway !'. The C.R.O. had suggested acting 
in unison with the Americans in this question. The Foreign Office felt 
that this approach was 'very feeble' on the grounds that, if Britain 
felt that the advice was correct, then it should be given on its 
merits.(13)
Attempts to. expand the E a d
J.A. Rahim, the Secretary of the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, met 
Symon on 9 March to explain the Pakistani perspective on the Baghdad 
Pact. Rahim said that, although British membership of the Pact was very 
necessary, there was the question of timing which had to be taken into 
consideration. The government of Pakistan would like one or two other
Middle Eastern states to join the Baghdad Pact before Britain did. Early
accession by Britain would be viewed with 'misgivings' in Pakistan as it 
would not seem to be an indigenous idea if Britain joined too soon. In 
Pakistan's view, the membership of Iran was very necessary, as had been 
agreed by the Turkish President and Ghulam Mohammed, the Pakistan 
Governor General. The inclusion of Afghanistan had also been mentioned 
by the Turks but Pakistan's reaction was noticeably cooler on that
suggestion, given the history of strained relations betwen the two 
states. The last point Rahim made was that Pakistan had still not made 
up her mind whether to join. The split in the Cabinet over this was 
spelt out later as events unfolded.(14)
The Indian reaction to possible Pakistani participation in the 
Baghdad Pact was predictably strong. The Secretary of the Indian
External Affairs Ministry, Pillai, told the High Commissioner in Delhi 
that, if both Pakistan and Britain joined the Baghdad Pact, then Britain
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would become military allies. This, he said, was bound to cause 
resentment against Britain in India. The High Commissioner replied that 
the hypothesis seemed both far fetched and misleading. (15) Despite this 
advice to the contrary and the possible repercussions, Britain joined 
the Baghdad Pact on 30 March. Eden gives a frank reason for this in his 
memoirs; 'our purpose. .. was very simple. I think by doing so we have 
strengthened our influence and our voice throughout the Middle 
East' . (16) Be that as it may, it provoked a predictable response from 
all concerned but it only served to underline what every one had already 
suspected: that Britain had had a large part to play in the very
creation of the Pact and her accession was only natural. The Americans, 
meanwhile, were still dragging their feet over the issue. Makins in 
Washington was informed by the State Department that the U.S. was 
concerned about the lack of any specific non-aggression clause in the 
treaty and that was providing ammunition for India, Israel and others to 
attack the Pact. The Americans told Makins that they would like to see 
this problem resolved before they could join.(17)
The Turkish and Iraqi pressure to secure more signatories to the 
pact continued, and particular attention was focused on Pakistan. The 
Turks found it puzzling that Pakistan should hesitate to join the Pact 
after signing a similar agreement with Turkey a year before. A joint 
Iraqi-Turkish message was sent to Pakistan on 2 April. The message said 
that both parties had 'Pakistan in mind as among the most important 
states whose adherence is necessary and important' . It continued by 
saying that Pakistan was 'fully qualified for and worthy of becoming a 
destined member of all organisations which would be set up in the Middle 
East for the maintenance of peace and security'. (18)
This invitation to Pakistan was discussed by a Foreign Office 
official with the Counsellor in the U.S. Embassy in London. The 
Counsellor was informed that the Iraqi and Turkish Ambassadors had met
pleasure at the invitation but did not commit Pakistan to anything and 
left for Switzerland to attend a conference of Pakistani diplomats. It 
was noted in the Foreign Office that Iraq, Turkey and America hoped that 
Pakistan would announce her accession to the Pact before the Bandung 
Conference started in a month. (19)
The British and Americans had expected that Pakistan would be more 
enthusiastic about the Baghdad Pact than the South East Asia Treaty 
Organisation but it was not to be as simple as that. On 14 June, Symon 
reported that Ayub Khan, the Defence Minister of Pakistan and the 
Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army, would visit Turkey. The King of 
Iraq and Nuri Said, the Prime Minister, would also be in Turkey at that 
time and so discussions as to Pakistan's adherence to the Iraqi-Turkish 
Pact would inevitably figure on the agenda. Ayub who would be 
accompanied by J.A. Rahim, would speak to the Turks along the lines
adopted by the Pakistan government. This was that Pakistan was in
principle in favour of defence groupings which addend to the strength of 
the region. However, Pakistan was sceptical about the value and 
prospects of a Middle Eastern pact without American membership; British 
adherence notwithstanding. The Pakistan government noted that in case of 
war the British government intended to rush troops to the area but that 
might prove problematic in case of a full scale war in Europe and the
general progress of the war. Pakistan, therefore, hoped to secure a full
American military commitment before joining. A Commonwealth Relations
Bogra and had delivered together. Bogra had expressed
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official commented, on the telegram, 'At last they have come out into the 
open. There seems no prospect of our now pressing them to join'.(20)
Symon had tried to talk to Ayub Khan on these Pakistani reservations 
before his departure. Ayub confirmed that the views expressed in the 
previous telegram were indeed the thoughts of the Pakistan Cabinet. The 
High Commissioner attempted to put forward the British perspective as 
strongly as he could. He said that it was wrong to assume that the U.K. 
would be unable to reinforce the Middle East in case of war or that the 
British forces already stationed there along with local forces would be 
inactive. The defence of the Middle East was seen as depending on the 
co-operation of local countries and in this Pakistan was seen as having 
an important role to play.(21)
Symon discussed the same topic with Sikander Mirza on 15 June. Mirza 
confirmed that Ayub's visit was of an exploratory nature; its main
present circumstances, Pakistan could not commit itself to making any 
positive contribution whatsoever to the defence of the Middle East. 
Mirza told Symon that before Ayub's visit was agreed to there had been a 
heated debate in the Pakistan Cabinet during which he, as Interior 
Minister, had tried to get a resolution adopted that Pakistan, should 
adhere to the Turko-Iraqi pact. Mirza said he had not succeeded but 
still hoped this would be the Pakistan government's ultimate decision. 
Symon reported that he was keeping in close contact with his Australian 
and American counter-parts on this issue. (22) G.V. Choudhry has 
confirmed that it was the Defence Minister, Ayub Khan, who spoke against 
the pact in the Cabinet. Speaking for the army, Ayub stated 'In our
objective being bring home to the Turks and Iraqis that, in the
□pinion this pact can only be saved if the Americans join in. Our 
joining in earlier will be premature and do no good to us or them'.(23) 
The Commonwealth Relations Office replied to Symon almost 
immediately. He was praised for the 'admirable arguments' which he had 
employed while talking to Ayub Khan. Symon was given some further 
arguments to use in trying to stiffen Pakistani resolve. The Chiefs of 
Staff suggested that Symon should point out to Ayub that the provision 
of adequate defence depended on on the creation of confidence and that 
the area could only be defended if all the countries in the region, 
including Pakistan, did everything possible to contribute towards this 
end. The U.K. was planning to make a maximum contribution towards this 
end and it was hoped that Pakistan would do the same. Further arguments 
were also supplied by the Commonwealth Relations Office. These were 
that, if more Asian countries joined the Pact, it would give it a less 
western image and would increase the likelihood of American accession. 
The U.S. Congress and public opinion would have to be convinced that the 
Pact was an effective grouping of indigenous states before that could 
happen. The second main argument used was that with the inclusion of 
Pakistan there could be set up a Permanent Council, which would futher 
co-ordinate local countries efforts. As the effectivenes of the 
organisation grew, so did the chances of American adherence.(24)
The Pakistani attitude to the pact was described by the Foreign 
Office as 'disappointing' and it was noted that it confirmed the feeling 
that Pakistan was less than enthusiatic about the way in which the Pact 
was shaping up. The Foreign Ofice decided, however, to make the best of 
the situation and to use the Pakistani attitude as further ammunition in 
some forthcoming talks with the Americans on 20 June, to try 'to get the
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for what was then described as the Tripartite Agreement. Ayub Khan had 
passed through Damascus on his way to the talks in Turkey and had asked 
the Pakistani Ambassador to find out why the Americans were so lukewarm 
about the Baghdad Pact. Ayub felt that the American ambivalence could 
not be entirely explained in terms of the Jewish votes. The British 
Ambassador said that he 'gathered that Ayub Khan's views on Pakistan's 
adherence to the Ankara-Baghdad Pact would be largely influenced by the 
American attitude'.(28)
The visit of Ayub Khan and J.A, Rahim was later described by the 
British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir James Bowker. The King and Prime 
Minister of Iraq had arrived in Turkey before the Pakistani delegation 
and had been given the full red carpet treatment. The talks which the 
Turks and Iraqis were having became tripartite with the arrival of Ayub 
Khan. Vhat is interesting to note is that General Ayub Khan was at this 
time not only the Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army but was also 
the Defence Minister. This gave him not only the official status to 
negotiate and discuss all issues relevant to Pakistan's role in the 
regional pacts, but also greater clout than any other single minister, 
possibly including the Prime Minister. According to one authoritive 
study, the opinion of the military was given great importance in 
Pakistan where decisions were often taken on a joint basis with the 
political leadership.(29)
The first round of talks were concerned with Pakistan's accession 
to the pact. By the end of the first day Ayub Khan had been convinced by 
the arguments put foward to him by tfuri Said and President Menderes. 
Ayub was reported to have come to Istanbul convinced that the Pact could 
never be an effective instrument for Middle Eastern defence unless the
Americans to take a more positive line',(25) The Foreign Office minute 
on 16 June was written explaining the British view of the Turko-Iraqi 
Pact. It noted that Britain had not brought any pressure to bear on 
Jordan to join the Pact, in spite of hopes that the latter would adhere 
to the agreement. It went on to note that ' It was hoped that the next 
accessions to the Pact would be Pakistan and Persia. It now looks as if 
Pakistan will not join unless the Americans join, or at least make it 
worth her while in some concrete way to do so'. The danger of the whole 
proposal running out of momentum was mentioned and so it was decided 
that the Americans had to be convinced of the value of the Pact and 
breathe some new life into it.(26)
had known of a memorandum sent by the Jointjp Chiefs of Staff to the 
Secretary of Defence in Washington on 16 June. The Joint Chiefs said 
that, if the Pact showed signs of consolidating, the U.S., having 
stimulated its development, could not resist remaining outside it 
indefinitely. The really important line was that U.S. adherence should 
be in the broadest possible sense 'carrying no obligations for the ear­
marking of the United States forces to the area, nor any implied 
commitment as to the order of financial or material support we may 
give'.(27)
Ayub Khan's Y..is.it to Turkey
The obvious American coolness to the Baghdad Pact was reported as 
being a source of disappointment not only to Pakistani diplomats, but 
also to the Turks. The British Ambassador in Syria reported to the 
Foreign Office that his Pakistani and Turkish colleagues were 
disppointed by the American failure to remove doubts about their support
The British and Pakistanis would
pointed to the necessity of some kind of link being provided between the 
pacts in western Europe and Asia. Ayub Khan in the end made an 
admission. He said that Pakistan's hesitation over acceding to the Pact 
had not been due to the politicians but to himself. From a military 
point of view, he had wanted to know the extent of Pakistan's 
responsibilities before joining.
The second day of talks was of a more general nature after the 
question of Pakistan's adherence to the Pact had been cleared up. The 
possible inclusion of Iran was discussed with Ayub Khan expressing the 
opinion that its inclusion was crucial to any plan regarding the 
Northern Tier. All the parties agreed that the Iranians should be 
encouraged in all ways and so the Iranian offer to hold Staff Talks with 
Pakistan, Iraq and Turkey was accepted. During a general review of the 
position of other Arab states, Ayub suggested that, in view of America's 
present difficulties with Israel, the question of other Arab states 
joining should be treated with circumspection. The Secretary-General of 
the Turkish Foreign Ministry informed the British Ambassador that, once 
Ayub Khan had accepted Pakistan's accession into the Turko-Iraqi Pact, 
the strained atmosphere which had marked the beginning of the talks had 
disappeared as had the 'noticeably reserved manner' in which Nuri and 
Ayub had eyed each other. The talks had been carried out in a frank and 
open manner and Nuri had even asked Ayub bluntly if Pakistani hesitation 
in joining the Pact was due to its regard for Saudi Arabia. This was a 
supposition which Ayub emphatically denied.(30)
United States became a signatory and so Pakistan's accession would be 
useless. Ayub was also apprehensive about Pakistan taking on new 
commitments in view of her present limited military resources and
internal and external preoccupations. He was further understood to be 
suspicious about the designs Iraq might have for the support of 
Pakistan's armed forces in case of war.
Nuri Said spoke first and was described by Bowker as being at his 
most convincing, as he combined flattering references to the lead 
Pakistan had given to the idea of a Northern Tier by concluding the pact 
with Turkey, with 'clear and convincing answers to the General's several 
doubts'. Both Nuri and Menderes reassured Ayub about the American 
intentions about the Northern Tier and the Turko-Iraqi Pact. It was
pointed out that American support was assured as continued American aid 
was being given to Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan, although for particular 
reasons accession itself was difficult. Nuri and Menderes also pointed 
out to Ayub that the Pact contained no new commitments and Nuri claimed 
it amounted to little more than Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The 
pact, being only a framework, it was up to the signatories themselves 
what to do with it. When Pakistan acceded, it would also be possible to 
set up a Permanent Council as provided for by Article 6 of the Treaty.
When Ayub asked a direct question as to what would be required of 
Pakistan in case of a war in which Turkey was involved in as a member of 
NATO, he was told that Pakistan's position would be no different then to 
what it was, and Menderes expressed the view that, although there would 
be no question of any automatic action being taken, there ought to be an
understanding amongst all the parties to the Pact to see what kind of
help could be provided in case of war. Both Nuri Said and Menderes
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Pakistan agrees ia adhere
The talks that Nuri and Kenderes had with Ayub Khan seemed to have 
such an effect on the latter that he immediately sent a telegram from 
Istanbul to the Pakistan Foreign Ministry recommending that Pakistan 
should join the Pact. He even said that he did not mind action in this 
regard being taken even in his absence, implying that now that his veto 
had been lifted, there was no obstacle to ratification. On 30 June, when 
the High Commissioner, Symon, was receiving this information from Baig, 
he was also informed that the Cabinet in Pakistan had decided to adhere 
to the Pact but with a proviso. The nature of this proviso was unknown 
to Baig, but the Deputy Foreign Secretary promised to inform the High 
Commissioner of any formal announcement the government might make, but 
that was not expected to be for some time. (31)
The following day, 1 July, the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammed 
Ali Bogra, summoned the American and Turkish Ambassadors, the Iraqi 
Charge d'Affaires and Morris James, in the absence of Symon who was on 
tour. Bogra announced that Pakistan had decided to accede to the Turko- 
Iraqi Pact. This would be publicly announced that evening an Pakistan 
Radio. In making this statement, Bogra wished to clarify a number of 
points. Firstly, Pakistan's obligations would be strictly limited to a 
direct attack on Turkey or Iraq, that is, if Turkey was drawn into a war 
through her membership of NATO by an attack on Norway, then Pakistan 
would not be involved. Secondly, Pakistan would make no greater 
commitment than her military potential would allow and would not accept 
any commitment which would mean a weakening of her own defensive 
capabilities. Bogra said he would not emphasise these points in his
broadcast and might not even refer to them but he wished there to be no 
official misunderstandings. The Turkish and Iraqi representatives said 
they felt the Pakistani reservations were perfectly understandable. They 
pointed out that the first reservation could apply in reverse to 
Pakistan through her membership of SEATO. The main point which everyone
understood was that the Turko-Iraqi Pact was a defensive instrument in
the Middle East. James said only that the news of Pakistan's adherence 
would be most welcome to his Government. (32)
News that the Pakistan Government had decided to adhere to the
Baghdad Pact came as no real surprise but was still welcome news to the 
previous members. The British Counsellor in Ankara met the Secretary 
General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey on 4 July. The 
Secretary General said that he was not worried by Pakistan's
reservations at present as Pakistan's announcement was still only a 
declaration of intention. Nevertheless, he recognised that the 
reservations may lead to difficulties and could set an awkward precedent 
for the alliance. The Secretary General said that Ayub Khan also had 
some reservations regarding Pakistan's obligations in case of Turkey 
being dragged into a European conflict through her membership of SATO. 
He said Ayub had been told that, although there could no question of any 
automatic action being obligatory in such a case, an understanding 
should exist which enabled all members to confer and see what help they 
could provide each other. The idea that the defensive pacts running from 
Western Europe to Pakistan should in some way be linked was mentioned 
again by the Secretary General. He noted with satisfaction the way in 
which Bogra had make no public reference to any reservations and hoped
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that the three existing members could accommodate any Pakistani 
fears.(33)
Ayub Khan returned from Turkey on 4 July and issued a statement 
regarding his visit. He emphasised that the talks which had taken place 
in Turkey were held in an atmosphere of great frankness and cordiality, 
with agreement being reached on all major issues. He still pointed out 
that Pakistan was not strong enough to take her rightful share of the 
responsibility for the defence of the Middle East. The decision to 
accede to the Baghdad Pact was reported by the High Commission in 
Karachi as being received favourably by most sections of the press in 
Pakistan. Dawnof Karachi argued that the decision was in line with the 
aim of Pakistan foreign policy, namely 'to promote international peace 
through co-operation with like-minded nations' . It pointed out, however, 
that the ultimate aim of the Pact was to ensure 'social betterment and 
economic advancement'.(34)
Vith the decision of the Pakistan government to join the Baghdad 
Pact, discussions moved on to the practical stage of where and how to 
manage the new Pact. As Sir James Bowker in Istanbul pointed out, one of 
the arguments used by Menderes and Nuri Said in trying to persuade Ayub 
Khan to join the Pact was that, with Pakistan's accession, the moves to 
establish a Permanent Council could begin. The Turks and the Iraqis 
expected that the Permanent Council would discuss the form that defence 
co-operation between the members should take. Bowker recalled that the 
Foreign Office 'were not particularly enthusiastic' about the idea of a 
Permanent Council when the Pact was being negotiated but pointed out
tliat Britain should not be seen to be lacking enthusiasm and could 
instead influence the form any Council might take. (35)
On 27 July, the Foreign Office prepared a paper relating to the 
position of Pakistan regarding the Baghdad Pact. E.M. Rose, who wrote 
the document, pointed out that Pakistan's delay in acceding to the Pact 
had been caused by the preparation of two necessary documents. One of 
these was the form of Pakistan's subscription to the exchange of letters 
between Iraq and Turkey on the United Nation resolutions regarding 
Palestine. The other document was one setting out Pakistani 
reservations. These were that Pakistan's obligations would be limited to 
the case of direct aggression against Iraq or Turkey. Secondly, that 
Pakistan could give no greater assistance than her military potential 
allowed and could accept no military commitment which would weaken her 
capacity to defend her own territory. The Commonwealth Relations Office 
were reported to be anxious to send instructions to Symon in Karachi. 
These would be to urge the Pakistan government to desist from
association with the exchange of letters which raises the Palestine 
question and could make thatissue more difficult to solve. These views 
were conveyed to the Pakistan government in April, along with the 
request to Pakistan to refrain from putting foward her reservations
formally at the time of accession. These reservations were seen as 
unnecessary in view of the wide drafting of the Baghdad Pact.
It was recalled by Rose that the Turks had pointed out to Ayub Khan
during his visit to Turkey that any commitment with regard to actual
troop dispositions would only come about as a result of the signing of 
special agreements as the British had done with Iraq. The correct forum 
for discussing this was seen as the ministerial council which would be
set up under Article 6 of the Baghdad Pact. The Foreign Office believed 
that any prior formal reservations would greatly detract from Pakistan's 
decision to adhere to the Pact. It was pointed out that, if Bogra felt 
that public or parliamentary opinion needed to be calmed down, there 
would be no objection to his pointing out publicly that adherence does 
not entail any commitment to NATO or specific commitments about the 
positioning of troops which would only be as a result of a special 
treaty. Rose suggested that American support should also be enlisted for 
these representations in Karachi as it was known that they did not like 
the idea of Pakistan associating herself with the Exchange of Letters 
openly. (36)
On 28 July, Morris James, the Deputy High Commissioner in Karachi, 
and Alexander Symon met J.A. Rahim. On the Baghdad Pact, Rahim said that 
he had put to the Cabinet some proposals on how Pakistan's accession to 
that Pact might be managed. He had suggested that there should be three 
documents. One would be a short formal Instrument of Accession, 
mentioning in its preamble the Turko-Pakistan Pact. Secondly, there 
should be a letter indicating Pakistan's agreement with the exchange of 
letters on Palestine and, thirdly, a note sent to the governments of 
Iraq, Turkey and Britain recording the reservations set out earlier. 
Rahim had suggested to the Cabinet that the first two of these documents 
should be published but the third should not. He hoped that he could 
show these documents to the relevant governments before they were 
finalised.
Symon reminded Rahim that the British government had expressed the 
hope that Pakistan would not subscribe to the letters on Palestine. 
Rahim said that it was unfortunately not possible for Pakistan to meet
the British wishes in this respect. For Pakistan to refrain from 
subscribing to the Exchange of Letters would be a pointed and deliberate 
abstention from Muslim solidarity which neither the Pakistani people nor 
the people of Iraq and Turkey would understand. Rahim appreciated the 
British view that this might make a settlement more difficult but he did 
not see how Pakistan's acceptance of the Letters would affect the issue. 
He said that Britain had to realise that the Arab countries were nervous 
of Israel and an essential element in any defence combination between 
them must be a correct understanding that they would act together in the 
event of further Israeli aggression. Indeed, such an understanding was 
vital prior to any negotiation as the Arabs would not negotiate from a 
position of weakness.
James went on to inform the Commonwealth Relations Office of the 
views which the Egyptian Ambassador has been propagating in Karachi. He 
had been advising Pakistan to go slow in completing her accession to the 
Baghdad Pact. The reason he gave for this was that the climate between 
east and west had improved so much that it was no longer necessary to 
build up a system of Middle Eastern defence. The Egyptian Ambassador 
believed that the western attempt to build up weak states like Iraq and 
Iran at the cost of alienating Egypt and the Arab League was 
misdirected. He believed that, given time, Egypt could build up her own 
capacity for leadership in the Middle East and weld the whole Middle 
East into an effective whole, in collaboration with Britian and America. 
The motive behind the argument seemed clear enough, that is, in a more 
relaxed atmosphere it would give Egypt enough time to regain her lost 
position of leadership in the Middle East. Symon and James had said that 
it was only because of western firmness that the atmosphere had improved
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and it would be folly for the western nations to relax at the time when 
their firmness was beginning to produce results. The reason James was 
mentioning the Egyptian Ambassador's views in such detail was that it 
was becoming clear that talks between the latter and Suhrawardy had been 
taking place along the same lines. With the prominent position of 
Suhrawardy in Pakistani political life, the British were worried as to 
the possible consequences.
James went on to say that the High Commission was aware that the 
decision to adhere to the Baghdad pact had only been taken after a 
'fairly stiff tussle'. There was always the possibilty of some ministers 
having residual doubts and the prospect of the Egyptian Ambassador 
plugging his line to them as he had been with Suhrawardy was taken 
seriously. Symon had asked Rahim how he viewed the position following 
some relaxation of tension between the Nato and eastern bloc allies. 
Rahim's cautious reply satisfied Symon and James who described it as 
'extremely sound'. James ended by reporting that the Pakistan government 
had not been able to meet with the Turkish and Iraqi request not to 
document the Pakistani reservations but had decided to treat them as a 
tacit understanding between the governments concerned. Symon wanted the 
Commonwealth Relations Office to record his considered judgement that it 
would be a mistake to push the Pakistanis any futher on this point. The
reservations were introduced as a result of a deliberate Cabinet
A
decision and for the sake of unity amo|ogst its members. Vith the 
Egyptians in full cry, it seemed to him dangerous to try and push the 
Pakistanis into dropping the idea of recording the reservations as it 
would lead to further dissent in the Cabinet and provide an opening for 
those who wished to hold up Pakistan's accession. (36)
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Pakistan delays accession
Pakistan's democratic credentials, weak since birth, took another 
battering in August. The Governor General since 1951, Ghulam Mohanmed, 
had to retire due to his ill health which had affected him for some 
time. Ghulam Mohammed had played a role of considerable importance - and 
intrusiveness - over Pakistan's political life and foreign policy. On 7 
August, Sikander Mirza was sworn in as Acting Governor General and it 
was announced that he would take over this job permanently when Ghulam
Mohammed officially retired on 6 October. In the power struggle which
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folljwed Mirza'a promotion from Interior Minister to Governor General, 
the Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Bogra, was removed. This has been seen 
as a result of Bogra's attempts to prevent Mirza from getting the job. 
In a rather bizzare twist, Bogra was sent back to the States as 
ambassador and Chaudhri Mohammed Ali, the former Finance Minister, was 
made Prime Minister.
An era of some turbulence followed as Mirza did not command the same 
fear and respect that Ghulam Mohammed had, and so relied on political 
intrigues to keep himself in power. A cabinet existed without any 
legislature to which it was in any way accountable, and no member of the 
assembly had been elected since independence. To prevent Ayub Khan from 
becoming too powerful, Mohammed Ali kept the defence portfolio, and 
turned his attention to drafting a constitution for Pakistan, which 
eight years after independence it was still lacking! These events 
obviously disturbed Pakistan's accession to the Baghdad Pact but the 
British and Americans were not too worried by the events, knowing that 
there was to be no real change in policy, only personalities. (37)
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The Exchange of Letters was to prove to be a tussle between the 
western powers and the Middle Eastern ones. On 4 August, Rahim informed 
Symon that the Iraqi Am^bassador in Karachi had expressed his 
government's strong desire that Pakistan should subscribe to the 
Letters. Hildreth, the U.S. Ambassador in Karachi, told Symon that he 
had been authorised to use his discretion on whether or not to apply any 
pressure on this question. He had decided not to do so as he felt too 
much pressure on Pakistan at once might be counter-productive.(38) The 
Turkish Foreign Ministry attempted to find a way out of Pakistan's 
insistence that the reservations be recorded. The Secretary General of 
the Turkish Foreign Ministry said that Pakistan's objections could be 
kept secret but should be understood by all the other signatories.(39) 
This question was to crop up throughout the month and the British line 
was that it was best not to keep the reservations secret as the United 
Nations was supposed to keep a record of all international agreements 
made. The other side of the coin was that Pakistan should not stipulate 
such severe reservations that it would detract from her very membership.
Symon noted with some trepidation that the draft of Pakistan's 
Instrument of Accession had not been cleared with Bogra before his 
resignation, and so the new draft would have to be cleared with the new 
Prime Minister and, possibly even the reconstructed Cabinet. The High 
Commissioner said that this 'troubles me somewhat since, if my 
information is correct, the new Prime Minister is not, repeat not, 
wholeheartedly in favour of Pakistan's accession to the Pact'. Symon 
fully agreed with the hope of the Secretary General of the Turkish 
Foreign Ministry that Pakistan's accession could be cleared quickly but 
he felt that the internal situation in Pakistan meant that any
intervention, however well meant, would mean a further delay. Rahim also 
informed Symon that he had been under strong Turkish and Iraqi pressure 
to drop the reservations altogether but he was still unconvinced.(40) 
Rose in London inferred that 'the new Pakistan Government may not be as 
anxious as its predecessor to accede to the Baghdad Pact' . (41) He felt 
that, although the resignation of Bogra and the installation of a new 
Cabinet would obviously result in some delay to Pakistan's adherence to
On 11 August, the High Commissioner met Sikander Mirza to discuss
the Baghdad Pact. Symon urged Mirza that Pakistan should push ahead hard
to complete the accession. Mirza told the High Commissioner that there 
had been three doubters in the old Cabinet; Ayub Khan, Chaudhry Mohammed 
Ali and Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani. Mirza said he did not expect Mohammed Ali 
to try and get the decision changed at this late stage despite his 
earlier reservations. Symon reiterated his request that Pakistan should 
join the Baghdad Pact as soon as possible. Mirza promised to do all he 
could to achieve this. <43) The battle of the Letters resulted in a 
rather inevitable western victory when, on 17 August, Baig told Symon 
that Pakistan had decided not to subscribe to the Exchange of Letters. 
The reason given for this was that the Iraqi Ambassador had told the 
Pakistan Cabinet that his government knew the feelings of Pakistan on 
the Palestine question and so there was no need to publicise it. This
comment was in direct contradiction to the reported Iraqi line of 4
August and seems to indicate that there had been some British and 
American pressure behind it. (44) There was probably little opposition to 
this within the Pakistan Cabinet as the main doubter, Ayub Khan, had
would not endanger it. (42) This was to prove correct.
11%
been won over and the deal worked out within the old Cabinet did not 
apply to the present one,
Iraq and Turkey continued to feel dissatisfied with Pakistan's 
reservations over the Baghdad Pact.(45) The Foreign Minister of Iraq 
sent for a member of the British Embassy in Baghdad, Beaumont, to 
express his dislike of the conditions Pakistan was laying down. He felt 
that the reservations were obvious and constituted a bad precedent. The 
fear that any new or possible signatory to the Pact could lay down their 
own particular condition and lead to a distortion of the Pact was a fear
shared by the British and Turks. The Iraqi Foreign Minister asked
Beaumont whether it was possible, even at this late stage, for pressure 
to be applied on Pakistan to drop the reservations altogether. (46) The 
Foreign Office replied that it seemed dangerous at the present time to
push Pakistan any more. The recent dropping of the desire to subscribe
to the Exchange of Letters by Pakistan was obviously what the Foreign 
Office meant but this was not mentioned. The Foreign Office felt that 
confidential letters sent to all the other signatories on whert 
reservations Pakistan insisted on seemed to be the least objectionable 
way of putting her conditions on the record.(47)
The Iraqi Minister in the Embassy in Karachi, Gaylani, also tried to 
get Symon to apply pressure in Pakistan. The High Commissioner replied 
that he did not plan to influence Mohammed Ali any further on this 
question because Mohammed Ali was a member of the Cabinet which took the 
original decision to accede to the Pact with t c e r t a i n  conditions and 
so the new Prime Minister was fully aware of all the facts. The second 
reason for not interfering at that time was that any further pressure 
would lead to an even longer delay in Pakistan's accession. The third
m
reason was that Mohammed Ali might refer the matter to the Cabinet which 
meant opening up the question to the 'unpredictable views of the East 
Pakistani elements in the new government'. (48)
The next British move to secure immediate Pakistani membership of 
the Pact was to propose that Pakistan should deposit her Instrument of 
Accession without delay and leave the text of the reservation document 
to be decided at a later date. (49) Mohammed Ali was too experienced a 
bureaucrat to be hurried and he told Symon on 25 August that it would be 
necessary to consult the Cabinet before any decision on when to ratify. 
This would still leave open the question of Pakistan's reservations and 
Mohammed Ali said that 'he did not wish to take two bites of the cherry' 
by discussing both ratification and reservations at one meeting. The 
Turkish Ambassador informed Symon that he had been instructed not to 
push the Pakistan government any further at this point as the situation 
was too delicate.(50)
The. Completion ol formalities,
The American interest in the Middle East was re-activated in 
September by an American intelligence report that Russia was planning to 
'jump over the Northern Tier' and sell arms to Egypt. Faced with this 
development, the U.S. suddenly became enthusiastic about the Baghdad 
Pact and encouraged Pakistan adhere quickly to it. On 23 September, 
Pakistan formally joined the Baghdad Pact. The State Department 
announced that the U.S. government was pleased by this development as it 
had always favoured the aspirations of Middle Eastern countries to 
promote their defence through an effective collective security 
arrangement.(51)
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The Baghdad Pact membership was completed with the decision of the 
Shah of Iran to join on 11 October. This meant the completion of the 
'Northern Tier' concept which the Americans had been hoping for since 
1953. In spite of this, America's reaction to the Iranian decision was 
muted, as she made it clear to Iran that any decision she had taken was 
her own and not in response to any American persuasion. The reason often 
given for this is that the Americans did not wish to see immediate 
Iranian accession as it might provoke a strong Russian reaction as Iran 
shared a border with the Soviet Union. The other reason was that it 
might lead to Iran demanding large quantities of U.S. military aid to 
bolster her defences.(52) As mentioned earlier, the Turks and Pakistanis 
were very keen on Iran's accession and the British government felt it 
was a natural and correct step for Iran to take.
The Iranian decision to adhere to the pact was welcomed in Pakistan
by Sikander Mirza. He told Symon that although it was good news, it 
would be expensive for the west to supply Iran with arms. Mirza inquired 
whether it would be the British or the Americans who would pay for those 
arms. Symon ventured the guess that it would be a joint venture, with
the Americans paying for the bulk of it. The need for the Baghdad Pact
Council to be established and functioning was considered to be vital by 
Mirza. He said that the members should know what they were expected to 
do and how to do it and that Ayub Khan would attend.
The seemingly invincible position of Ayub Khan within the Pakistan 
army was reported to the Commonwealth Relations Office to be under some 
threat in October. The Chief of Staff, Nasir Ali, was reported to be 
intriguing against his Commander-in-Chief, Ayub Khan. During the same 
meeting with Mirza, this rumour was mentioned by Symon. The Cabinet
reshuffle in August had meant that Ayub Khan had last his position as 
Defence Minister and so inevitably some power. Mirza said that Ayub had 
now 'settled down well' after being a 'little upset' at his removal from 
that important job. As for the intrigues, Mirza dismissed them by saying 
that there was no cause for concern. Nasir Ali was being carefully 
watched and action would be taken if necessary. Ayub Khan would be given 
an extension as Commander-in-Chief and Nasir Ali would be retired rather 
than promoted. (53)
Attention focused increasingly on the United States as the first 
meeting of the Baghdad Pact approached. Mak, an American diplomat in 
London, discussed American views on the Baghdad Pact with Hadow, of the 
Foreign Office, on 18 November. He said that all the American 
ambassadors in the Middle East had recommended to the State Department 
that the U.S. should accede to the Pact. Hadow replied that, although 
the British government would welcome such a development, the Foreign 
Office had understood that this was impossible because of the strength 
of the Jewish lobby in America and the Israeli dislike of the Pact. Mak 
said he felt that, although this had been the case, the fear of Russian 
infiltration in the Middle East had grown so strong in the past few 
weeks that the American public were quite ready to support such a move. 
He even said that he personally felt that America should join the pact. 
The 'Russian infiltration' Mak was referring to was obviously the 
Egyptian decision to buy Soviet arms via Czechoslovakia. (52) The 
American view of the Baghdad Pact was sent to all the members at the end 
of October. It stated that it welcomed the setting up of the 
organisation and would set up military and political liaison with the 
Pact. The military aspect of American involvement was played down; and
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the message ended by saying that America would keep in close contact 
with the Pact and did not rule out the posssibility of future 
accession.(54)
On 3 November, Baig informed James that Pakistan had received the 
American memorandum on the Baghdad Pact. He repeated the old Pakistani 
line that Pakistan would have been happier if the U.S. had joined the 
Baghdad Pact to start with and hoped it would still join.(55) Baig then 
read to James 'in strict confidence' a secret minute from Ayub Khan. 
Ayub made his frustration clear by demanding how much 'concrete help' in 
the way of equipment the U.S. was willing to make. He continued to 
express his old belief that any defence arrangement in the Middle East 
without the membership or full support of the U.S. was bound to be 
ineffective. He went on to complain that American aid had been 'halting 
and tardy' and this was 'contrary to the pledged word' of the United 
States.(56) Mohammed Ali held views similar to Ayub which he informed 
Symon of the same day James was meeting Baig. Mohammed Ali tried to calm 
Symon down about the Egyptian arms deal with Czechoslovakia by saying 
that the strong western reaction had only succeeded in inflating Abdul 
Gamal Nasser. The incident, according to Mohammed Ali, could be seen by 
some countries as showing that neutralism pays off and so the west 
should do something to counter-act this. The Pakistan Prime Minister 
said that he now regarded SEATO as little more than a 'paper pact'. The 
Middle East, however, was seen as far more important and as he wanted to 
see the Northern Tier to be strong, he hoped that the U.S. would soon 
become a full member of the Baghdad Pact. He felt that the Russians had 
not given up their plan to try and dominate the Middle East but had 
changed their tactics in the face of overwhelming western military
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superiority. Vhat the Russians were going to rely on now was 'probing 
and infiltration' rather than any direct confrontation. He went on to 
say that the west should try and strengthen all weak spots, of which the 
Middle East was one. (57)
After adhering to the Pact, Pakistan seemed to play the role Turkey 
had done earlier by trying to persuade other states to join. The British 
Ambassador in Syria reported to the Foreign Office that the Pakistani 
Minister in Damascus was doing all he could to persuade Jordan to accede 
to the Pact. The Pakistani Minister met with the King and deputy Prime 
Minister of Jordan on 14 November and he told Gardiner that he felt that 
he/ succeded in ensuring that Jordan was favourably disposed to the
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Baghdad Pact. The Minister had said that Pakistan had an advantage over 
Turkey and Iraq in that, while she had only the defence question to 
worry about, the two Middle Eastern states could be seen as having other 
motives in Jordanian accession.(58)
The Indian government left the Foreign Office in little doubt as to 
their feelings about Pakistani and British membership of a defence pact. 
The Indian Foreign Secretary had protested strongly over the whole 
arrangement to the High Commissioner in Delhi and so the Commonwealth 
Relations Office told j'thatj^  himj Britain would do all it could to 
streng^en the Pact and the defences of its members but this would be 
done in a way which would cause minimum offence to India.
The Commonwealth Relations Office painted out that they 'had to meet 
criticism from Pakistan that in the present circumstances they receive 
very little material benefit from their close collaboration with the 
west, both in SEATO and the Middle East. There is a danger that Pakistan 
may become disillusioned with its present policy, to which we attach the
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utmost importance, and come to the conclusion that neutralism pays 
equally well'. This telegram was mainly for the benefit of the High 
Commissioner but India was to be left in doubt as to Britain's 
motives.(59)
The first meeting of the Baghdad Pact was held, aptly enough, in 
Baghdad starting an 20 November. Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan were 
represented by their prime ministers and Britain sent her Foreign 
Secretary, Harold Macmillan. The U.S. attended the meeting as observers 
and the American Ambassador to Iraq was the liaison officer. Chaudhri 
Mohammed Ali gave a press conference before leaving Karachi for Baghdad. 
The main paints he made were that the Asian members needed far more 
military equipment before they could be adequately equipped for an
ensure that the Council of the Pact should discharge its function of 
ensuring a viable defence of the area. (60) It was to prove to be a 
frustrated hope.
Pakistan a M  the. Baghdad East i_ L retrospective Look.
The Pakistan government and army had been looking to the Middle East 
to prove their worth to the western powers and in the process, increase 
their own military potential. Such hopes were to prove futile. Unlike
SEATO, the Bghdad Pact did provide for a military council which was
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supposed to co-ordinate and plan defence amongst all the members. In 
reality, the Middle Eastern powers were left to draw up plans and 
discuss strategies over which they had little control. The United States 
refused ever to join the pact. There have been three reasons suggested
effective defence of the region. American of the Pact was
still seen as necessary and Pakistan believed that the Pact should
2o S
for this, to avoid antagonising Egypt, to avoid Israeli pressure and to 
preclude a Senate fight over ratification in an election year.(61) An 
uncharitable fourth reason could be that the U.S. wished to avoid 
further financial commitments. By leaving Britain to carry the can, the 
U.S. coujlgjl enjoy the best of both worlds, the Northern Tier without any 
responsibility. Other historians have seen the Baghdad pact as a product 
of Anglo-American rivalry in the Middle East, rather than a well- 
considered military strategy to protect that area from Soviet 
attack. <62) For Pakistan, however, the result was that it proved to be 
the final straw for Soviet patience. The Soviet Union started to 
cultivate both Kabul and New Delhi and so any hope of resolving the 
Kashmir di te in the United [Rations was over.
Pakistan found herself in the rather extraordinary position of 
having military commitments ranging from Turkey to the Philippines.
commitments given the state of relations with India and her own economy. 
The irony of the Baghdad Pact for Pakistan was that it came close to the 
initial idealism of her foreign policy, the combination of Muslim states 
in a military agreement. Events in Egypt, however, were to show the 
British reasons for initiating the pact and within a year, it was all 
but over.
There was no way that Pakistan could hope to honour tnose
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Chapter 5.
PAKISTAN A M  IfiE. S U M  QA1AL - luly. to. October 
Iha background,
The year 1956 was fateful for many countries and people but few 
could have forecast the dramatic events which unfolded within a few 
months. Pakistan is not one of the countries normally thought of as 
being greatly affected by the events in Egypt, but for the rulers of 
that country, the whole episode was painful and one which they would 
have preferred not to have happened at all. The dilemma was whether to 
choose between its former colonial masters and recent Baghdad Pact 
allies: the British; or to side with a fellow Muslim country, with whom 
Pakistan sincerely wanted good relations, not only as a country whose 
trade depended heavily on the Suez Canal, but also for the rather vague 
hope of encouraging Muslim unity: Egypt.
The prime minister of Pakistan since August 1955 had been Chaudhry 
Mohammed Ali and the foreign minister was Hamidul Haq Choudhry, a man 
who by his own confession would rather have been in charge of the 
Finance Ministry!(1)
The background to the whole episode is typical of the problems 
facing newly independent countries, trying to develop internally, while 
coping with the realities of Cold Var politics, Gamal Abdul Nasser was 
the darling of militant Arab nationalists. He proclaimed that his 
ultimate dream was to build up one Arab state, sweeping away borders 
between Arabs, with the eventual destruction of Israel. Such fiery, 
revolutionary rhetoric, however, was tempered with the realization that 
the economic clout and technical skills of the western powers would be 
of immense help in Egypt's own development. Nasser, meanwhile, also
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hoped to keep good relations with the Soviet bloc, thus irritating the 
Americans in particular, who tended to see anyone trying to woo both 
sides with suspicion. Nasser, along with Nehru of India and Tito of
Yugoslavia, was in the forefront of the Non - Aligned Movement. Nasser's
original request to the west for help in building the proposed Aswan 
Dam, was quite well received and original indications were that the west 
welcomed the chance to wean Nasser away from the east altogether.
Nasser's acceptance of eastern bloc arms in early 1956 sent shock 
waves, not only to Israel, who dreaded the thought of a strong Arab 
attack, but also the Americans, who felt Nasser was taking them for a
ride. On 19 July 1956, John Faster Dulles, the U.S. secretary of state,
told the pro-west Egyptian ambassador in Washington, that the U.S. had 
decided not to help the Egyptians in building the Aswan Dam. On 26 July, 
stung by this refusal, yet mindful of the symbolic importance of his 
action, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company. The Canal revenues, 
claimed Nasser, would be sufficient, to help Egypt finance the dam 
itself. The die was cast.
thought that Nasser could pull off such a spectacular coup, and even his 
friends, the Indians, were far from delighted with the news, feeling 
that Nasser's act was high handed. <2) In the Arab world, however, the 
news was greeted with unrestrained joy, and even some pro-west
congratulations to Nasser.(3) In Pakistan the press reaction was noted 
by the Americans as being revealing as it strongly supported the 
Egyptian action. The Embassy in Karachi saw this as giving an insight to 
the emotions, which were described as 'pro-Islam and anti-imperialism'.
The news of this action stunned the whole world. Few countries
governments were forced by public feeling to send their
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The Pakistan government was seen as vulnerable to attack on this 
question as it had asked the U.S. not to finance the Aswan Dam. (4)
The issue was portrayed by Nasser as an independent country taking 
charge of it/s land and resources and striking a blow at the
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exploitation of poorer counties by the richer ones. The Suez Canal 
company was owned jointly by the British and French, who immediately 
denounced Nasser's action as illegal and unacceptable. The U.S. was 
concerned by the fact that a man, in their view, as politically 
unreliable as Nasser, should have complete control of a waterway as
strategically and economically important as the Suez canal. As later 
events were to show, however, the U.S. was not too keen on the British 
neo - colonial attitude of treating certain areas as their own, as they 
felt it was counter - productive.
On 2 August, Sir Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister, declared
in the Commons that it was unacceptable that any single power should
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exercise unfettered control over the Suez Canal, in pursuit of national 
policy, and with a possible lack of technical know how.(5) Even before a 
joint statement by the foreign ministers of Britain, France and the U.S. 
could be issued, Eden called up reservists and despatched troops and 
aircraft carriers to the Mediterranean. Notice was given to the world in 
general, and Egypt in particular, that Britain was not prepared to sit 
back and be taken so lightly. Eden had convinced himself that Nasser was 
a particularly dangerous character, (references to Hitler were also 
made) (6), and that he must not be allowed to get away with this act. 
While plans were being drawn up to capture the canal by force, the
British led the diplomatic war in trying to rally all the main canal
users behind her in trying to show Nasser how diplomatically isolated he
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was. The conference was called for by the three foreign ministers of 
Britain, France and the U.S. The conference was called in London on 16 
August . Nasser did not attend, despite Indian and Russian advice that 
he should go.(7)
EaJsl.stan.Vs reaction
Nasser's action had widespread support throughout Pakistan, even 
amongst senior political figures. In aj^  statement to the press on 1 
August the Pakistan Foreign Ministry stated that Pakistan's thinking was 
as follows : firstly, free navigation of the canal was vital to
Pakistan's economic interests, as 56% of it|s exports and 49% of imports 
passed through the canal. Secondly, a peaceful solution to the problem 
had to be found, which was acceptable to all parties. Thirdly, Pakistan 
was unhappy with the military manoeuvers in the Mediterranean. And 
finally, Pakistan believed that the Arab-Israeli dispute must be kept
The U.S. Embassy was informed that despite Ch|iudhry's efforts, some 
members of the Pakistan Cabinet had congratulated Egyp^ on her action, 
and noted how the Pakistan government was trying to be as non-
comittal. (9) The Americans recognised how the Suez issue had shown the
problem of Pakistan's leaders in that the 'wide gulf between their view 
of what is important and the emotions of the people has never before 
been so strikingly apparent'. The Cabinet was thought to have handled 
the situation with caution yet responsibility. (10) Little satisfaction 
was derived by the acting British High Comissioner in Karachi, Sir 
Morris James, in a meeting with the prime minister on 13 August. 
Chaudhr Mohammed Ali told James that he wanted freedom of the Suez
from the Suez Canal and hoped that this dispute would not be
used as a pretext to give arms to Israel.(8)
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Canal guaryanted but Pakistan would not support the use of force. He
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said the reason Pakistan was going to the conference was to try and help 
in a peaceful settlement of the dispute,(11)
elaborated on his views. He stated clearly that Egypt as a sovereign 
state had the right to nationalise the Canal. (12) Miss Fatima Jinnah, 
the sister of the founder of Pakistan, and a formidable political figure 
in her own right, stated that Nasser's step was a bold and correct one. 
Sardar Nishtar, another figure revered for his role in the Pakistan 
movement, was the most outspoken of the senior figures. As a top ranking 
official in the ruling Muslim League, he was a senior official figure. 
He stated that whatever the differences between Pakistan and Egypt, 
Pakistan should stand firmly with Egypt in this dispute to combat what 
he called ' British colonialism' . (13) The most muted response was that 
of the leader of the opposition, H. S, Suhrawardy, who merely called for a 
'mutual adjustment' to be made. Suhrawardy, however, was more than the 
leader of the opposition. As the chief minister of Bengal during the 
raj, he was a political figure with considerable standing. In April that 
year, he had been sent on a semi-official European tour by the Pakistan 
government, and was seen by many, including his hosts in the many 
counties he visited, as being groomed for future prime ministership. 
Vhen Pakistan was invited to the London conference, starting on 16 
August, she accepted.
The Pakistan delegation was to be headed by the Foreign Minister, 
Hamidul Haq Chaudhry, and consisted of Tayyab Hussain, Pakistan 
Ambassador to Egypt, joint secretary, S.K.Dehlavi and Ikramullah, the 
High Commissioner in London. Chaudhry decided to visit Nasser on his way
At an August, the Prime Minister
to the conference, after receiving an invitation. Pakistan was hoping to 
play some role as a mediator between Egypt and Britain, using both its 
Islamic credentials and its membership of the Baghdad pact. Relations 
between Pakistan and Egypt had been strained since Nasser came to power. 
Nasser saw the Baghdad pact as a western tool to keep its influence in 
the east. He had directly criticised Pakistan's role in the regional 
pacts and had made the error of siding with India with its disputes with 
Pakistan, thus losing support from a section of the papulation and the
press. Despite this, Nasser had been encouraged by many expressions of
support from a wide section of Pakistan since the nationalisation of the 
canal, and therefore hoped to gain Pakistani help in the forthcoming 
conference, and possibly beyond. Chaudhry, therefore, met Nasser on 14
August, with instructions to warn Nasser of the need to be careful in
matters of the freedom of navigation and the payment of dues. Pakistan
thought that these two things might provoke a military response. (14).
The British ambassador in Egypt also met Chaudhry while he was there, 
and reported that Chaudhry had been impressed by Nasser's argument that 
the British had acknowledged only a few years earlier Egypt's capability 
to run the canal.(15)
Chaudhry was said to have suggested to Nasser that the canal could 
be run by an international board with Egypt having the final veto or 
deciding vote. Chaudhry was giving this version of events at a lunch at 
10 Dawning Street on 17 August. He claimed that Nasser was interested in
the proposal but the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Fawzi, said any
suggestion that Egypt was not to be in complete and sole control of the 
canal was unacceptable to its sovereignty. Nasser was to have asked 
Chaudhry to use Pakistan's good offices with the west to negotiate on
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Egypt's behalf. According to Chaudhry, Nasser was sweating profusely 
throughout the meeting and had said that a British warship had been
sighted only six miles off Egypt's coast. (16)
Meanwhile, reactions from all over the world were starting to flow 
back, through the Foreign Office. It is almost certain that Nasser did 
not inform any government of his action in advance, including many
friends and sympathizers. The Pakistan counsellor in Peking told his 
British counterpart that there had been no correspondence between the 
Chinese and Egyptians on the Suez issue. The British counsellor was 
inclined to believe this because, as he put it,' Muslim solidarity tends 
to be rather strong in these parts'. The British diplomat regretfully 
noted that the Suez crisis had became another disputed topic between
India and Pakistan, as the Indian ambassador had been overheard saying 
that the decision to withdraw finance from the Aswan Dam project had 
been taken at the recent Baghdad Pact meeting. This infuriated the
Pakistan ambassador. (17)
Nehru was shocked by the announcement, not only because Nasser had
a few days earlier at Briorni, but also because of the possible
that Nehru's own actions in Kashmir had hardly met with unanimous 
international approval. Nehru's opinion of Nasser as a person was rather 
unflattering. He considered Nasser 'inexperienced and narrow­
minded' . (19) . Nehru took nearly two weeks to come out in favour of 
Egypt, in a speech to parliament on 8 August.
King Saud of Saudi Arabia was similarly surprised and insulted. He 
did not, therefore, send Nasser any congratulatory telegram. The
not even hinted his move on the canal, even though they had met just
consequences of his action A cynic may point out
Pakistani and Egyptian ambassadors to Saudi Arabia were good friends and 
the Egyptian ambassador confirmed this story to his Pakistani 
counterpart. It may be interesting to note that the Egyptian ambassador 
was seen as not being very keen on Nasser himself. (20) This was
confirmed by the U.S. Embassy in Karachi. Baig revealed that when King
Saud had heard the news th^ of Nasser's action, he had said 'May God 
save Nasser'. (21) As Saudi Arabia was growing in importance, both
politically and economically, Britain was keen to see Pakistan - Saudi
links grow, as a passible means of extending her own influence, through 
Pakistan.(22) Pakistan, as mentioned earlier, was not averse to the idea 
of acting as mediator, as in the possible outcome of a successful 
agreement being reached, it would have earned the gratitude of both the 
Muslim and western blocs. The Pakistan Ambassador to Washington, the 
former Prime Minister, Bogra, together with his Iraqi colleague, 
suggested to the Egyptians on 4 August that they should agree to Arab 
control of the Suez canal, with finance provided far the Aswan Dam. 
Dulles was impresed with/idea as neither Britainor France were willing 
to consider it and he himself felt that greater international control 
was the only solution. (23) In conversations with the Syrian Foreign 
Minister on 7 August, the Pakistan Ambassador in Damasjis suggested that,
if the Egyptians wanted a neutral site, then Pakistan was available. The 
Syrians also told the Pakistanis, who passed on the message to the 
British, that the Egyptians would attend a conference if it was held 
anywhere other than London and if the British and French ceased their 
military threats.(24)
The other Baghdad pact powers were more hostile to Nasser than 
Pakistan. The Turkish Prime Minister, Menderes, told the British thal£"on
his recent tour of Iran and Pakistan, they had both been agreed on the
threat of Nasser, but had agreed not to follow too similar a line to
prevent popular discontent against the Baghdad Pact. (25) He accepted
that many people in these three countries were pro-Nasser as his action
had 'demagogic appeal'. Menderes said that he regarded Nasser as a
stooge of Russia's, which in turn he saw as Turkey's^/ 'mortal
enemy' . (26) The Shah also made clear his contempt for Nasser, and
although he realised the political folly of a full scale attack, he
suggested a similar removal of Nasser to that of the former Iranian
prime minister, Mossadeq, which enabled him to take the throne.(27)
The first Suez conference
The British had, therefore, succeeded in calling a conference in 
London, as they had wished. Twenty-two countries were represented, the 
majority supporting the Anglo-French line, but the Egyptians were 
comforted by the fact that Russia and India were there. Dulles had 
suggested to the British that the best course of action would be one in 
which friendly nations should be lobbied before the conference, and a 
draft prepared before the conference starts.(28) Whatever Nehru's 
reservations earlier about the whole episode were, he had now come out 
firmly with Nasser on the crucial points that the threat of force was 
unacceptable and that if Egypt did not agree to international control 
voluntarily (a highly unlikely event), there should be no compulsion. 
The British were under no illusions about the conference. A Foreign 
Office document on 9 August shows their line of thinking quite 
clearly. (29) It was obvious from the list of invitees that a large 
majority would favour the British, French and American line on the
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crucial question on whether Egypt has the right to complete control over 
the canal or not.
therefore what the next move should be, once the conference had voted 
for the internationalisation of the canal. There were two options after 
the conference, stated the document. One was to appoint a small 
committee to negotiate with Nasser and the other was to adjourn and wait 
for Nasser to compromise. If Egypt was to reject both approaches, then 
three courses of action were discussed. Significantly, the first option 
to be discussed was that of military action to occupy the canal, and if 
nec^essary the rest of Egypt. The main drawback was seen to be the lack 
of a suitable pretext, although the reason of Nasser's total refusal to 
compromise was seen as a possiblity. The second option was the immediate 
establishment of a company, to which the anti-Nasser countries would pay 
their dues ||). Interference with this committee would also provide a 
good excuse to attack Egypt. The third choice was to present counter - 
proposals to Egypt, such as an international authority to run the canal, 
and not a company, which the Egyptians would obviously find too 
obj ectionable.
The public statements of the Pakistan government had not left the
British with a great deal of hope / securing whole hearted Pakistani
support. Although not categorized with Russia or India, from whom the 
British expected nothing, the Pakistanis were classed with the Iranians
and Spanish, in the category of ' doubtful qualities'. It was clearly
stated that they could not be 'counted upon for positive support'.(30) 
Pakistan was lobbied, nevertheless, from the double angle of being a 
Commonwealth member and also a member of the Baghdad Pact. The
The discussion, even before the conference had started, was
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Commonwealth Relations Office said that Pakistan would be pulled both 
ways. It also said that she would hesitate to come out too firmly with 
Britain on the question of international control, if Egypt was 
adamant.(31) The Commonwealth Secretary had spoken to both the Pakistani 
and Indian High Commisssioners on 1 August, and had gathered that they 
expected to attend the conference along with other Commonwealth 
states.(32) On 15 August, the secretary of state for foreign affairs met 
the representatives of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. Chaudhry had not yet 
arrived from Cairo and so Ikramullah was representing Pakistan. 
Ikramullah stated the official view that Pakistan stood for a peaceful 
settlement, but he agreed to the crucial point that exclusive control of 
the canal, particularly by a person like Nasser, was dangerous.(33)
Chaudhry arrived later on the same day, 15 August , with clear 
instructions. Before he left Pakistan, the Cabinet had approved the 
Pakistan Foreign Ministry recommendation that they should uphold both of 
Egypt's main claims, that is, the ownership and the ultimate control of 
the canal. However, Pakistan did agree to a possible committee to be set 
up by the United Nations, which would supervise the canal and in which 
users from both east and west should be equally represented.(34) This is 
confirmed by the U.S. Embassy in Karachi, which was informed by Mohammed 
Ali that if compensation was paid by Egypt, then the leagality of her 
action was indisputable. The Prime Minister voiced grave doubts to the 
Americans about the wisdom of insisting on international control.(35)
Upon arrival, Chaudhry met Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign 
Secretary. The conversation seemed to be mainly an interview,(36) 
Chaudhry asked Lloyd how much support he expected for the proposal to 
call for international control of the canal, Lloyd replied that he hoped
at least nineteen out of the twenty-two delegates'tw support the motion. 
One wanders whether Pakistan was one of the expected nineteen! Lloyd
said that he hoped that such a large majority would send a clear signal
0
to Nasser that a large proprtion of the canal users agreed with them. 
Chaudhry reported that Nasser had seemed quiet and subdued but had still 
refused to discuss the question of Egypt's control of the canal. He said
Nasser admitted that the way he nationalised the canal may not have been
the best one, but it should not have come as a great surprise as they 
had been discussing it for two years. Chaudhry then asked what India's 
position was. Lloyd replied that the Indians knew very well that they 
were not going ^o^^Tust) sit back, and if nec^essary would take firm 
action.
Chaudhry rather simplistically asked how far the British were 
prepared to go. Lloyd replied that Britain was prepared in the end to 
fight for her interests, in the same way as he supposed Pakistan would 
to defend hers. Lloyd gave the example of Pakistan being prepared to 
fight aver Kashmir. Chaudhry accepted this rather strange analogy 
without argument. He said that he thought it was best to keep the
proposed role of any future association ambiguous, as it would be less 
offensive to the Egyptians and their supporters, the Russians and
Indians. He went on to say that it would be better if Pakistan was seen 
not to be too close to the west on this issue, as it would not go down 
with the Muslim world very well. One wonders whether he had heard his 
prime minister's speech the previous day, which stated that Egypt, as a 
sovereign state, had the right to nationalise the canal ! One is often 
left wondering what to make of the contradictions in statements between 
ministers and their own public and private views. Lloyd then emphasised
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the fact that Dulles was firmly with the British on the issue of
international control and 'as the power of the U.S. in both the economic 
and military fields was overwhelming, a firm statement by Mr. Dulles 
would do much to clear the air'. This was a veiled reminder to Pakistan, 
as to where it received its military and economic aid.
Chaudhry was certainly given attention by the western powers. On 17 
August, the day after the conference started, Chaudhry was one of six 
foreign ministers invited to 10 Dawning Street for lunch.(37) On the 
following day, Dulles went to visit Chaudhry in his hotel, canvassing 
for support for the U.S. proposal for an international control board to 
manage the canal. Dulles said that this was necessary as the Egyptians 
lacked the technical know-how to manage the canal. Chaudhry seemed to 
accept this, ignoring the fact that since nationalisation, many ships 
had passed through the canal without hindrance or problem. Chaudhry 
asked for permission from Mohammed Ali to omit that part of his
statement which required him to support Egyptian control of the
canal.(38).
Ikramullah confirmed the proposed change in Pakistan's ground. He said 
that Chaudhry was personally convinced that Dulles' proposals were right 
and Pakistan should support them. Chaudhry was said to regard his brief 
as ' unsatisfactory', (39) For this reason he had kept his opening speech
deliberately ambivalent, in order to leave open the possibility of
support for the idea of international management.
Mohammed Ali went straight to the heart of the matter in
instructing Chaudhry to ask Dulles how any resolution about
international control could be carried or enforced in the face of
Egypt's determination never to accept any such control. (40) He was said 
to be convinced that eventually control of the canal would have to be 
left to Egypt, These instructions were still not acceptable to Chaudhry, 
let alone the British or Americans. He asked that he should be allowed 
to propose the establishment of a small committee, to negotiate with 
Egypt to discuss how to set up an organisation, in which Egypt would be 
fully represented, to manage the canal. He argued that this would also 
safeguard the right of the user's and that anything else would isolate 
Pakistan, and, worse, in his view, place Pakistan in the wrong company.
This was confirmed in a conversation which James had with Baig on 
this issue on 21 August.(41) Baig said that official thinking was that a 
sharp Egyptian reaction should be avoided if possible. Also, Pakistan 
wanted to go as close to international control as possible, but wanted 
to avoid it in name. Baig revealed that, in Chaudhry's trip to Cairo 
before the conference, Nasser had accepted the idea that an 
international consultative body should be set up. Baig said that, if 
this formula was acceptable to the west, Pakistan would do all it could 
to get Egypt to agree. James said it was inconceivable that Nasser 
should be given the power of veto.
James reported that the press was covering the conference fully but
because of a strike since the 16th, public interest had declined. The 
question was whether this body would have any real control of the canal 
or not, and Baig said Pakistan was in favour of having the committee's 
advice being binding.(42) The whole argument,in a nutshell, was whether
Egypt had the right to ultimate control of the canal or not. The
suggestion to set up a committee to negotiate international control was 
obviously one the Egyptians would not reject but would find offensive.
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The British were sceptical of the whole idea and were determined that 
the world should be shown that Nasser, and all future leaders, could not 
get away with such actions.
Mohammed Ali agreed that a negotiating committee be set up, which 
would do no more than discuss with Nasser what operational arrangements 
could be made to safeguard the interests of all concerned. He was said 
to have instructed Chaudhry to ask Dulles how international control 
would be set up and maintained in the face of Nasser's opposition.(43)
On 20 August, at 10.30 am, Lloyd met the Baghdad Pact
representatives and asked them what they thought of the draft resolution 
which had been prepared mainly by Dulles. Chaudhry immediately replied 
that it was splendid. (44) He said, however, that Pakistan, Iran, 
Ethiopia and Turkey had some slight amendments to make and he hoped this 
was agreeable to the British. The British noted appreciatively the role 
Pakistan had played in the final draft declaration, and the fact that 
they had lobbied the Ceylon and Indonesian delegations to support their
proposals in an effort to isolate Russia and India.(45) Even Dulles'
proposals, although presented as a purely American initiative, were 
first discussed and agreed upon by the British and French. These
amendments were purely cosmetic in nature and were recognised as such by 
the Americans and British and were, therefore, accepted without a 
murmur.
President Eisenhower said later that Dulles' skill showed when 'with 
nominal amendments these four nations agreed to introduce our proposal 
as their own'.(46) This became known as the Five-Power proposal. As far 
as Dulles was concerned, the fact that three large Muslim states were so 
closely involved in the preparation of the final document, must have
been a godsend. On 18 August, Dulles had told the French that too much
pressure.(47) He said their prospect of taking any action or adhering to 
any western declaration, was unlikely. The French also appreciated the 
tactical advantage of the proposals coming from Muslim countries, rather 
than the west (48t)
Chaudhry also wanted the negotiating time with Nasser aver these 
proposals to be reduced from a suggested four months to three weeks. In 
presenting the amendments to the conference, which merely tried to make 
the wording of the declaration more acceptable, Chaudhry declared that 
although the west had tried to befriend many poor countries, they had to 
be careful not to appear too domineering. He said that, although big
improvements h* been made, more needed to be done. He said that his 
amendments also sought to separate the question of compensation from 
that of a canal board. Chaudhry told Lloyd that Nasser had offered to 
pay adequate compensation to the shareholders, which had been one of the
main British and French demand^ Lloyd dismissed the offer as impossible 
as Nasser could not have had the sterling reserves.(49)
Chaudhry further said that he thought that the terms that should be 
presented to Nasser should be kept as ambiguous as possible, so as not 
to give Nasser a chance to reject the proposals. He emphasised the need 
for flexibility, and a 'psychological approach'. (50) On 21 August, the 
first Suez conference came to an end. Of the twenty-two countries 
invited, eighteen supported the call for some form of international 
organization to manage the canal. The four countries not to accept the 
proposal were Russia, India, Ceylon and Indonesia.(51) Vhat was
could not be expected of Pakistan because of internal
important to Nasser was the fact that three Muslim countries, Pakistan, 
Iran and Turkey, accepted the resolution.
It was the role of Pakistan, however, which particularly infuriated 
Nasser. Chaudhry on his way to the conference had pledged that Pakistan 
would recognise sole Egyptian control and rights of the canal. The fact 
that Chaudhry was closely linked with the declaration calling on Egypt 
to accept an international board to manage the canal, was seen as 
treachery by Nasser, who in an outburst pointed to the chair Chaudhry 
had sat on, assuring Nasser of Pakistan's support. (52) It was perhaps 
just as well that Nasser did not know that Chaudhry had earlier 
suggested to the Americans that Pakistan should be a member of the 
committee which would seek to negotiate with Egypt. (53) Little more is 
heard of this suggestion, but it seems likely that the Pakistan 
government deciaded against it. However, according to Dehlavi, a member 
of the Pakistan delegation, the Egyptian Ambassador in London had
thanked Pakistan for their role in the conference and said Egypt may be
able to negotiate with the five-power proposals. (54) Baig said to James 
that this may be worrying as the Egyptians may demand control of the
board but James said the important thing was what the users were
prepared to accept and that Nasser was in no position to dictate to 
them.
IM. conference, aftermath.
Chaudhry now had to explain his decision to the people and press of 
Pakistan. There is little doubt that public opinion in Pakistan was far 
and away firmly with Nasser. On 29 August , a 'Protest Day' meeting was 
called to protest against the governments attitude over the Suez issue. 
The biggest crowds since independence were seen and many of the
newspapers in Pakistan strongly criticised the Pakistan government's 
stance. The government responded with the imposition of Section 114(C), 
which forbade political meetings after 30 August. Chaudhry, however, had 
to meet a hostile press conference on the 29th.(55)
In this press conference, Chaudhry's tactics were to deny that 
Pakistan had been led by the west to take an anti-Sasser stance. 
Instead, he claimed, rather unconvincingly, that Pakistan had influenced 
the U.S. more than the U.S. had influenced Pakistan. He claimed that the 
amendments, which he had helped to frame, had altered the resolution a 
lot and had emphasised the need to negotiate a settlement, rather than 
use force. He claimed that some countries often surrender some of their 
rights in exchange for others. This means that he was accepting Egypt's 
right to nationalise the canal but was hoping that she would voluntarily 
relinquish it ! Chaudhry claimed that Pakistan's membership of the 
Baghdad Pact had not influenced her foreign policy but found it hard to
outcome of the dispute, were not invited to the conference. The British 
high commission, reporting Chaudhry's return, said that he was trying 
'to pull the wool over the eyes of the press here' with his comments 
over Pakistan's real attitude to the management of the canal. (56) The 
newspaper 'Dawn' declared that Pakistan was, for the first time 
supporting the west in a quarrel with another Muslim state. The ruling 
Muslim League also declared the proposal to be interference with Egypt's
sovereign rights.(5#)
Meanwhile, world attention was focused on the delegation led by the 
Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, and .four other countries' 
delegates. The mission has often been seen as an exercise in
explain why more Middle Eastern countries, with a vital
futility,(58) but few people must have realised that Henzies, in taking
a series of peace proposals to Nasser, had discussed the possible
military support Australia could give the British in the event of an
attack. Menzies told Home that Australia could give naval and air
support, and said he was going to warn Nasser of the 'horrible folly' of
his refusal to compromise. (59)
The British line of thought becomes clear in a memorandum prepared
by Beeley in the Foreign Office, on 28 August, outlining the situation
and options,(60) This stated that the thought of letting Nasser get away
/
with the nationalisaton unchallenged was simply an unaffordable option.
A
British prestige in the whole Kiddle East would collapse and even the
present position would fall apart. Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria were
seen as soft targets in the spread of Nasser's influence. It also stated 
the belief that, if Nasser got away with this, it was only a matter of 
time before oil in Iraq was also nationalised. The memorandum accepted 
the fact that many Arab states might be offended if Egypt is attacked, 
but stated that they would be less offended if Nasser gave them a 
reason. It was realised that, if Israel was in any way involved in the
Qattack, then Arab condemnation would be unanimous. The memorandum ended 
by saying that the ideal situation would be one in which the dispute is
settled peacefully, and with Nasser being seen to lose face and give
way.
Vhat the British were now determined upon was to keep up the 
pressure on Nasser hoping he would crack first, either giving a pretext 
to use force, or give in to the idea of international control and be 
humiliated. This meant keeping the eighteen powers united and of these, 
Pakistan was the weakest link. The Foreign Office noted that ' The
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Pakistanis have been very feeble and equivocal in their statements since 
the London conference'.(61) Although Pakistan's role in the first 
conference had been acknowledged by Selwyn Lloyd as 'helpful'(62), the 
next conference was a different situation with a different government in 
Pakistan. As the Foreign Office files confirm, a determined effort was 
made to keep Pakistan in the fold, not only for its own sake, but 
because of the fear it may discourage Iran and others to keep away.(63) 
Xhs. Pakistan front 
The situation in Pakistan was now becoming more complicated as the 
ministry of Mohammed Ali resigned on 8 September and the President, 
Sikander Mirza, was to choose a new prime minister. This was done on 10 
September and the East Pakistani, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, was 
appointed. Suhrawardy was seen as a tougher proposition than Mohammed
Egyptian stance. Suhrawardy was said to have been offered the job only 
after having agreed to three conditions of Mirza's: firstly, that he
would not try to alter Pakistan's pro-western foreign policy, secondly, 
that he would not interfere with the army and thirdly, he would keep the 
left-wing element of his Awami League Party in control.(64)
The Egyptians kept up a diplomatic offensive in trying to win over 
government support in Pakistan. On 6 September, James sent a report of 
the Egyptians activities.(65) Handouts were circulated, but with the 
more extreme language removed. The Egyptian Ambassador, Seoud, invited 
over press correspondents and gave them prepared statements. He also 
invited a correspondent from the pro-Nasser 'Pakistan Times' to visit 
the canal and meet top Egyptians. The newspaper's top reporter, Kamal 
Hyder, was to have gone but the Pakistan government stopped him by
-i-fte-— em<^  f mare sympathetic to the
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withholding his passport. The government did not wish to lose all press
support, and so allowed Z.A, Suleri of the 'Times of Karachi' to go
instead. They must have wished they had not sent him later ! Suleri
termed Nasser a 'second Salladdin', and printed a long and favourable
account of his visit. Seoud also used all social occasions to lobby 
ministers hard for support. He complained to a British diplomat, <of all
people!), that the Pakistani ministers were evasive in their replies
over the issue and when pressed would claim support for Egypt, but Seoud 
claimed they were lying. On 22 August, Seoud remonstrated with Baig over 
Pakistan's attitude.(66)
Seoud was said to have became unpopular with many ministers because
of the widely held belief, whether true or not, that he had organised
the heckling of Mohammed Ali during the independence day rally, calling 
for firmer support for Egypt. Ministers were also annoyed at the method 
that Seoud used of appealing through the Pakistani newspapers over the 
head of the government. The government hit back by inspiring leaks that 
Nasser was not supporting Pakistan over Kashmir and was reported to have 
called Nehru 'the giant of Asia'. They also expressed bewilderment, 
however genuine, at Nasser's ungratefulness after Pakistan's role in the 
conference. (67)
To make matters worse for the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, trying 
desperately to stave off harsh criticism, internally and externally, 
when the director-general of the Pakistan information service, Syed 
Farid Jafri, visited Cairo on 6 September. (68) Jafri started by saying 
that Egypt was his 'spiritual home' and Nasser was his 'beloved hero'! 
He was reported to have said that Pakistan only joined the Baghdad Pact 
because of Kashmir and, should Egypt be attacked, Pakistan would
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relinquish membership of that pact and the Commonwealth. He also stated, 
much to the fury and embarrassment of the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, 
that Pakistan had only agreed to the Dulles plan 'under duress'. This 
was enough to send shock waves, not only in Karachi, but London, where
September, the British information secretary reported that Jafri had 
been instantly recalled, despite having tried to issue denials that he 
had been misquoted.(70) Jafri had been dismissed and the British 
secretary noted that Jafri would find it extremely difficult to find a 
job now, given his record. The deterioration of relations in Pakistan 
between the Information Ministry and Foreign Ministry was also 
mentioned.
host a conference where all interested parties could work out their 
arrangements bilaterally with Egypt. On 14 September, a Pakistani 
newspaper announced that Pakistan had agreed to go to the Cairo 
conference. <71) James immediately met Baig and Moon, the new Foreign 
Minister, who said they had only agreed to go if a majority of invited 
countries also accepted. Baig said this was typical of Egyptian attempts 
to pressurise Pakistan into going.
On 12 September, James reported more diplomatic Egyptian attempts to 
woo Pakistan. (72) A note was sent by Seoud to the Foreign Ministry, 
expressing the hope that Pakistan would attend the conference proposed 
by Egypt. Baig showed James the letter and said he had asked Seoud which
other counties had expressed their acceptance. Seoud was unable to give
as Egypt had now dec|ided to try and draw some of the eighteen powers in
the Foreign Office demanded the remarks should be denied.(69)
The diplomatic war was now in full swing. Egypt had offered to
r
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a definite answer to this. The moderate tone of the note was noticable
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the first conferance away from that declaration. Baig pointed out the 
dilemma Pakistan was in, as public opinion was firmly behind the
Egyptians, not only in Pakistan, but throughout the middle east. He said 
that Pakistan would still not be committed to Egypt, but they hoped for 
a peaceful settlement. The Egyptians also used friendly countries to try 
and lobby Pakistan.(73) The Syrian Foreign Minister asked the Pakistan 
minister in Damascus what his country's attitude was to Egypt's offer to 
host a conference. The Pakistan minister said that Nasser's statements 
on Kashmir had not helped his case but he would still refer Nasser's 
offer back to Pakistan. He also said Nasser should realize that the 
British were serious in their determination to have international
control of the canal.
After the rather bruising experience of the first conference, 
Pakistan was not going to jump at the invitation to participate in
another. The Pakistan government was facing harsh criticism at home,
through the press and political parties across the spectrum, and popular 
discontent. Even the British accepted the popularity of Nasser and said 
the 'ignorant masses of Pakistan' were firmly behind him. (74) The 
British also noted with alarm the growing criticism in Pakistan, not 
only of the Suez crisis, but of the whole direction of that country's
political figures, Maulana Bhashani, called for Pakistan's withdrawal 
from the military pacts. Another major figure, Mumtaz Daultana, said 
that Pakistan should support Egypt over Suez, regardless of other 
issues. The religous figure of Mafedoodi said that Britain's past record
A
on Suez was no justification for the future. To make matters worse, 
interviews with returning pilgrims from Mecca revealed Pakistan's
foreign policy.(75) On 14 September, one of Pakistan's leading
unpopularity in the Muslim world. Attempts by the British to tell 
Pakistan about the effect on the price of goods if Suez was closed, were 
not meeting with great success. For obvious reasons the British could 
not criticise Nasser on Kashmir too much ! <76)
stance, the first time since Sir Feroze Khan Noon had been appointed 
Foreign Minister. (77) The substance had not changed much. The first 
point was that Pakistan favoured U.N. mediation in settling this 
dispute. Secondly, they would regard the use of force as touching off an 
already explosive situation in the middle east. It was felt the setting
y
up, and implementation, of a users association, might precipitate the 
crisis if any attempt was made to force those ships through the 
canal. Thirdly, Pakistan was of the view that negotiations with Egypt 
were far from exhausted yet.
On 15 September, James conveyed the formal British invitation to 
Baig, for the second Suez conference due to start on 19 September. (78) 
Baig, after studying the invitation, said that he had thought the only 
purpose of the conference was the setting up of a users' association. In 
that case, said Baig, Pakistan's position would have been disapproving 
as it would have seemed that the British and Americans were trying to 
impose a settlement, rather than negotiate one. He said that attendance 
of the conference would have to be decided by the Cabinet, and as 
Suhrawardy was away in Dacca till 17 September, it left Pakistan with 
very little time. James replied if Pakistan did not attend, it would be 
a very great shock in Britain and would undo the good Pakistan had done 
at the first conference, and not only for itself. Her attendance at the
14 September, the Pakistan Foreign Ministry explained its
conference did not commit the country in any way and if the Pakistani 
government wished to make this clear, then it was free to do so.
James argued, rather cheekily, that, if Pakistan wished to attack 
the users' association, then the best place to do it was at the 
conference. James added that, if Suhrawardy had agreed in principle to 
the idea of attending a conference organised by Nasser, then it was only 
logical that Pakistan should carry an its peace efforts in London. The 
Deputy High Commissioner said if Pakistan went, she 'would be free to 
speak her mind' . Baig replied that the idea of a users' association had 
not even been discussed with Pakistan, as a result of which there was a 
good deal of public alarm about the whole idea. He thought the whole 
idea looked as if the association was going to shoot it out with the 
Egyptians. Baig felt that confidence had been damaged after the first 
conference and the government was operating within narrow horizons from 
the beginning, but now they were getting smaller. James reported to 
London that it was obvious from this conversation that Pakistan's 
acceptance of the invitation could not be assumed, but he felt he had 
succeeded in convincing Baig.
James was informed later on the same day that Noon and Mirza agreed 
Pakistan should go to the conference and, if Suhrawardy agreed, then the 
delegation would set off the next day.(79) In the event, the delegation 
did set off as planned, but not without some drama. Baig informed James 
on 16 September that he had received a phone call from Suhrawardy in 
Dacca, at 5 p.m. local time, to inform Baig that he had deci«ded that 
Pakistan was not going to/the conference. (80) Baig told James that his 
main problem was trying to explain to Suhrawardy why he had changed his 
mind since last Friday and was now advising that Pakistan should attend.
Baig claimed that Mirza and Noon had argued in vain with Suhrawardy, 
but in the event it was, he, himself that had persuaded Suhrawardy. This 
claim seems highly dubious given Mirza's conditions on appointing 
Suhrawardy. He was, no doubt, confident that Mirza would not wish to 
appoint a third prime minister in a month, particularly on an emotive 
issue like Suez, but eventually agreed to a compromise. James says that 
this confirms what he had earlier suspected, that is, until his talk 
with Baig an 15 September, Pakistan had no intention of going to the 
London conference.
Hildreth confirmed this sequence of events by describing them to 
Dulles. Hildreth pointed out that the Pakistan Foreign Ministry was very 
irritated by the western assumption that Pakistan would rubber stamp all 
their ideas. The Ambassador said he could detect some irritation and 
surprise by the British in Karachi that he had no instructions to push 
the Pakistan government into accepting the idea of the userjs1 
association. Hildreth said until he was instructed to the contrary, he 
would leave the 'initiative and labouring oar' with the U.K.(81)
James had his first talk with Suhrawardy on Suez on 17 September. 
Suhrawardy told him that the most important aspect, as far as Pakistan 
was concerned, was that Egypt's sovereignty over the canal should not be 
questioned. Suhrawardy believed that only economic or military force 
could budge Nasser, and in the present world, Suhrawardy said military 
action should not really be an option, particularly in a dispute between 
rich and poor countries. Suhrawardy added that he hoped Nasser's regime 
would come to an end quickly, as it was nothing but trouble for 
everyone. James thought it was pleasing that Suhrawardy had been 
persuaded to send a delegation without reference to the cabinet. (82)
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James wrote a long and important despatch to the Commonwealth 
Relations Office on 17 September (83), which described the situation in 
Pakistan. He started by saying that, as he had stated earlier, great 
care would be needed to help the Pakistanis to get over their 
'psychological block' over the use of force. He felt there had been a 
real danger after Eden's speech to the Commons, before the conference, 
of Pakistan completely parting way with the west over the whole Suez 
issue, with all the 'adverse consequences' that would have accompanied 
that action. Luckily, James reported, thanks to the material sent and 
reassurances given, Pakistan had changed her mind but had only given a 
stiff and formal reply to the invitation to the conference, making clear 
that Pakistan was not keen on any users' association and that Pakistan 
would never support the use of force. (84) He said it was fortunate that 
Pakistan had accepted the invitation, otherwise a personal message from 
Eden to Suhrawardy would have been called for. A meeting with Mirza 
would no doubt have helped as well. James professed himself unable to 
say whether the appeal to Suhrawardy would have succeeded, but he was 
sure that Mirza was firmly behind them.
James then elucidated Mirza's point of view, that is, had Britain 
and France taken immediate military action in the canal, it would have 
been accepted in Pakistan as a 'fait accompli'. Pakistan's loyalty in 
this dispute was firmly with the British and anti-Masser. However, 
because of the present situation and strength of feeling, Pakistan now 
wanted a peaceful solution to the dispute, through negotiations because, 
if Pakistan came out in favour of strong action and the dispute was 
settled through peaceful negotiations, Pakistan would be left in the 
cold. James said this meant that, even Mirza would not come out too
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openly in support of the British, and because Suhrawardy was now prime 
minister, he, James, would have to be careful in going over Suhrawardy's 
head to meet Mirza as this would lead to resentment. This implies that 
James could have gone over Mohammed Ali's head, but Mirza had not been 
needed at the last conference, as Chaudhry was doing the job f A 
compromise had now been reached within the Pakistan government to send a
delegation to the second conference, but not, saj£ James, without its 
anxious moments.
James believed that, had the Pakistanis been consulted in advance 
about the idea of a users' association, there would have been more 
support for the idea than there was at present. He felt that getting 
them to this conference, which the Pakistanis had been naturally
reluctant to attend, after the reaction of Egypt and public opinion
following the last one, had used Pakistan goodwill and a sense of self-
interest. James expressed the hope that such a severe strain was not
imposed again. He said it would make his task much easier if Hildreth 
and the French Ambassador, were to co-ordinate meetings with him to 
maximise the pressure.
James then recounted a most interesting story. He told London that 
when he was with Baig in the evening of 16 September, Baig had just
formally accepted the invitation to the second conference. The exact 
nature of the call was revealed in the earlier telegram <85), that is an 
attempt to stop any delegation from representing Pakistan. James, no 
doubt, had been called by Baig to let him know, as this meeting was well 
outside office hours on a Sunday. Baig then received a phone call from 
the Egyptian counsellor, who said that he understood that Pakistan was
telephone call from Suhrawardy in Dacca, after Pakistan had
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not to attend the London conference. Baig told James this was 
extaordinary as, to the best of his knowledge, only he, Mirza, 
Suhrawardy, Soon and James knew of this decision. Baig said it was only 
possible to assume that some of the pro-Masser factions of the Awami 
League had got hold of the news and were gleefully spreading it. It was 
a known fact that the Egyptians had some contacts within Suhrawardy's 
party, who may have convinced him of the inadvisability of attending. 
James said this method of Egyptian diplomacy sometimes paid dividends, 
but not this time.
In another, and equally important, despatch to the Foreign Office^/ 
on 19 September, James described a dinner party thrown by Mirza.(86) The 
reason for the party was a farewell dinner for Mohammed Ali. James was 
one of the guests who also included the American and Iraqi ambassadors, 
former and present ministers, including Suhrawardy, the new prime 
minister. James described the party as a nice gesture, and one which 
removed some of the bad feeling created by political fights over the 
last few days.
Mirza took James aside for a private talk. He first informed James 
of the attempt by Suhrawardy not to attend the conference by his phone 
call to Baig. James naturally did not say that Baig had already told 
him. This shows how James was building up individual contacts among the 
Pakistan hierarchy. Mirza described how he had remonstrated with 
Suhrawardy over the decision and said, 'Only a few days ago, you gave me 
an assurance that there would be no alteration of the main trend of 
Pakistan's foreign policy; yet you are already seeking to alter it'. 
Suhrawardy was then said to have assured Mirza that this was not the 
case and the basic trend would continue. The eventual compromise was
that Pakistan would attend the conference on the assurance that 
attendance would not bind Pakistan to any users' association, that the 
association would not be used as a pretext for the use of force, and 
should Nasser refuse to deal with the association, then the matter would 
be referred to the Security Council. Mirza expressed his own view that 
he would personally resign rather than see a change in Pakistan's 
alignment. Mirza repeated his views that Pakistan wished to see Nasser 
lose, but could not be too open in case a negotiated settlement was 
reached. James found the suggestion of Mirza resigning rather 
surprising, and mentioned it in later despatches also.
James then met with Suhrawardy . Suhrawardy said that Nasser, by 
keeping the canal open and functioning normally, was seen to have won 
the first round. The Prime Minister expressed the belief that because of 
this, this was the correct time to negotiate, as Nasser would not feel 
too threatened. James replied that it was too early yet to say who had 
won the first round. He suggested to Suhrawardy that, if he wanted to 
see Nasser, he should privately consult Eden first. James also pointed 
out the danger of going to see Nasser. He said the Egyptians could use 
it as a propaganda victory, as they had when Chaudhry had seen Nasser in 
Cairo. Suhrawardy did not contest these points and they both agreed the 
best thing to do now was to wait for the outcome of the second 
conference.
James thought Suhrawardy was thinking aloud to test his reaction, 
and felt it significant that, so soon after his appointment, Suhrawardy 
was willing to try and play a significant role in such a delicate 
matter. Also important was the fact that Suhrawardy had not mentioned 
these plans to Mirza, fcwhofJames was sure)! would have told him. James
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noted this would have been unthinkable under Mohammed Ali and noted that 
for the first time in Pakistan's history that there was a strong 
president and prime minister, and these two characters were evenly 
matched. James said the decision to send Noon, after an argument, might 
bring the two of them together, or it might lead to a future split. He 
said that neither of the two was ready for a showdown, and, if and when 
it tttkes place, the outcome was unpredictable. This explains the care 
with which James dealt with Suhrawardy during the next few weeks and his 
reluctance to meet Mirza to veto Suhrawardy.
Before the Pakistan delegation had left for London, Hildreth 
informed Dulles that Noon wished to meet him there. Hildreth recommended 
that Dulles should do this as soon as possible as Noon was a prominent 
pro-western politician. The U.S. Ambassador warned Dulles that Seoud, 
the Egyptian Ambassador, had been working hard on Noon and other 
Pakistani officials in trying to get more support for the Egyptian 
position.(8^) Noon issued a statement to the press before leaving 
Pakistan. He said there were three main issues to be discussed at the 
conference, firstly, the Menzies mission, secondly, Nasser's proposals, 
and thirdly, the user's association. He said that Pakistan was a party 
to the five-power proposal and would now give careful consideration to 
Nasser's counter-proposals. He made clear that Pakistan was not clear 
what the users' association would entail and said that Pakistan had 
satisfied herself that attendance at the conference did not bind her to 
membership. He noted with satisfaction the British statement that the 
association could not function without Egyptian co-operation and in the 
event of any incidents, the matter would be taken to the Security 
Council. He said Pakistan had stood for a peaceful settlement from the
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start and would be ready to attend a conference called by Egypt,
provided the majority of those invited agreed to do so. (88) The last 
point seemed to be a ploy of keeping both sides happy. By saying
Pakistan would be willing to attend, it kept the pro-Nasser faction 
satisfied, and yet, Pakistan must have known that the majority of the 
canaljs major usersj would not attend. Noon read out this statement, 
almost in its entirety at Amsterdam airport, before reaching London. (89) 
This was far the benefit of the world press, Nasser and Pakistan's 
public opinion. Pakistan's position, at least at the beginning of the 
conference was, therefore, spelt out.
Pakistan and the second Suez conference
The Pakistan delegation to the second conference consisted of the 
Joint Foreign Secretary, M.S.A. Baig, an under secretary, Sajjad Hyder, 
and was led by the Foreign Minister, Sir Feroze Khan Noon. In London, 
they were joined by Ikramullah. On 18 September, Noon, along with the 
Australian and New Zealand delegates, met the Commonwealth Secretary, 
Lord Home. Noon proclaimed himself utterly opposed to any users' 
association , and to the proposed diversion of shipping around the Cape. 
He said that if the association was set up with great fanfare and Nasser 
refused to deal with it, it would make them all look ridiculous and 
destroy the prestige of the west in Asia, once and for all. This was
politely seen by Home as a first reaction and the meeting was still
termed friendly. No doubt Home was remembering the change in Chaudhry's 
attitude once the last conference got under way.(90)
A meeting of Baig and Noon with Eden was also recorded by Hyder in 
his memoirs, and considering the nature of the meeting, it is not 
surprising that no record of this conversation is to be found elsewhere
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Hyder says that Eden told Noon that he had decided to attack Egypt, 
with or without American support. (91) Hyder says that Eden requested 
that this information should be kept secret. This indicates either the 
degree of trust Eden had in Noon, or, as seems more likely, the British 
expected Noon to transmit this information to someone friendly to 
Nasser, in the hope it may force the latter to negotiate out of fear. 
This second conference was held on Dulles' suggestion but it was 
apparent now that the British and Americans were not seeing eye to eye 
on the use of force. Eisenhower said later that he thought this issue 
was a wrong one for the west to make a stand on as Nasser had both legal 
and sovereign rights.(92) The British were obviously hoping that Nasser 
would think the west was united against him, and therefore feel obliged 
to make concessions.
Noon, according to Hyder, decided to warn Nasser through King 
Saud.(93) A telegram was certainly sent to Saud but the British saw it 
as a useful gesture, in trying to get Nasser to negotiate. (94) However, 
instructions were given that the telegram should be traced. On 26 
September, the British Embassy in Jeddah sent a transcript of the 
telegram. (95) The gist of the telegram was, although Pakistan spoke for 
Egypt at the opening session of the conference, there was very little 
chance of this crisis ending peacefully, unless Nasser came to some 
agreement with the British. Noon said if this is not done, Egypt and 
Syria would be 'in grave danger'. He pleaded, therefore, for Saud to use 
his influence on Nasser, and try to persuade him to come to some 
compromise. The telegram ended with a warning to Nasser not to rely on 
'pseudo-friends' like Russia and India to protect him. This telegram was 
also shown to the British as it was sent. (96)
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The British Embassy in Jeddah discovered through conversation with
the Pakistan Ambassador there, that Noon's telegram was also a reply to
one which Saud had sent Noon before he left for the conference.(97) Saud
had argued that Nasser was right in this dispute and the proposal to set
up a users' association was one which might easily touch off an already
explosive situation. Saud hoped, therefore, that Noon, as a personal
friend, and Pakistan, as the most important Muslim country, would
support Egypt's claim. The Pakistan Ambassador said that he thought
Nasser had asked Saud to send this message. The British Ambassador,
Parkes, said he thought that was regrettable, but he was glad that Noon
had given him such a firm reply.
Once the conference got under way, on 19 September, much of the
friendly atmosphere was replaced by surprise and annoyance at the
Pakistan delegation's stance. Hyder said that the Pakistanis saw the
second conference as little more than a last minute attempt by Dulles to
prevent a British and French attack.(98) Bearing this in mind, along
with the hesitation about whether even to attend this conference, Noon's
brief was clear. He was the only delegate to speak out against the
O)
proposed users' association. (99) Not only that, Noon criti!sed its legal
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basis and said its establishment was an unnecesary prelude to going to
A
the security council. He also said that the terms of reference of the
Menzies committee were inadequate, as they were not negotiating with
Nasser, only taking a series of proposals to him. Noon said the users 
should negotiate with Nasser without any terms of reference, and if 
Nasser rejected that approach, then the matter should be taken up by the 
security council. This speech was delivered even before the motion to 
set up any association had been moved and so took everyone by surprise.
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Dulles was said to have remonstrated with Noon after his speech and 
threatened economic pressure, uni ess the Pakistanis fell into line. (100) 
The Egyptians were delighted by the speech and Anwar Sadat, writing in a 
Cairo newspaper, said it was 'the return of the p r o d i g a l (101) The 
British embassy in Cairo also noted that the change in Pakistan's 
direction had received wide publicity in Egypt and was warmly 
welcomed. (102)
In private talks with the British, however, Noon seemed to more 
accomodating. He said the speech was made purely for domestic 
consumption and he was confident of getting the thinking on the 
association changed within two days. (103) He further stated that 
Pakistan's thinking was as follows: firstly, the main objection to the
users' association was to its being set up now; secondly, the best step 
now would be negotiations with Nasser, taking as a basis the existing 
proposals of both sides. Thirdly, if this failed then Pakistan did not 
mind what the rest do. The Security Council is mentioned as an 
alternative but the use of force was not ruled out. It was also reported 
that Noon gave the impression of 'being irresolute and unsure where he 
stood with his own government'. (104) Noon was said to become nervous 
after Dulles and others 'talked hard to him' and was calmed down only 
when he received his final instructions from Suhrawardy. It was 
doubtful whether the British anticipated any problems with Noon and his 
earlier appointment was seen as good news. Hyder hinted that Noon tried 
to get the brief changed, as Chaudhry had managed to do earlier, and 
Noon wrote to Suhrawardy 'informing him of the general trend of the 
conference after the opening plenary session, and he, (Suhrawardy), told
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us quite sharply that we were not to depart from our written
brief1.(105)
The Pakistan delegation absented themselves from the discussion of 
20 September, on the setting up of a users' association. (106) This was 
despite assurances that any delegation taking part in the discussions, 
would not be associated with the final draft. This was especially 
worrying as the Turks and Iranians also started to have cold feet about 
joining, if Pakistan refused. The British recognised than any 
association without any Asian members would be morally weak, and 
therefore instructed James to try and persuade the Pakistan government 
to send some helpful instructions to Noon, preferably an agreement to 
join the association before the conference ended.
The British and Americans could have had little inkling at that 
time what exactly Noon's instructions were at the final session. An 
emergency telegram was sent to James, telling him that confidential
information had been recieved that Noon had been instructed by 
Suhrawardy in a telegram to denounce the whole idea of a user's
association in no uncertain terms. (107) This information was leaked to
the British and Americans by none other than Noon himself! This news 
reached Dulles and Selwyn Lloyd during a discussion on S.C.U.A. but a 
member of the American team had already persuaded Noon to modify it to 
sayjjj^ simply that Pakistan could not join the organisation. Dulles and 
Lloyd instantly sent instructions to Karachi, telling their 
representatives there to point out to Suhrawardy and Mirza 'the 
catastrophic effects' such a change in foreign policy would have.(108) 
James was instructed to meet Suhrawardy, and Mirza if necessary, and 
try and change this brief. Within an hour of the telegram being sent, a
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reply from James said that Suhrawardy's new instructions to Noon were 
that he should say, ' I have ne.de the position of my government clear. 
The revised proposals will be referred to my government'.(109) James 
said that these instructions had been sent to Noon, but if they did not 
reach him in time, the British could inform him of the change. James 
said if these changes were not enough, he could go back to Suhrawardy, 
although he doubted they could be Improved. James said he was reluctant 
to go to Mirza as he wished to avoid a possible showdown. In the event, 
these instructions were very welcome to the Foreign Office and they 
revealed later that pressure was brought to bear on Noon from many 
quarters and they also thanked the Iranians for their help.(110) 
Hildreth reported later that James had managed to persuade Suhrawardy 
with considerable difficulty but single-handedly.(Ill)
Whatever Noon's real feelings about the whole issue, his closing 
speech was still strong enough to make him something of a hero amongst 
pro - Nasser supporters and he also received an invitation from Nasser 
to visit Cairo. Noon declined the invitation, aware no doubt of the snub 
Suhrawardy received from Nasser when he offered to visit Nasser.(112) 
Noon did ask the Americans, however, for their opinion on whether he 
should go to Cairo or not and was willing to have gone if given the 
green light. He did tell the U.S. Ambassador in London that he did not 
want to give out the wrong message by going to visit Nasser.(113) Dulles 
agreed with Noon that his going to Cairo might be misunderstood and so 
suggested that he write to King Saud before Nasser was to arrive 
there. (114) Noon told Fawzi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, that he 
could see Nasser in Karachi or he could write to him. (115) Before Noon 
left London, he went to visit Selwyn Lloyd on 25 September. (116) Noon
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said he had no intention of running after Nasser like everyone else and 
giving him a sense of his own importance. He also said that Pakistan 
should now be given plenty of time to deceide whether or not to join the 
association, so as to give a chance for hostile criticism to die down. 
Ikrammullah was accompanying Noon and he said that Suhrawardy seemed to 
be less critical of S.C.U.A., at the moment. Ikrammullah also said that 
Suhrawardy had asked him to reassure everyone thaVPakistan intended to 
stand by her allies and fulfil her obligations.
Before returning to Pakistan, Noon went to Turkey where the British 
and Americans hoped, extra pressure would be put on Noon to agree to the 
proposal. The Pakistan Ambassador in Ankara was also anti-Nasser. He 
earlier told a British embassy official that he regretted the fact that 
force had not been used at the outset of this dispute. (117) Dulles sent 
a message to the Turks while Noon was there, urging them to stand firm 
and stiffen up Pakistan. Noon also received a message from Dulles while 
he was in Ankara, which said that he understood that Pakistan had to try 
and maintain a position in the Muslim world, and was, therefore, unable 
to come out too strongly against a fellow Muslim state but the friendly 
ties expressed in the Baghdad Pact should not be undermined,(118)
The. Post - Confereacg- Aftermath,
The British were, therefore, disappointed by the lack of 
Pakistan's support to the idea of the Suez Canal users' 
association.(S.C.U.A.) Even if one is to take the view that the proposed 
association was not even expected to do anything, the fact that the 
largest Muslim state in the world had sided with the west in a dispute 
with another Muslim state, would have been a diplomatic coup for the 
British. In the event of force being used by the British, they felt it
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expedient to have as many Muslim countries on their side as possible. 
Turkey, Iraq and Iran needed little persuading; in fact such was their 
enthusiastic support for the west, that they often urged Pakistan to 
join them. (119) As fellow - members of the Baghdad Pact, they urged 
Pakistan to join the first meeting of the users' association planned for 
1 October. The British tried to use the Baghdad Pact as a means of
persuading their Muslim allies to counter Nasser's anti-British 
propaganda. This was discussed at a meeting of the Baghdad Pact counter­
subversion committee.(120)
In a review of the second Suez conference, the general British 
satisfaction with the way it had proceeded, was spoilt by the Pakistani 
attitude which had emerged. Noon was described as 'the most recalcitrant 
representative'. (121) Noon had insisted on fresh negotiations with 
fresh proposals to be opened with Nasser and refused to cooperate in the
final phrasing of the Statement and Declaration. The Foreign Office
noticed that it was only after discourse with Karachi that Noon even 
agreed to refer the conference's decision back to Pakistan.(122). This 
contrasts with the views of Chaudhry, and the Pakistan line in the first 
conference, quite sharply.
The next move by the British and Americans was now to apply 
pressure on Suhrawardy to agree to join S.C.U.A. On 22 September, James 
indicated that any futher concessions from Suhrawardy would be 
difficult. (123) He said the previous meeting, the day before, had been 
'somewhat chilly'. Vhen Hildreth met Suhrawardy at a party, the American 
Ambassador said he assumed once Noon returned the government would make 
up its mind on whether to join S.C.U.A. or not, Suhrawardy replied,
'There is nothing more to deceide. I was willing to concede to the west
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that I would not embarrass them by denouncing the association at the 
conference, but we have made it clear that we will not join it; and that
is all there is to it'. But he told Hildreth that he would consider any
further paints the Americans wished to put to him. (124) Hildreth added 
that he felt in view of the growing emotions and bad publicity over 
Suez, the Prime Minister would be 'swimming up stream' in trying to get 
the Cabinet to agree to join S.C.U.A., even if he felt inclined to do 
so. Hildreth concluded that, in view of the firm attitude Suhrawardy had 
adopted, the only chance seemed to be a direct appeal to Mirza, but that 
was seen as dangerous as forcing a split between the President and Prime 
Minister.(125)
James recommended that the only way to move Suhrawardy was by a 
personal letter from Eden to him. He believed there was a streak of 
vanity in Suhrawardy, which meant he would be flattered by the personal 
attention, and Nasser had recently also sent him a message. James 
believed that Suhrawardy's present ruffled feelings were because he felt 
he was being used as a pawn. James also emphasised the need for the
Turks to persuade Noon, but urged quick action, in case opinions in
Pakistan hardened.
Mirza, of course, needed no persuading. In a meeting with James and 
Hildreth, on the evening of 22 September, he said Suhrawardy had 
informed him of the previous day's events. (126) He said that he would 
strongly recommend to Suhrawardy that he agreed to join S.C.U.A. Mirza 
said Pakistan should weigh the scheme on its merits and not be deterred 
from supporting its friends by thoughts of who they might offend. Mirza 
also promised to say nothing of this talk to Suhrawardy, and endorsed 
the idea of a joint approach to Suhrawardy next week. Mirza expressed
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his determination to keep Suhrawardy 'on the rails', and take strong 
action if necessary. He elaborated by saying that if he is 'forced' to 
take over the country, people in the U.K. and U.S. should not say that 
he had done so for personal reasons. James, not surprisingly, called the 
meeting 'very satisfactory'.
James' advice was taken and within a few days, Eden sent a personal 
message to Suhrawardy. (127) The message consisted mainly of a request 
for Pakistan to maintain the unity of the eighteen countries at the 
second conference, as this was the best way to persuade Nasser to 
negotiate, and for the crisis to end peacefully. Eden flattered 
Suhrawardy by saying that he was aware that Pakistan had an important 
role to play, and he hoped Pakistan would help in settling the dispute. 
The State Department was requested by the Foreign Office to also send a 
message to Suhrawardy to keep up the pressure of a united western 
front.(128)
When the British message was delivered by James on 26 September, 
Suhrawardy said that as far as Pakistan was concerned, Eden's reference 
to Pakistan's special position was the key point. (129) Suhrawardy said 
at a key moment he may be able to intervene, and for that, it was 
necessary that Pakistan for the present, should keep Egypt's confidence. 
Suhrawardy said that Eden's reference to the Baghdad Pact was 
unnecessary as there was no question of Pakistan repudiating her 
membership, but he said the issue was a seperate one. He went on to say 
that if Pakistan could be seen to be taking a manifestly independent 
line over Suez, it would help him justify Pakistan's alliances and claim 
that Pakistan made foreign policy decisions for the good of her country, 
rather than subservience to anyone. Suhrawardy said the present
situation was that Nasser meant to dominate the Middle East and Nehru 
South East Asia, He said Pakistan intended to stop both, through her two 
parts. Vhen James raised the question of S.C.U.A.'s first meeting on 10 
October, he dodged the issue by saying that the last conference had 
shown that Pakistan could attend such meetings without commitment. James 
said as the last conference had shown Pakistan had an independent 
foreign policy, and so attendance, even on an observer basis, could be 
defended, and be consistent with Pakistan's desire for a negotiated 
settlement.(130)
The Australians also attempted to do their bit. The Australian High 
Commissioner delivered a personal message from Menzies to Suhrawardy on 
24 September. (131) Suhrawardy told him that as a lawyer he saw great 
difficulties with S.C.U.A., and was afraid Pakistan would not be able to 
join it. Suhrawardy, however, promised to keep an open mind on the 
subject. He told the Australian that it was difficult for poor countries 
to support Nasser as his actions were harming them and pointed out that 
as only Israeli shipping was not being allowed through the canal, and it 
was operating smoothly, Nasser could claim that the west was doing all 
this to help Israel. He said Nasser could raise the slogan 'Muslims 
against Israel' which would make Pakistan's position very awkward. He 
expressed optimism that everything would work out all right.
The really important message for Suhrawardy was that from Dulles in 
response to the British request. A transcript was sent to London on 27 
September. (132) Dulles started by thanking Pakistan for sending a 
delegation to the conference. He said Noon had promised to take the 
proposals for S.C.U.A. to Pakistan and he was trying to clarify the 
position. He emphasised the peaceful nature of the association and the
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need for unity amongst the eighteen nations. The really important point 
was in the end. Dulles said that in the event of the canal, for whatever 
reason, ceasing to operate effectively, it would be natural 'that 
concern far meeting the resultant problems. . . . would ^  first be 
directed towards issues facing the members themselves'. In other words, 
if Pakistan did not join, and there was any problem, she should not 
expect any help from the members, that is, America or Britian. Hildreth 
was told by Dulles that if Suhrawardy should show reluctance for fear of
displeasing Egypt, then he should mention that failure to adhere to
S.C.U.A. for that reason, may be seen by the Americans as indicating 
that Pakistan was more concerned with pleasing Egypt than the U.S. and 
her other allies.(133)
On 27 September, Hildreth had another talk with Suhrawardy, after 
Dulles' message had been delivered.(134) Suhrawardy remained firm and 
said he doubted that Pakistan would join S.C.U.A. because, firstly, he 
believed it would be futile, secondly, now that the matter was before 
the U.N. , it was 'sub judice', and thirdly, Egypt felt that 
international control was inconsistent with its sovereignity. He agreed, 
however, that the west was rightly concerned at the thought of an
important waterway in the sole control of a man like Nasser, with the
possibility of blackmail. He said the Egyptians had been 'scoundrels and 
trouble makers', and had tried to play off the western powers against 
the 'eastern democracies'. Suhrawardy summarised his thinking. Firstly, 
the issue must be settled peacefully. Secondly, S.C.U.A. must make it 
clear to the Egyptian's that their sovereignty was not in question. 
Thirdly, Pakistan would turn against Egypt if she proved herself 
unwilling to accept a reasonable solution but that had yet to be done.
Suhrawardy said that he was sceptical of S.C.U.A. as there was a threat 
of force in the background, and at least of economic force.
Suhrawardy repeated the same point which he had made to James, that 
is, that although Pakistan was siding with the west, Pakistan could play 
a more effective role by not being seen to be too close to it. Hildreth 
firmly intervened to say that Pakistan's refusal to join S.C.U.A. can 
only have encouraged Nasser and public opinion may see this as a move 
away from the west, and even the military pacts. Suhrawardy merely 
reassured Hildreth on Pakistan's commitment to the regional pacts. 
Hildreth suggested that Suhrawardy should send a representative to the 
S.C.U.A. meeting and issue a statement on the pacts. Suhrawardy now said 
that the two questions should be kept separate. He said he had to first 
convince the country that he was following an independent foreign policy 
and then secure support for the pacts. Suhrawardy conceded that a 
statement on S.C.U.A. would have to be made soon, and an observer might 
be sent. James and Hildreth said this is as far as Suhrawardy can be 
pushed till his return from a tour on 6 October. (135) Hildreth added in 
his message for Dulles thatjthe more Suhrawardy is approached, the more 
he develops his own thinking. Hildreth felt by 26 September that 
Suhrawardy was starting to develop an interest in S.C.U.A. for his own 
use.(136)
Suhrawardy replied to Eden's telegram on 28 September, and said 
briefly he was awaiting Noon's return and he appreciated the observation 
that Pakistan was in a special position to help and was keen to secure 
the objective of bringing about greater understanding between Asia and 
Europe. He also said he was glad the issue had been referred to the 
U.N. (137) Suhrawardy replied to Dulles on the same day and in much the
same manner. He said that nothing would give him greater pleasure than 
to be able to maintain 'the unity of all the nations who realised the 
serious repercussions that will arise if the passage of ships through 
the Suez Canal was impeded'. Other than that, Suhrawardy merely stated 
that he was awaiting the report of Feroze Khan Noon.(138)
Ikramullah had now arrived from England and did his best to persuade 
Suhrawardy to join S.C.U.A. as he had promised the Commonwealth 
Relations Office in August. Being related to the prime minister, 
Ikramullah certainly seemed to have a better chance than the others who
had tried.( Quite a few attempts were made to persuade Suhrawardy
to join S.C.U.A. but with a lack of success. Instructions were sent to 
James on 12 October, (140) that he should reassure the Pakistan 
government that by joining S.C.U.A. , Pakistan in no way committed 
herself to any hostile act against Egypt. Also, the membership of Israel 
was not even considered in S.C.U.A. and thirdly, as a large proportion 
of Pakistan's imparts and exports pass through the canal, it was surely 
in Pakistan's interests to see the canal operate efficiently.
Hildreth to persuade the Prime Minister. (141) This time Suhrawardy 
decided to counter-attack. James descibed how Suhrawardy 'launched into 
a long harangue'. He said he was not convinced that S.C.U.A. was likely 
to have any negotiating role and future negotiations would involve Egypt 
with the three western powers. He said Pakistan would play a more useful 
role out of S.C.U.A. and, if a small committee was set up under the 
U. N. , it was more likely to include Pakistan if she had not lined up 
with the west. He repeated his belief that any settlement must include 
no use of force and recognition of Egypt's sovereignty. He said, if
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On 15 October, another attempt was made se by James and
Egypt proved awkward, then there was a possibilty of Pakistan joining 
S.C.U. A.
Suhrawardy said that, if Pakistan did join, it would ask for certain 
assurances. Firstly, no force would be used against Egypt. Secondly,
Israel would never be a member and thirdly, if force was used, Pakistan
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would be free to leave. James said he could have forseen that Suhrawardy
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would not rule out joining S.C.U.A. altogether. James said that
agreement in the U.N. had been reached on tolls and charges and this
meant the possibility of a role for S.C.U.A., from which Pakistan was 
excluding herself. Secondly, balanced membership between east and west 
in S.C.U.A. was a point the British took seriously. Thirdly, the effect 
of Pakistan not joining S.C.U.A. had to be considered and Pakistan could 
exert moral pressure by joining. Suhrawardy said he would discuss the 
matter on his return from China - around 3 November.
In his meeting with Hildreth, Suhrawardy was slightly more
encouraging. He said that if there was any crisis over Suez, Pakistan 
would be with the west but repeated that S.C.U.A. seemed to be of no use 
at the present time. He said that he would like to join the association 
for reasons of solidarity but the continued threat of force made the 
decision very difficult. Hildjreth was encouraged that he did not rule 
out the possiblity of future membership. (142)
The pressure was relentless. In the event, Pakistan did not send a 
delegate to the S.C.U.A. meeting but both the British and Americans 
wanted Pakistan to join, to help exert that extra pressure on Egypt.
Hyder says that within a few days of the delegation's return, Noon, 
Hassan, Baig and himself were called to Government House.(143) He said
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Mirza rebuked them for the .stance at the conference ated had let down
Pakistan's friends and allies. Mirza said the only thing to do now was 
to call on James and Hildreth to agree to join S.C.U.A. This meeting was 
confirmed by Hildreth. He said that the Pakistani team which had 
attended the second Suez conference, met himself and James, but did not 
see the value of S.C.U.A. Hildreth and James argued that the association 
would avoid the use of force and, by not joining S.C.U.A., Pakistan was 
giving the impression of moving away from the west. Hildreth said the 
heart of the Pakistani position was that they were opposed to the use of 
force and did not want to join any organisation that Egypt was opposed 
to. Noon pointed out that Pakistan did not feel she had been consulted 
in this matter at all. Vhen the two western diplomats protested, Noon 
withdrew his remark. Hildreth ended sarcastically by saying that the 
Pakistanis seemed very 'taken with the idea that they can become "honest 
broker" between Egypt and western powers in settling the Suez 
dispute'.(144)
Mirza expressed great annoyance to Hildreth about the reluctance of 
Suhrawardy and the Foreign Ministry to join S.C.U.A. Mirza claimed that 
his understanding with Suhrawardy was that if the west really wanted 
Pakistan to join, then she would do so. He went on to say that he did 
not fully trust Britain in this situation but had faith in Dulles in 
wanting to avoid war. Hildreth said it was obvious that Pakistan was 
moving slowly in case a settlement was reached with Egypt and Pakistan 
was left looking silly. Hildreth asked Dulles if additional pressure 
should be applied on Pakistan at this time, suggesting he felt it should 
not be. (145) Dulles, however, replied that Pakistan's membership of 
S.C.U.A. was 'highly desirable' and pressure should be maintained.(146)
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This pressure was maintained. Another attempt to secure Pakistan's 
membership was made on 28 October, the night Egypt was attacked. Hyder 
writes that the delegation previously summoned before Mirza, was 
recalled again, in Suhrawardy's absence. Hildreth and James were 
present, and Hildreth asked for Noon to sign up for membership of 
S.C.U.A. immediately.(147) Noon asked for an assurance that Egypt would 
not be attacked. Hildreth was then reported to have likened Pakistan's 
attitude 'to an offensive metaphor, which does not bear repetition in 
print'. Hyder says everyone was stunned but Noon insisted he would wait 
for the assurance before signing, at which point, the meeting was over. 
If Hyder's version is correct, it is remarkable that Noon told Hildreth 
on 30 October that he and Mirza had sent a message to Suhrawardy in 
China, recommending that Pakistan join S.C.U.A. Suhrawardy had still 
refused to agree. Hildreth made it clear that the U.S. wanted Pakistan 
to join yesterday, today and tomorrow. (148) It seemed clear that action 
would have to await the return of the Prime Minister but events in 
Egypt, with the Israeli invasion, made the whole point acedemic.
REFLECTION M L  CQlCLttDIlG REMARKS
From 1947 to 1956, the period of this thesis, the steady movement of 
Pakistan into the western orbit can be clearly seen. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the problem with attempting an examination of Pakistan's 
foreign policy without access to the Pakistan Foreign Ministry files, 
causes problems. The only work ever to be written based on those 
documents has been that of G.V. Choudhry. Unfortunately from the point 
of view of this thesis, it is a wide-ranging study of the sub-continent 
and the super-powers, of which the regional pacts are a small part. The 
most comprehensive survey of the American role in Pakistan's first steps
towards alignment has been done by M.S. Venkata lani. This work is
useful for its comprehensive survey of American diplomatic files, but is 
lacking the British angle and understanding of the possible motivation 
behind Pakistan's diplomacy. Recent work using both British and American
j
material has been done by Ayesha Jalal. This is done, however, to study 
the effect within Pakistan of her alignment, and not of the regional 
pacts themselves. Memoirs have been written by some of the characters 
involved in this period and have been consulted. The Pakistani angle has 
come from Ayub Khan, Sajjad Hyder, Agha Shahi and S. M. Burke. The main 
characters from Britain and America have also written memoirs but they
pacts. Vhat little work there has been done on the regional pacts 
themselves had either been officially sponsored or poorly researched. It 
is hoped that this work will contribute to plugging the gap in this 
department.
There are two differing schools of thought on the question of 
Pakistan's foreign policy in this period. One school believes that the
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devote little attention to Pakistan, and even the regional
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Americans were generous in their aid and Pakistan had no right to expect 
any more, thereby accepting the whole policy as worthwhile. The other 
view is that the decision makers in Pakistan were harbouring a dangerous 
illusion if they believed the west was now in alliance with Pakistan 
against all potential threats. The first view accepts that Pakistan did 
not receive all it might reasonably have expected from the alliances,
but received enough over the period from the Americans to be able to
hold off India throughout the fifties and specifically in the 1965 war 
which she would have been unable to so otherwise.
There are two related questions relating to the first decade of 
Pakistan's foreign policy. One is whether Pakistan could, or should, 
have remained neutral. The other is at which point Pakistan, having 
decided to align herself with the west, moved out of the British orbit 
and into the American. The latter question seems easier to address than 
the former as it is less subjective. An important point which is worth 
mentioning in relation with the latter point is that, according to 
existing documentary evidence, any delay in the Pakistani move towards 
the United States was due almost entirely to American hesitancy in 
becoming involved in the Kashmir dispute and Indo-Pakistan relations.
The Pakistanis seem to have been keen from the start to accept American
form. The initial American recognition that Pakistan was a potential 
ally worth making can, reasonably safely, be dated from March 1951 
during the conference of American ambassadors in Ceylon. Although this 
was then agreed upon in the State Department, it was not until the 
advent of Eisenhower and Dulles in 1953 that the first real steps 
towards alignment were taken. The British could not hope to compete with
all-consuming fear of Indian hostility taking a military
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what the Americans could offer Pakistan militarily and economically; nor 
did they really wish to try. The British had, unsurprisingly, decided 
early on that India was the far more desirable ally of the two and, 
although Pakistan's air bases and manpower made her useful, she was
simply not in the same league as India.
Throughout this thesis the presence of India crops up regularly on 
the sideline, mostly in reference to the western powers reminding
themselves not to antagonise her too much. As a factor in Pakistan's 
foreign policy, on the other hand, the importance of India can hardly be 
over-emphasised. The fear the Pakistani leadership had that the Indian 
government would attempt to undo partition seemed to be gaining credence 
by Indian actions within the first year of independence in Kashmir and 
Hyderabad. Although Pakistan's archives in this period are still
closed to public access, it would be a safe bet to assume that India was 
the constant factor behind Pakistan's desire for weapons and support by 
the west and, if that meant taking sides in the Cold War and risking 
Indian and Soviet anger, it was a price which almost every member of 
the Pakistani ruling group was willing to pay. A Pakistani cabinet
minister later recalled how a member of the Pakistan Foreign Service had 
told him that his main duty during the period of initial alignment with 
the west, had been to receive the Soviet protest notes and give suitable 
but polite replies!(1)
The few Pakistanis who felt uneasy at the thought of alienating two 
huge neighbours were ignored or silenced. The 'Young Turk' element in 
the Pakistan army was removed in March 1951 during the 'Rawalpindi 
conspiracy' case, while the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, and 
removal of Nazimuddin, meant that by April 1953 there was no opposition
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to the pro-western policy in either the army or the government. There 
was widespread speculation in Pakistan that these events were too well 
co-ordinated to have been accidental or spontaneous. There is obviously 
no solid evidence to suggest that either the British or American 
intelligence agencies planned those things but little doubt that they 
were deeply concerned about the outcome. Vhat is notable in this period 
is the way certain individuals in Pakistan seemed to take it upon 
themselves to ensure that a close relationship between Pakistan and the 
west should develop. Ghulam Mohammed, Sikander Mirza and Ayub Khan are 
three names which are automatically associated with this. Vhat is also 
very noticeable is the extent to which other Pakistani politicians, 
bureaucrats and diplomats seem at times to bend over backwards to keep 
the west informed of Pakistani intentions and moves.
This point leads on to the one mentioned earlier; namely, whether 
Pakistan could or should have remained neutral in the Cold Var. Vhat is 
striking is that after the creation of Pakistan, there was very little 
of the radical anti-imperialist feeling or rhetoric associated with 
newly de-colonised states. The Indians always accused the Muslim League 
of being hand-in-glove with the British and were therefore annoyed, but 
not surprised, by the close relationship between Pakistan and the 
British after independence. Pakistani politicians countered angrily to 
such statements by pointing out that Lord Mountbatten had been made the 
first Governor General of India and had prevented Kashmiri accession to 
Pakistan by flying in Indian troops.
There seem to have been a number of reasons why Pakistan did not 
attempt a 'radical' foreign policy in the first few years. Firstly, the 
creation of Pakistan was not the result of a nationalist uprising and
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was directed primarily against possible Hindu domination. Feelings ran 
so high amongst some Muslims that the British Raj was seen as possibly 
preferable to a 'Hindu Raj'. Secondly, once Pakistan had been created 
there was a proportionately high number of British civil and military
officers in senior positions which made any change in perspective
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diffiylt, Many Pakistani historians still resent the fact that the 
British army officers serving in Pakistan did not follow the order of 
Jinnah to move into Kashmir in 1947. (2)
Thirdly, those who supported the ideological policy of Muslim
solidarity were disappointed by the lack of response to such a call. 
Even those few states who agreed with the ideal, such as Saudi Arabia, 
were not in any position to help Pakistan. Turkey, Iran and Egypt in
1947 had pro-western governments and were suspicious of such calls. By
1951, the embryonic move towards an 'Islamic foreign policy' was killed 
with the deaths of Mossadeq in Iran and Liaquat in Pakistan, while in
the Arab world, the call of Arab nationalism held more attraction than
Islamic nationalism. Another reason which made Pakistani neutrality, 
let alone hostility, improbable was the training and education of the 
men in charge of Pakistan. The education in England, or on British 
lines, was a must for every Pakistani army officer, civil servant, 
diplomat and most politicians. These were 'Macaulay's children', that 
is, British in morals, tastes and opinions. The spirit of independent 
nationalism seems to have been conspicuous by its absence in almost
every major figure of the time. Given this, it seems naive and
unrealistic to have expected that an independent foreign policy would be 
sustained; and when this is coupled with the fear of India, such a
possibility seems even more remote.
The central issue of this thesis is, however, the regional pacts in 
Asia, not the internal dynamics and problems of Pakistan. The Pakistani 
oligarchy ruling in the fifties was fortunate to have Dwight Eisenhower 
elected as President of the United States in November 1952 and John 
Foster Dulles appointed as his Secretary of State. This is not to
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suggest that it was a dramatic shift in American policy, but/new sense 
of urgency which the Eisenhower administration brought to the question 
of regional defence, certainly/sped up the departure of the Pakistani 
posture of neutrality.
Without an American willingness to set up, encourage and finance 
regional pacts, the Pakistan government could have shouted itself hoarse 
without any American response. It was this coincidence of interests 
which led to the succession of pacts. Dulles seems to have been 
convinced of two things regarding Pakistan. Firstly, that she would 
never go communist and secondly, that she had the right sort of raw 
material: brave and hardy men. These factors, combined with an almost
missionary belief that communism was an evil force which all decent 
governments should isolate, led him to break with the American policy of 
treating India with kid gloves and risking Indian alienation with the 
west, against British advice. Though he never quite gave up the hope 
that Nehru would see the error of his ways, he was prepared to risk 
Indian anger by giving military aid to Pakistan, while constantly 
reminding India that they were welcome to the same aid.
The Foreign Office were more sceptical of Pakistan's commitment to 
fight communism than Dulles. The British felt that the fear of communist 
expansion, expressed so eloquently by Pakistani leaders, was more for
itionalism following the end of the Second World War and were 
itermined not to jeopardize their future position by being too closely 
ssociated with either of the two colonial powers.
A certain amount of British and American rivalry was, therefore, 
aevitable as Britain wanted to defend her oil and strategic interests 
a the Middle East, and hoped for American help in doing so. Dulles had 
3 intention of doing this; and Suez was to prove not only the end of 
ritish power in the Middle East, but also to demonstrate American 
sluctance to attract unnecessary opprobrium from peoples in the area,
tie contemplated role of Pakistan in all this was to provide the men
tiling to fight in case of war. The Pakistani ruling group had no 
bjection to doing this, but wanted the money and arms to equip an army 
owerful enough to hold off the Red Army until American reinforcements 
rrived. The constant references to Ayub Khan being disappointed by the 
mount of American aid on offer showed the gulf between Washington and 
arachi over what were Pakistan's legitimate needs. What the Americans 
bviously realised was that, a Pakistan army capable of worrying Soviet 
ilitary planners, would be a serious threat to India and, as events in 
965 were to prove, once the Pakistan army felt militarily capable of 
inning Kashmir, they attempted to do so. Whatever the impatience
biles and Eisenhower might have felt against Nehru, they were only too 
ware that he was still preferable to some alternatives and the 
•alkanisation of the sub-continent, with all the opportunities that
rauld create for the Soviets to exploit, was a fear present in American 
>olicy towards South Asia.
Once the American decision to grant military aid to Pakistan was 
iaken, Dulles had refused to divulge the amount of aid to Pakistan until
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the benefit of the Americans than the Russians or Chinese. In this they 
were almost certainly right. The mask of Cold Var rhetoric slipped 
occasionally when some statements were made along the lines of 'Better a 
communist Pakistan than no Pakistan'. The Pakistani leadership were 
especially careful not to alienate China too much and, despite the 
avowed dislike of communism of Mohammed Ali Bogra, he was always careful 
to restrict his criticism to the Soviet Union. The South East Asia 
Treaty Organisation was clearly designed to prevent Chinese-sponsered 
communism from sweeping South East Asia, but the Pakistani leadership 
attempted to have the best of both worlds; adhering to the treaty, while 
assuring China that she had no cause for worry from Pakistan. (3) The 
strategic value of Pakistan to the western powers was recognised by her 
own leaders, and milked for all it was worth in front of British and 
American policy makers.
The American initiative which originally took shape in 1951 made a 
major advance two years later. The removal of Nazimuddin, and the 
appointment of a hopelessly pro-American Prime Minister in the shape of 
Bogra, did no harm to this move at all. Bogra admitted that his position 
depended on the amount of American aid he could get, and he could have 
mentioned that he was not the only one who would suffer if American aid 
was inadequate. The real value of Pakistan to American strategic 
planning was in the Middle East, specifically Iran and Iraq. Dulles' 
masterplan was to create a Northern Tier of states running along Soviet 
Asia, committed to its defence against the Red Army. Following the 
break-up of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and France had been the dominant 
powers in the Middle East, with French influence limited to the Lebanon 
and Syria. The Americans noted with some alarm the birth of Arab
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The Mutual Defence Agreement with America was signed in May 1954, 
just a few months after the pact with Turkey. It was not until November 
that any arms reached Pakistan, and American suggestions that the money 
allocated would be the ceiling of aid, rather than the wherewithal for
establishing a certain number of army divisions, hit the Pakistan
government like a bomb. Assurances which were then given by various 
American officials that more was planned in the future calmed the
Pakistani military down, but the grand illusions of a large well-
equipped army paid for by the Americans, all but disappeared.
The Mutual Defence agreement made it clear to Pakistan that the
be able to use any aid only for internal security and self-defence, and 
for the defence of the 'free world' and not for other purposes. The 
agreement also lacked any American commitment to guarantee the security 
of Pakistan. The constant ensuing struggle with the Americans, behind
nations. Pakistan viewed the alignment as a possible way for security 
against a three thousand mile frontier with a hostile and more powerful 
India. For the Americans, however, the perspective was Pakistan's role 
in defending the 'free world', which, in reality, meant defending the 
oil wells of the Middle East, for the west and from the Russians. As 
recent events in the Middle East have shown, whatever the situation 
there, western troops and bases are an unpopular and last solution. The 
use of Muslim troops, on the other hand, was seen as a far more 
attractive military and political option. It was this differing 
viewpoint which led some Pakistanis to write off the regional pacts as 
useless to Pakistan, as they offered her no lasting protection against
United under no obligation to defend her, and Pakistan would
w
the scenes, was based upon the differing perspectives of the o
a military mission had visited Pakistan and, she had committed herself 
to the western cause by signing a military agreement with Turkey, the 
eastern flank of NATO. This method of alignment with the west was the 
most acceptable way for the Pakistan government to proceed, as Turkey 
was held in high regard in Pakistan for historic and nostalgic, rather 
than practical, reasons. The Turkish government had to be prodded into 
this by Dulles, but their eventual acceptance of the idea was never in 
doubt. Within days of the announcement that Turkey and Pakistan had 
agreed to co-operate on various things, including military matters, only 
the formalities needed to be completed with the United States, as 
previously agreed during the visit of Ghulam Mohammed and Ayub Khan to 
America in late 1953. Zafrullah Khan had, therefore, made the formal
application for aid, which was instantly accepted by President
Eisenhower, much to the amusement of observers at the time, who were 
told that the decision to grant aid was made only after a mutual and 
independent decision by Pakistan and Turkey had been reached to move co­
operate. (4) The die was cast.
With the long courtship over, Pakistan wanted to know what the 
dowry was. As in almost all such cases, she was disappointed. The 
initial figure of S25 million seemed a ridiculously small amount, 
particularly given the high Pakistani expectations, which the Americans 
had done little to dampen in case Karachi pulled out. Having accepting 
the offer before knowing the figures and learning of its details, 
Pakistan, according to Ghulam Mohammed, felt like a girl being used, and 
like girls in such circumstances, was extremely hesitant to back out as 
she would be left with nothing but a bad repuation and could only 
protest loudly, hoping to improve the deal.
what was seen as the real enemy, but the Pakistani leadership attempted 
to balance this out by obtaining enough aid to satisfy both needs.
The details of the amount and nature of U.S. aid to Pakistan still
had to be resolved when Dulles moved his plan a stage further in mid-
1954. The pressing American concern in the fifties, was not the Middle 
East, but South East Asia. The Korean Var had broken out in 1950, and 
with the emergence of Communist China the year before that, it seemed to 
the Americans that the impoverished but important strategic states of 
South East Asia were vulnerable to communism. To defend this area in 
general, but Thailand and Vietnam in particular, the South East Asia 
Treaty Organisation was devised. The British were similarly interested 
in some defence pact for that region but, as shown earlier, with rather 
different ideas.
East Pakistan could only loosely be described as falling within 
'South East Asia', and the thought that the Pakistani government was
really worried about communist expansion in that area stretches one's
imagination. However, the fact that the alliance needed some Asian 
allies for purposes of respectability meant that Dulles had to encourage 
Pakistani membership of the scheme. It is difficult to contemplate what 
the Pakistan government could possibly have hoped to gain from the 
Manila Pact, given the American reluctance to set up any standing army 
in Asia along Nato lines, and an express understanding that America was 
not concerned with nan-communist, that is, Indian, aggression. In his 
eagerness to please her new allies, the Pakistan representative, 
Zafrullah Khan, signed the Manila Pact without any knowledge of the new 
aid figure or of the commitments involvedand most importantly, without 
the permission of his own government! Keen though Bogra and his
ministers, including Ayub Khan, were to cement the relationship with 
America, they wanted at least a promise of increased aid before 
antagonising the Chinese, in addition to the previous list of Russia and 
India. After much haggling, both in London and Washington, Bogra gave 
way to the inevitable, and ratified the treaty with only the promise of 
an additional five million dollars.
The flurry of pacts was completed with the most difficult one of the 
four to negotiate, the Baghdad Pact. As pointed out earlier, the British 
pushed the Iraqis into signing a defence agreement with Turkey. The 
British were keen to secure their declining position in the Middle East 
but this was not to prove the way to da it. The Americans stayed well 
clear of the Pact in the hope that they could get the best of both 
worlds: a pro-western alliance in the Middle East, without Arab League
criticism led by Egypt and without worrying Israel, which felt 
uncomfortable with the idea of Muslim countries joining up for defence 
purposes.
As the United States showed no inclination to follow the British 
lead, and accede to the Pact, Pakistan also kept her distance. When 
Dulles had talked of the Northern Tier, the Pakistanis had assumed 
America would either take the lead, or encourage the Turko-Pakistan 
accord to develop into a Middle East defence agreement. Eventually, the 
Turks and Iraqis convinced Ayub that the Pact was worth joining and that 
it would enjoy strong but tacit American backing. Yet again, Pakistan 
signed up for an agreement in which she had little to gain, either 
materially or in terms of prestige. Although Pakistan's leadership 
hailed it as a move in the step towards an Islamic defence pact, the 
presence of Britain served as a reminder that this was hardly the case.
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The Suez crisis showed the fragility and contradictions of the pact as 
no joint action could be agreed against Egypt. The British motivation 
for sponserrjig the pact became clear and what little hope there was of 
other Arab states joining was finished. No government in the Muslim 
world could have taken action against Nasser and hoped to survive. The 
contradictions were, therefore, ruthlessly exposed in just over one 
year. The Baghdad Pact limped on and even suffered the humiliation of 
Iraq withdrawing in 1958, leaving the organisation without its 
headquarters! The remaining members re-grouped under the name of the 
Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).
For the Pakistani leadership, Suez was a diplomatic mightmare. The 
crisis had evoked a popular reaction inside Pakistan and set the
of
government one /its trickiest problems. For a country which claimed 
Muslim solidarity to be a t^neix of its foreign policy, to go against an
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obviously popular leader like Nasser, in direct contradiction with the 
popular mood in Pakistan was very difficult. On the other hand, Pakistan 
was committed to the western alliance, and America had no interest in 
seeing a wave of Arab nationalism sweeping the Middle East, as it would 
upset their own plans. Sikander Mirza had no sympathy for Nasser but 
was unable to say so openly, and so Pakistan was desperately trying to 
balance the two sides, with Suhrawardy left with the unenviable task of
avoiding meml^bVship of S.C.U.A. Pakistan was saved from further
■? &  embarrasment once the crisis broke as the United states refused to
Isupport'^the British-French-Israeli action. This enabled the Pakistani 
leadership to make a few statements against the British and to continue 
with its western alignment policy. It is interesting, if futile, to
speculate what the Karachi government could possibly have done if the 
U.S. had backed the invasion of Egypt.
In under two years, therefore, Pakistan went from being a nominally 
neutral and non-aligned state to being the most 'allied ally' of a U.S.- 
sponsored global network for the containment of the Soviet Union. <5) The 
appearence was obviously deceptive. There was no longer any doubt by 
1954 where Pakistan stood in the Cold Var but there was considerable 
doubt where America stood in Indo-Pakistan relations, which for Pakistan 
was a more relevant criterion. In spite of the profusion of agreements, 
the United States had managed to secure Pakistan's help in the defence 
of the Middle East without any commitment of its own, other than a 
limited and unspecified amount of military aid. Four pacts later, 
Pakistan still lacked a single ally and, as one historian has pointed 
out, the sad but hard fact of the matter for Pakistan was that there was 
not a 'single country which could be counted as an unfailing friend and 
ally willing to lend aid and comfort in time of need'(6)
Such a position might not be a worry to those surrounded by friendy
K
neighbours; but Vest Pakistan occupied a very strategic position, 
sandwiched between India, China, Afghanistan and Iran and East Pakistan 
was almost surrounded by Indian territory. Given the underlying 
hostility from both India and Afghanistan, Pakistan needed allies more 
than most countries. The United Nations had disappointed Pakistan by its 
inability to agree on any action over Kashmir.
The precise contribution which Pakistan could make to American 
strategic interests seems never to have fully decided by the Statei
Department. Vith domestic instabil/ty in Pakistan and the constant threat
of war with India remaining a feature of the fifties, the possibility of 
Pakistani troops being deployed abroad seemed unlikely. The chorus of 
demands from Pakistan has been seen by some historians as being 
'extraordinarily effective in forcing the United States to respond'.(7) 
Critics of the Eisenhower-Dulles approach to military aid for Pakistan 
charged the administration with major strategic and political bungling. 
They believed that the agreement would alienate India and Afghanistan to 
the extent where they would turn to the Soviet Union and thereby lead to 
an arms race in South Asia; such an environment would make any
settlement of regional disputes, particularly Kashmir, harder to
resolve. Even more seriously, these critics charged that the belief that 
limited aid to Middle Eastern countries would be enough to defend that 
area from Soviet attack, was nothing but self-delusion.
Dulles had replied to such criticism by arguing that no policy was
entirely trouble-free and the rationale of aid to Pakistan outweighed
any passible disadvantages. He remained convinced that Pakistan was an 
ally worth having in Asia but the exact role she could play in the 
western alliance was never spelled out. It is possible that such 
decisions were reached at such a secret and high level that the American 
papers on the subject have not been released but it seems more likely 
that the exact nature was never quite discussed because no clear vision 
existed on that question.
Pakistan's motivation for the membership of the regional pacts was 
clear: security. Pakistan was clearly willing to turn to turn to anyone 
willing and capable to help preseve her independence. This was summed up 
by Feroze Khan Moon who pointed out, ' If the Hindus give us freedom. . . 
then the Hindus are our best friends. If the British give it to us, then
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the British are our best friends. But if neither will give it to us,
then Russia is our best friend'.(8)
The option which Noon did not mention was the United States, who was 
originally not too interested in the freedom of Pakistan, but had the 
financial and military power to guarantee if it wished. Pakistan was 
obviously not pulled into the western alliance against her will; in 
fact, if anything, she pressed America into making decisions sooner than
she might have liked. That is not to suggest that Pakistan got
everything she hoped for out of the pact. The level of aid never reached 
the amount hoped for, America refused to take Pakistan's side on the
Kashmir question in the United Nations; and Dulles refused to let the
regional pacts be used for anything other than a possible agreement for 
attack by communist aggression. The fact that military aid came at all, 
however, streng^jen^d the position of the armed forces in Pakistan to an 
extent where the" Commander-in-Chief, Ayub Khan, could virtually decide 
Pakistan's foreign policy and some have suggested that martial law in 
1958 was an inevitable result of this programme. Pakistan's other losses 
may be said to include a loss of sympathy in the Muslim and non-aligned 
world, particularly when contrasted with India's steady refusal to tie 
herself to any camp. The dream of a Muslim bloc, independent of the Cold 
war alliances, as an objective of Pakistan's foreign policy was finally 
and rudely shattered by Suhrawardy in 1956. He told the Pakistan
Assembly that 'zero plus zero plus zero is still zero'.(9) By
classifying Pakistan as a zero, he showed why he had remained in the 
western alliance, in spite of his early criticisms and constant
disappointments and disagreements.
It is hard, therefore, to avoid the conclusion that Pakistani 
involvement in the regional pacts was born out of mutual needs, mutual 
misunderstandings and differing perpectives. There was little chance 
that the pacts would ever serve as a satisfactory defence structure for 
the Middle East and no chance that they would ever defend Pakistan 
against India. The fact of the matter seems to be that the regional 
pacts were never thought of by the Americans as military assets, only 
political ones. By succeeding in persuading countries to declare their 
interest and sympathies in the Cold War, the Americans seemed to have 
been playing a tactical diplomatic game. By ensuring that countries 
became aligned to the western side, the chances far the Soviet Union 
trying to outbid her in those nations became very difficult. The defence 
of the region was never to be left to the power of local countries, or 
even to be shared, but in the hands of the United States. The problem 
for the United States in these tactics was some countries like Pakistan 
saying, 'Give us the tools and we'll finish the job!'.
If defence against India is accepted as the touchstone of Pakistan's 
diplomacy, the regional pacts were irrelevant yet dangerous. Irrelevant, 
because they afforded Pakistan no collective or individual protection; 
dangerous, because they increased Indian hostl/lty^and made Pakistan a 
target of Soviet annoyance in the Middle East, thereby creating a threat 
which could have been avoided by neutrality. The main justification for 
the pacts from a Pakistani perspective is that they lessened the feeling 
of international isolation and enabled her to receive nearly a billion 
dollars worth of military aid and an almost equal amount of economic aid 
within the first decade of alignment. (11)
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Pakistan's leadership always tried to portray the pacts as
agreements of mutual benefits, based on respect and understanding. This 
myth of mutual partnership was best dispelled by an American official in 
1944. He said that in every alliance one partner wears the boots and 
spurs, while the other wears the saddle. ' Ve are obviously wearing the 
boots', he noted; but 'if we are to stay in this fortunate position, we 
have to find some way to feed the horse. ' <12) It could be said by 
critics that the aid provided was just enough to ensure that Pakistan 
remained the horse. The aid did not encourage self-reliance in military 
or economic matters. Another justification used by the Pakistan 
government for the acceptance of aid was that it would enable them to 
divert those scarce funds into development. Unfortunately, the figures 
do not agree with that assertion. The figures spent as a percentage of 
total revenue stay steady throughout this period, recording a small fall 
only in 1957/58.(13) There is little doubt Pakistan was militarily 
strengthened as a result of this combination of defence spending brought 
about by the regional pacts. In that criterion, at any rate, the policy 
was a success for Pakistan. The point is, however, how long defence can 
take priority over development. It is fascinating to see that
similar to the fifties. Whether anything has been learnt by anyone, or 
if the results are to be the same, remains to be seen.
spectacular movement, returned to a pictu
Pakistan's domestic scene and international
seems uncannily
has, after some
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(TABLE I)
Division of the Armed Forces between India and Pakistan
T H E  ARM Y India Pakistan
Infantry Regiments ... 15 8
Armoured Corps ... ... 12 6
A rtillery  Regiments ... 18* 8*
Engineering Units ... 61 34
Signal Corps ... The then existing
static layout re-
mained unchanged
Supply Units (RIASC) ... in each Dominion.
Electrical & Mechanical Eng. Units ... 10 4
Indian Pioneer Corps ... Group 2 Coys.
H  Qrs &
9 Coys.
Animal Transport Regiment ... 4 3
Mechanical Transport Units (RIASC) ... 34 17
Ambulance Platoons ... ... 15 7
Indian Army Medical Corps Hospitals ... 82 34
11,713 4,037
beds beds
M ilitary  Farms ... 29 20
Mountain Regiments ... 2 1
TH E NAVY
Sloops ... ... 4 2
Frigates ... 2 2
Fleet Minc-Sweepers ... 14 4
Corvettes 1 N il
Survey ship ... 1 N il
Trawlers ... 4 2
M otor Mine sweepers ... 4 2
M otor Launch ... 1 N il
Harbour Defence M otor Launches ... 4 4
Landing crafts ... A ll existing N il
crafts;
T H E  AIR FORCE
Fighter Squardrons ... 7 2
Transport Squardrons ... 1 1
Defence Expenditure 1947-59
Year
1947-48*
1948-49
1949-50
1950-51
1951-52
1952-53
1953-54
1954-55
1955-56
1956-57
1957-58
1958-59**
Defence Expenditure 
(in Million Rs.)
Percentage o f the 
total Government 
Expenditure
236.0 65.16
461.5 71.32
625.4 73.06
649.9 51.32
792.4 54.96
725.7 56.68
633.2 58.7
640.5 57.5
917.7 64.0
800.9 60.1
854.2 56.1
996.6 50.9
  6 , 1  'v j i b i  iv iarcn  iy 4 « .
Covers the period of 15 months from 
to 30th June 1959. 1st A p r i l  1958

M u t u a l  D e f e n c e  Assist
b e t w e e n  T h e  G o v e r n m e
a n d  T h e  G o v e r n m e n t
The Government of Pakistan and the Government of the United States 
of America,
Desiring to foster international peace and security within the framework 
of the Charter of the United Nations through measures which will fur­
ther the ability of nations dedicated to the purpose and principles of the 
Charter to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and col­
lective self-defence in support of those purposes and principles;
Reaffirming their determination to give their full cooperation to the ef­
forts to provide the Untcd Nations with armed forces as contemplated 
by the Charter and to participate in United Nations collective defence 
arrangements and measures, and to obtain agreement on universal 
regulation and reduction of armament under adequate guarantee against 
violation or evasion;
Taking into consideration the support which the Government of the 
United States has brought to these principles by enacting the Mutual 
Defence Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, and the Mutual Security 
Act of 1951, as amended;
Desiring to set forth the conditions which will govern the furnishing of 
such assistance;

Have agreed:
ARTICLE 1
1. The Government of the United States will make available to the 
Government of Pakistan such equipment, materials, services or other as­
sistance as die Government of the United Stales may authorize in ac­
cordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed. The furnish­
ing and use of such assistance shall be consistent with die Charter of the 
United Nations. Such assistance as may be made available by the 
Government of the United Stales pursuant to this Agreement will be 
furnished under the provisions and subject to all the terms, conditions 
and termination provisions of the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 
1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, acts amendatory or sup­
plementary thereto, appropriation acts there under, or any other ap­
plicable legislative provisions. The two Governments will, from lime to 
time, negotiate detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the the 
provisions of this paragraph.
2. The Government of Pakistan will use this assistance exclusively to 
maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defence, or to permit it 
to participate in defence of the area, or in United Nations collective 
security arrangements and measures, and Pakistan will not undertake 
any act of aggression against any other nation. The Government of 
Pakistan will not, without the prior agreement of the Government of the 
United States, devote such assistance to purposes other than those for 
which it was furnished.
3. Arrangements will be entered into under which equipment and 
materials furnished pursuant to this Agreement and no longer required 
or used exclusively for thr purposes for which originally made available 
will be offered for return to the Government of the United States.
4. The Government of Pakistan will not transfer to any person not an of­
ficer or agent of that Government, or to any other nation, title to or pos-
^  session of any equipment, materials, properly, information, or service
received under this Agreement, without the prior consent of the
Government of the United Suites.
5. The Government of Pakisuin will take such security measures as may 
be agreed in each ease between the two Governments in order to 
prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified military articles, 
sercviccs or information furnished pursuant to this Agreement.
6. Each Government will Like appropriate measures consistent with 
security to keep the ~ L,:c informed of operations under this agreement.
7. The two Governments will establish procedures whereby the Govern­
ment of Pakistan will so deposit, segregate or assure title to all funds al 
located to or derived from any programme of assistance undertaken by 
the Government of the United Slates so that such funds shall not, except 
as may otherwise be mutually agreed, be subject to garnishment, attach­
ment, seizure or other legal process by any person, firm, agency, 
corporation, organisation or government.
ARTICLE II
The two Governments, will, upon request of them, negotiate appropriate 
arrangements between them relating to the exchange of patent rights 
and technical information for defence which will expedite such exchan­
ges and at the same lime protect private interests and maintain neces­
sary security safeguards.
ARTICLE II!
1. The Government of Pakistan will make available to the Government 
of the United Stales rupees for the use of the latter Government for its 
administrative and operating expenditures in connection with carrying 
out the purposes of this Agreement. The two Governments will 
forthwith initiate discussions with a view to determining the amount of 
such rupees and to agreeing upon arrangements for the furnishing of 
such funds.
2. The Government of Pakisuin will, except as may otherwise be 
mutually agreed, grant duty-free treatment on importation or exporta­
tion and exemption from internal taxation upon products, properly, 
materials or equipment imported into its territory in connection with
60

this Agreement or any similar Agreement between the Government of 
the United Stales and the Government of any other country receiving 
military assistance.
3. Tax relief will be accorded to all expenditures in Pakistan by, or on 
behalf of, the Government of the United States for the common defence 
effort, including expenditures for any foreign aid programme of the 
United States. The Government of Pakistan will establish procedures 
satisfactory to both Governments so that such expenditure will be net of 
taxes.
ARTICLE IV
1. The Government of Pakistan will receive personnel of the Govern­
ment of the United Stales who will discharge in its territory the respon­
sibilities of the Government of the United States under this Agreement 
and who will be accorded facilities and authourity to observe the 
progress of the assistance furnished pursuant to this Agreement Such 
personnel who are United Slates nationals, including personal tem­
porarily assigned, will, in their relations with the Government of Pakis­
tan, operate as part of the Embassy of the United Stales of America 
under the direction and control of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, 
and will have the same privileges and immunities as are accorded other 
personnel with corresponding rank of the Emabassy of the United States 
who are United Slates nationals. Upon appropriate notification by the 
Government of the Unites states the Government of Pakistan will grant 
full diplomatic status to the senior military member assigned under this 
Article and the senior Army, Navy and Air Force officers and their 
respective immediate deputies.
2. The Government of Pakistan will grant exemption from import and 
export duties on personal property imported for the personal use of such 
personnel or their families and will lake reasonable administrative 
measures to facilitate and expedite the importation and exportation of 
the personal property of such personnel and their families.
ARTICLE V
1. The Government of Pakistan w ill:
(a) join in promoting international understanding and goodwill, and 
maintaining world peace;
(b) take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate 
causes of international tension;
(c) make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the 
full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities 
and general economic condition to the development and main­
tenance of its own defensive strcnght and the defensive strength of 
the free world;
(d) take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop 
its defence capacties; and
(e) take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilisation of the 
economic and military assistance provided by the United States.
(a) The Government of Pakistan will, consistent with the Charter of 
the United Nations, furnish to the Government of the United States, 
or to such other govmments as the Parties hereto may in each case 
agree upon, such equipment, materials, services or other assistance 
as may be agreed upon in order to increase their capacity for in­
dividual and collective self-defence and to facilitate their effective 
participation in the United Nations system for collective security.
(b) In conformity with the principle of mutual aid, the Government 
of Pakistan will facilitate the production and transfer to the 
Government of the United Stales, for such period of time, in such 
quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed 
upon, of raw and semi-processed materials required by the United 
States as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own 
resources, and which may be available in Pakistan. Arrangements 
for such transfers shall give due regard to reasonable requirements

of Pakistan for domestic use and commercial export.
ARTICLE VI
In the interest of their mutual security the Government of Pakistan will 
cooperate with the Government of the United States in taking measures 
designed to control trade with nations which threaten the maintenance 
of world peace.
ARTICLE V II
1. The Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature and will 
continue in force until one year after the receipt by either party of writ­
ten notice of the intention of the other party to terminate it, except that 
the provisions of Article 1, Paragraphs 2 and 4, and arrangements 
entered into under Article 1, paragraphs 3, 5 and 7, and under Article II, 
shall remain in force unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments.
2. The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them, con­
sult regarding any matter relating to the application or amendment of 
this Agreement.
3. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretariat of the Union 
Nations.
Done in two copies at Karachi the 19th. day of May, one thousand nine 
hundred and fifty four.
T h e  A g r e e m m e n t
C o o p e r a t i o n
P a k i s t a n
Preamble. Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles pf the 
U.N. Charter, and their determination always to endeavour to apply and 
give effect to these purposes and principles; desirous of promoting the 
benefits of greater mutual cooperation deriving from the sincere 
friendship existing between them; recognizing the need for consultation 
and cooperation between them in every field for the purpose of promot­
ing the well-being and security of their people; and being convinced 
that such cooperation would be in the interest of all peace-loving na­
tions, and in particular of nations in the region of the contracting par­
ties, the two countries have therefore decided to conclude this 
Agreemenr for friendly cooperation.
ARTICLE I
The contracting parties undertake to rclrain from intervening in any 
way in the internal affairs of each other, and from participating in any 
alliance or activities directed against the other.
ARTICLE I I
They will consult on international matters of mutual interest, and, 
taking into account international requirements and conditions, cooperate 
to the maximum extent.
ARTICLE I I I
They develop the cooperation, already established between them in the 
cultural field under a separate agreement, in the economic and technical 
fields, if necessary by concluding other agreements.

A RTICLE IV
Consultation and cooperation between the contracting parties in the 
field of defence shall cover the following points:-
(a) Exchange of information for the purpose of deriving joint 
benefit from technical experience and progress.
(b) Endeavours to meet, as far as possible, the requirements of the 
parties in the production of arms and ammunition.
(c) Studies and determination of the manner and extent of coopera­
tion which might be effected between them, in accordance with Ar­
ticle 51 of the U.N. Charter, should an unprovoked attack occur 
against them from outside.
ARTICLE V
Each contracting party declares that none of the international engage­
ments now in force between it and any third State is in conflict with the 
provisions of this Agreement, and that this Agreement shall not affect, 
and cannot be interpreted as affecting, the aforesaid engagements. They 
undertake not to enter any international engagement in conclict with 
this Agreement.
ARTICLE VI
Any State, whose participation is considered by the contracting parties 
useful for achieving the purposes of the Agreement, may accede to this 
Agreement under the same conditions, and with the same obligations, as 
the contracting parties Any accession shall have legal effect, after the 
instrument of accession is deposited with the Turkish Government.
ARTICLE V II
This Agreement, of which the English text is authentic, shall be ratified 
by the contracting parties in accordance with their respective canslilu- 
tional processes, and shall enter into force on exchange of instruments 
of ratification in ankara. If no formal notice of denunciation is given by
either of the contracting parties to the oilier one year before the termina­
tion of a period of five years from the date of its entry into force, the 
Agreement shall automatically continue in force for a further five years. 
The same procedure will apply for subsequent periods thereafter.
Done in two copies April 2, 1954.

T h e  S o u t h  E a s t  Asia
Preamble. The parlies lo this treaty,
Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the parties,
Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the 
Charier of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all 
peoples and all Governments,
Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
they uphold the principle of equal rights and self determination of 
peoples, and declaring lhat they will earnestly strive by every peaceful 
means to promote self-government and lo secure the independence of 
all countries whose peoples desire it and are able lo undertake its 
responsibilities,
Desiring lo strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold 
the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and 
to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in 
the treaty area,
Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that 
any potential aggressor will appreciate that the parties stand together in 
the area, and
Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defence for the 
preservation of peace and security,
Therefore, agree as follows :
A RTICLE I
The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, 
to settle any international disputes, in which they may be involved, by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security 
and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international rela­
tions from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.
A RTICLE I I
In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this treaty, the par­
lies, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self- 
help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and col­
lective capacity to resist armed attck and to prevent and counter subver­
sive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity 
and political stability.
AR TICLE I I I
The parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to 
cooperate with one another in the further development of economic 
measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote 
economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual 
and collective efforts of government toward these ends.
A RTICLE IV
1. Each party recognizes lhat aggression by means of armed attack in 
the treaty area against any of the parties or against any state or territory 
which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, 
would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that 
event act lo meet the common danger in accordance with its constitu­
tional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be im- 
meadiately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.
2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the in­
tegrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of 
any party in the treaty area or of any other state or territory to which the 
provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is 
threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or 
threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of 
the area, the parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the

measures which would be taken for the common defence.
3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any state designated 
by unanimous agreement under Paragraph 1 of this Article or on any 
tcn-itory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the 
consent of the government concCmcd.
ARTICLE V
The parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be 
represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this 
treaty. The council shall provide for consultation with regard to military 
and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may 
from time to time require. The council shall be so organized as to be 
able to meet at any time.
ARTICLE V I
This treaty docs not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in 
any way the rights and obligations of any of the parties under the 
Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Na­
tions for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each 
party declares that none of the international engagements now in force 
between it and any other of the parties or any third party is in conflict 
with the provisions of this treaty, and under-takes not to enter into any 
international engagement in conflict with this treaty.
ARTICLE V II
Any other state in a position to further the objectives of this treaty and 
lo contribute to tne security of the area may, by unanimous agreement 
of the parties, be invited to accede to this treaty. Any state so invited 
may become a party to the treaty by depositing its instrument of acces­
sion with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the 
parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.
ARTICLE V III
As used in this treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of Southeast
Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian parties, and the 
general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area 
north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The parties may, by u- 
nanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the treaty 
area the territory of any state acceding to this treaty in accordance with 
Article 7 or otherwise to change the treaty area.
ARTICLE IX
1. This treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of 
the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be 
transmitted by that Government to the other signatories.
2. The treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the par­
ties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The in­
struments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of 
the other signatories of such deposit.
3. The treaty shall enter into force between the states which have 
ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the 
signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with 
respect lo each other state on the date of the deposit of its instrument of 
ratification.
ARTICLE X
This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any party may cease to 
be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the 
Governments of the other parties of the deposit of each notice of denun­
ciation.
ARTICLE X I
The English text of this treaty is binding on the parties, but when the 
panics have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be 
equally authentic and binding on the parties.

UNDERSTANDING OF U.S.A
The United Slates of America in executing the present treaty does so 
with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression 
and armed attack and its aggrcemcnt with reference thereto in Article 4, 
Paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the 
event of the aggression or armed attack it will consult under the 
provisions of Article 4, paragraph 2.
Done at Manila eighth day of September, 1954.
(The treaty was signed by the principal members of all eight delegations 
at the Conference).
THE PROTOCOL
Designation of states and territory as to which provisions of Article 4 
and Article 3 arc to be applicable:
The parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty unani­
mously designate for the purpose of Article 4 of the treaty the states of 
Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the 
state of Vietnam. The parties further agree that the above mentioned 
states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures 
contemplated by Article 3.
This protocol shall come into force simultaneously with the coming into 
force of the treaty.
In witness whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this 
protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty.
Done at Manila eighth day of September, 1954.
The delegates of the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, 
New Zealand. Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines,
Desiring to establish a firm basis for common action to maintain peace 
and security in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific;
Convinced lhat common action to this end, in order lo be worthy and ef­
fective, must be inspired by the highest principles of justice and liberty;
Do hereby proclaim :
First, in accordance with provisions of the United Nations Charter, they 
uphold the principle of equal rights and self- determination of peoples, 
and they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote the 
self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose 
peoples desire in and are able to undertake its responsibilities;
Second, they arc each prepared to continue taking effective practical 
measures to insure conditions favourable to the orderly achievement of 
the foregoing purposes in accordance with their constitutional proces­
ses;
Third, they will continue to cooperate in the economic, social and cul­
tural fields in order to promote higher living standards, economic 
progress and social well-being in this region;
Fourth, as declared in the southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, 
they are determined to prevent or counter by appropriate means any at­
tempt in the treaty area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their 
sovereignty or territorial integrity.
proclaimed at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

P a c t  o f  M u t u a l  C o o p e
WHEREAS the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq 
and Turkey are in constant progress, and in order to complement the 
contents of the Treaty of friendship and good neighbourhood concluded 
between His Majesty the King of Iraq and His Excellency the President 
of the Turkish Republic signed in Ankara on the 29th of March, 1946, 
which recognized the fact that peace and security between the two 
countries is an integral part of the peace and security of all the nations 
of the world and in particular the nations of the Middle East, and that it 
is the basis for their foreign policies;
Whereas Article II of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic 
Cooperation between the Arab League Stales provides that no provision 
of the Treaty shall in any way affect, or is designed to affect any of the 
rights and obligations accruing 10 the contracting parties from the 
United Nations Charter,
And having realised the great responsibilities borne by them in their 
capacity as members of the United Nations concerned with the main­
tenance of peace and security in the Middle East region which neces­
sitate taking the required measures in accordance with Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter,
They have been fully convinced of the necessity of concluding a pact 
fulfilling these aims and for that purpose have appointed as their 
Plenipotentiaries:
His Majesty King Faisal II
King pf Iraq
His Excellency Nuri-AI-Said 
Prime Minister
His Excellency Burhanuddin Bash-Ayan 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affaris 
His Excellency Cclal Bayar 
President of the Turkish Republic 
His Excellency Adnan Mcndercs 
Prime Minister
His Excellency Professor Fuat Koprulu 
Minister for Foreign Affairs
who having communicated their full powers, found to be in good and 
due form, have agreed as follows:
AR TICLE I
Consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Con­
tracting Parties will cooperate for their security and defence. Such 
measures as they agree to take to give effect to this cooperation may 
form the subject of special agreements with each other.
ARTICLE I I
In order to ensure the realisation and effect application of the coopera­
tion provided for in Article I above, the competent authorities of the 
High Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as 
soon as the present Pact enters into force. These measures will become 
operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of 
the High Contracting Parties.

The High Contracting Paritcs undertake to refrain from any interference 
whatsoever in each other's internal affairs. They will settle any dispute 
between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United 
Nations Charter.
ARTICLE IV
The High Contracting Parties declare lhat the dispositions of the present 
Pact are not in cotradiction with any of the international obligations 
contracted by either of them with any third state or stales. They do not 
derogate from, and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said 
international obligations. The High Contracting Parlies undertake not to 
enter into any international obligation incompatible with the present 
Pact.
ARTICLE V
The Pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab League 
or any other state actively concerned with the security and peace in this 
region and which is fully recognized by both of the High Contracting 
Parties. Accession shall come into force from the date of which the in­
strument of accession of the concerned is deposited with the Minsitry of 
Foreign Affairs of Iraq.
Any acceding State party to the present Pact may conclude special 
agreements, in accordance with Article 1, with one or more stales palies 
to the present Pact. The competent authority of any acceding State may 
determine measures in accordance with Article 2. These measures will 
become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Govern­
ment of the Parties concerned.
ARTICLE VI
A Permanent Council of ministerial level will be set up to function 
within the framework of the purposes of this Pact when at least four 
Powers become parties to the Pact.
The Council will draw up its own rules of procedure.
This Pact remains in force for a period of Five years renewable for other 
five year periods. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from the Pact 
by notifying the other Parties in writing of its desire to do so, six 
months before the expiration of any of the above-mentioned periods, in 
which case the Pact remains valid for other Parties.
ARTICLE V III
This Pact shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties and ratifications 
shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall 
come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.
IN WITNESS whereof, the said Plenipotentiaries have signed the 
present Pact in Arabic, Turkish and English all three texts being equally 
authentic except in the case of doubt when the English text shll prevail.
DONE in duplicate at Baghdad this second day of Rajab 1374 Hijri cor­
responding to the twenty-fourth day of February 1955.
(Signed) Nuri Al-Said
For His Majesty The King of Iraq
(Signed) Burhanuddin Bash-Ayan
For His Majesty The King of Iraq
(Signed) Adnan Mcndcrcs]
For the President of the Turkish Republic
(Signed) Fuat Koprulu
For the President of the Turkish Republic

BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1 Primary Material
In this category, the public record office is dominant. The 
FO 371 category reveal much unresearched material. The minutes from 
both the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office are 
in this section because of the interest both these departments have 
in Pakistan. Despatches from the British High Commision in Karachi 
are also here, as well as outward instructions. The American 
material was mostly in the Central File index at the National 
Archives, but the Embassy Files at Suitland were also useful. The 
Eisenhower Library was useful in providing a glimpse of the 
rationale behind American thinking of this period but the bulk 
of the papers were available in Washington.
Published
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, VI, II, Asai and the 
Pacific, Washington, 1977.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-4, XI, II, Africa and 
South Asia, Washington, 1983
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-57, VIII, South Asia, 
Washington, 1987.
Pakistan, the Heart of Asia, Speeches by Liaquat Ali Khan. Harvard 
University Press, 1950.
V
\
>
Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan, ed. K.Sarwar Hasan, 
Karachi, 1966.
Secondary Material 
Memoirs
Eden, Sir Anthony, * Full Circle1. Cassell, 1960 
Eisenhower, D. Waging Peace. Heinemann. 1966.
Hyder, Sajjad, Ike. Foreign Policy ol Pakistan, Reflections at an 
Ambassador. ', Progressive Publishers, 1987.
Khan, Ayub, ' Friends. Mot Masters, Oxford University Press, 1967.
McGhee, George, * Envoy to. the_ Middle World' > Harper and Row, 1983.
Menon, K. , The Lamp and the Lamp Stand, London, 1967.
Menzies, Sir Robert, Afternoon Light. Cassell, 1967.
Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956. Jonathan Cape. 1978.
Sulzenberger, C.L. , L Long Row of Candles j_ memori pr and diaries
MacDonald, 1969.
Articles
Afroze, Sultana, 'Pakistan and the 1951 Middle East defence plan : 
the U.S. and U.K. positions', Asian Affairs, Volume XIX, June 1988.
Aldrich, R. and Coleman, M., 'Britain and the Strategic Air 
Offensive against the Soviet Union : The question of South Asian Air 
Bases, 1945-49', History, October 1989.
Brands, H.V. , 'India and Pakistan in American Strategic Planning, 
1947-54, The Commonwealth as a collaborator', Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, Volume XV, October 1986.
Harrison, Selig, 'Case history of a mistake', New Republic, 10 
August 1959.
SC'
Jalal, Ayesha, 'India's partition and the defence of Pakistan : An 
historical perspective'. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 
May 1987, Volume XV, So. 3
Jalal, Ayesha, 'Towards the Baghdad Pact : South Asia and the Middle 
East defence in the Cold Var', International History Review, 1, August 
1989.
McMahon, R.J., United States Cold Var Stategy in South Asia : Making 
a military commitment to Pakistan, Journal of American History, Vol.74,3 
December 1988.
Singh, A.I., Imperial Defence and the Transfer of Power in India' 
International History Review, Volume IV, November 1982.
General Background Studies 
Barnet, R. J. , Allies i_ America, Europe and Japan since, the. mu,
Cape, 1984.
Burke, S.M., Pakistan's Foreign policy, Oxford University Press,
1973.
Callard, Keith, Pakistan j_ & political study. George Unwin and 
Allen, 1957.
Chaudhri, M.A., Pakistan and the Regional Pacts. Karachi, 1988 
Choudhry, G.V. , India. Pakistan. Bangladesh and the. Great P.QMer.S,
Sew York, 1975.
Cohen, Stephen, The Pakistan Army, University of California Press, 
1984.
Goswami, B.S., Pakistan and China, a study ol their relations,
Allied Publishers, 1971.
CQRRIQEffPA
1. Contents page : For Chapter 6, read Chapter 5.
2. Page 29. Lines 3-4 from bottom should read 'when he was told by
Ikrammullah to be careful in dealing with the Russians'.
3. Page 34. Line 9 from bottom should read 'The Department officials
appeared...'
4. Page 38. Line 5 'Ispahani'.
5. Page 48. Line 1 'Shadow of the Quaid-e-Azam'.
6. Page 48 Line 10 should read 'the fact that he came from a part of 
Central India left Liaquat without a natural constituency, and made him 
feel an outsider.'
7. Page 86. Line 8 For 'regiment', read 'brigade'.
8. Page 113. Line 1 should read 'even if it was "in certain respects
unpalatable to us" ' .
9. Page 123. Line 7 from bottom after 'discounted' delete 'on'.
10. Page 124. Line 7 after 'one of' add 'which'.
11. Page 125. Line 3 for 'Malay' read 'Malaya'.
12. Page 132. Line 8 should read 'He added that his country had the
'bodies' that were needed'.
13. Page 141. 2 lines from bottom should read 'although acceptance of the 
invitation itself did not necessarily mean acceptance of the terms of
membership, it was an important gesture' .
14. Page 155, Line 12 should read 'he says that they were concerned at
possibly having to provide troops, not only to protect fellow-members of
SEATO, but also to cover those areas the treaty was trying to defend, such 
as Indo-China' .
15. Page 168. Last line for 'and' read 'over'.
16. Page 171. Line 10 should read 'but in the post-war position this
position came under fire',
17. Page 172. Line 13 after 'the use of two air-bases' read 'and the right 
to station troops'.
18. Page 187-8. Delete.
19. Page 216. 4 lines from bottom for 'doubtful qualities' read 'doubtful
quantities' .
20. Page 226. Line 13 sentence should read 'Suhrawardy was seen as a 
tougher proposition than Mohammed Ali being sympathetic to the Egyptian 
stance'
rage nasr line snouia reaa r :
conference which had let down' etc.
24, Pages out of sequence : page 261 - 262
262 - 261
263 - 264
264 - 263
21. Page 236. Last line should read 'these plans to Mirza, who (James was 
sure) would have told him' .
22. Page 251. For reference '123' read '139'.
23. P 252. L t h ld d 'Mirza rebuked them for their stance at 
the 
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